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ABSTRACT 
The non-proliferation treaty regime the international community has utilized for over half 
a century is insufficient to combat emerging global threats, specifically, WMD terrorism. 
The current landscape of transnational terrorism requires a major shift in U.S. 
nonproliferation policies if the current regime is going to address WMD threats and the 
proliferation of weapons and materials by non-state actors adequately. From a policy 
perspective, nonproliferation and counterterrorism still largely operate as separate and 
distinct missions which creates a disconnect that can be exploited. Recent efforts have 
been instituted in an attempt to fill gaps but they still fall short because these measures 
operate in the absence of an overarching international framework, which results in the 
failure to capture fully the integration of the convergence of issues in the fields of 
counter-proliferation transnational terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction. This 
thesis explores how the traditional non-proliferation policy regime can be connected to 
domestic homeland security efforts as an effective counter-terrorism strategy. It 
recommends a modern policy approach, including leveraging the non-proliferation 
framework already in existence, by supplementing with efforts to combat international 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Since its inception, the non-proliferation policy regime has focused on preventing the 
emergence of new nuclear nations; however, the old paradigm of nation state 
confrontation is no longer the only threat. The non-proliferation treaty regime that the 
international community has utilized for over half a century is insufficient to combat 
emerging global threats, specifically, WMD terrorism. The current landscape of 
transnational terrorism requires a major shift in U.S. non-proliferation policies if the 
current regime is going to address WMD threats and the proliferation of weapons and 
materials by non-state actors adequately.  
Recent efforts have been instituted in an attempt to fill gaps but they still fall short 
because these measures operate in the absence of an overarching international framework 
that results in the failure to capture the integration of the convergence of issues in the 
fields of counterproliferation and terrorism fully.  
It appears as if a considerable gap exists between the theoretical aspects of the 
non-proliferation regime and its application for preventing WMD terrorism. Non-
proliferation scholars and terrorist experts approach the threat very differently—from a 
nation-state paradigm based in theory and international norms vs. a criminal threat based 
in criminality and domestic security. Issues of WMD terrorism and nonproliferation are 
stove-piped and approach the issues as “cause” and “effect,” rather than different sides of 
the same coin. From a policy perspective, nonproliferation and counterterrorism still 
largely operate as separate and distinct missions that create a disconnect that can be 
exploited.  
Proliferation challenges are growing increasingly more complex. WMD terrorism 
is a growing threat fueled by broader trends of the 21st century. The rise of transnational 
terrorism, emerging patterns in extremism, and the impacts of globalization, have all lead 
to an increasingly complex environment. Attention to the potential of a catastrophic 
attack using WMD is driven in part by specific incidents, such as the 1995 Aum 
Shinrikyo sarin nerve gas attack, evidence of Al-Qaeda’s desire to develop nuclear 
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capabilities and chemical and biological weaponry, and the discovery of the A.Q. Kahn  
network. These incidents were significant in demonstrating the convergence of issues in 
the fields of counterproliferation, transnational terrorism, and weapons of mass 
destruction.  
The central limitation of using the current arms control regime to prevent 
terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction is that treaties proscribe and 
prohibit the activities of states, not sub-national groups. They focus on thwarting 
proliferation between states and provide only limited value for preventing the 
proliferation of weapons and weapons materials to terrorists and other sub-state entities. 
Non-proliferation measures, cooperative threat reduction, and other arms control 
initiatives can help limit the opportunities for terrorists to acquire or develop WMD if 
written consciously to acknowledge and account for the risks of terrorism. Coupling 
international protocols with domestic security initiatives may provide a greater defense 
than either protocols or detection programs alone. 
In an attempt to address the increasing threat of WMD terrorism, the next 
generation of non-proliferation instruments must address trading, smuggling, and 
trafficking of WMD related materials.  
Two new mechanisms, the Pacific Security Initiative (PSI) and United Nations 
Resolution 1540, have been instituted in an attempt to fill gaps in the existing non-
proliferation regime. However, these efforts have thus far fallen short by failing to 
capture the integration of the enforcement mission (criminal) into the non-proliferation 
regime (diplomatic) fully. Implementation issues further hamper their effectiveness. The 
result is a failure to bridge the gap in the fields of WMD counter-proliferation of WMD 
and terrorism fully.  
In a struggle to limit the spread of WMD, every available tool in the U.S. security 
arsenal must be used and linked to a comprehensive strategy that will help prevent 
individual actors from developing or using WMD capabilities. Bridging the gap between 
diplomatic protocols and the law enforcement efforts will lead to a systematic approach 
in counterterrorism; thereby, closing critical gaps.  
 xv 
This thesis examines how the traditional non-proliferation policy regime can be 
connected to domestic homeland security efforts as an effective counterterrorism 
strategy. It explores how the non-proliferation policy regime can be more connected to 
domestic homeland security efforts as an effective counterterrorism strategy and how 
international/domestic protocols can be revised to include the role of non-state actors. 
Ultimately, this thesis recommends a modern policy approach, including 
leveraging the non-proliferation framework already in existence, by supplementing with 
efforts to combat international criminal networks and overarching counterterrorism 
objectives to keep pace with current threats. Solutions to this new WMD threat may look 
unconventional to the non-proliferation regime but these additions will make all elements 
across the spectrum of approaches more effective. A need exists to accelerate the 
integration of effort among the counterproliferation, counterterrorism, and law 
enforcement communities to address WMD proliferation and terrorism issues to 
strengthen and modernize the non-proliferation regime to deal with the WMD threats of 
the 21st century.  
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I. MAKING NON-PROLIFERATION POLICIES RELEVANT TO 
THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST TERRORISM 
The greatest danger of another catastrophic attack on the United States 
will materialize if the world’s most dangerous terrorists acquire the 
world’s most dangerous weapons. 
       – 9/11 Commission Report1 
The non-proliferation regime began under the Cold War era when enemies were 
clearly defined, theory rational, and catastrophic threats involved other nation-states. The 
reduction of nuclear stockpiles and 9/11 have “stilled the former apocalyptic vision of the 
end of human kind resulting from interstate and intercontinental nuclear warfare and 
replaced them by a rise in concerns about individual acts of nuclear terrorism.”2 
However, the non-proliferation regime, which grew out of the Cold War, has not 
modernized to keep pace with the threats. Nonproliferation and counterterrorism still 
largely operate as separate fields, which misses an opportunity to maximize efforts to 
prevent weapons of mass destruction (WMD) attacks.  
Attention to the potential of a catastrophic attack using WMD is driven in part by 
specific incidents, such as the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo sarin nerve gas attack,3 evidence of 
Al-Qaeda’s desire to develop nuclear capabilities4 and chemical and biological 
weaponry, and the discovery of the Abdul Qadeer Khan network (A.Q. Kahn ).5 These 
incidents were significant in demonstrating the convergence of issues in the fields of 
counterproliferation of WMD and terrorism.  
                                                 
1 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Final Report of the National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission Report), July 22, 2004, 380. 
2 John Simpson, “WMD Terrorism.” in Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Future of 
International Nonproliferation Policy, eds. Nathan E. Busch and Daniel H. Joyner (Athens, GA: University 
of Georgia Press, 2009), 46. 
3 See Sarah Daly, John Parchini, and William Rosenau, Aum Shrinkyo, al Qaeda and the Kimshasha 
Reactor, Project Air Force, RAND Corporation, 2005. 
4 See Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, Islam and the Bomb, Religious Justification for and Against Nuclear 
Weapons, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, January 2011.  
5 David Albright and Simon Hinderstein, “Unraveling the A.Q. Khan Network and Future Proliferation 
Networks,” Washington Quarterly 28, no. 2 (2005): 111–128. 
 2 
Proliferation challenges are now much more complex. WMD terrorism is a 
growing threat fueled by broader trends of the 21st century, including emerging patterns 
in extremism and globalization in an increasingly complex environment. The increasing 
convergence of issues of terrorism, proliferation, and WMD issues highlighted in this 
chapter are fueling the odds of WMD terrorism occurring and making it increasing 
difficult to detect the threats. An increasing number of rogue nations pursuing illicit 
weapons programs, the expansion of nuclear energy programs, and several weak or 
failing states add to the problem. The transnational terrorists’ threat and complicated 
proliferation networks faced today are a very different enemy than that faced just over a 
decade ago. The complex world, in which they thrive, is also very different. These groups 
are both a “product” and “beneficiary” of globalization. If policy makers and intelligence 
want to be able to interdict and stop the behavior, it is necessary to exploit the same 
opportunities criminal networks and non-state actors have been able to. It is absolutely 
essential to think differently about the threats facing this nation.  
A need exists to accelerate the integration of effort among the 
counterproliferation, counterterrorism, and law enforcement communities to address 
WMD proliferation and terrorism issues in order to strengthen and modernize the non-
proliferation regime to deal with the WMD threats of the 21st century.  
A. EFFORTS TO DEAL WITH ISSUES OF PROLIFERATION AND 
TERRORISM 
The history of the proliferation threat (and how it is dealt with) and its link to 
terrorism has differed greatly with changing international circumstances. The fall of the 
Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War dramatically changed the security environment 
but also created unintended consequences. In the midst of chaos following the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union were “loose nukes,” and nuclear material. Fears were great that 
terrorists may be able to gain access to dangerous weapons/and or materials. Then, the 
United States led the international community by introducing the Nunn-Lugar, a 
Comprehensive Threat Reduction Program.6 This program targeted the security of 
                                                 
6 In November 1991, Senator Lugar (R-IN) and former Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) authored the Nunn-
Lugar Act, which established the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. 
 3 
nuclear the stockpile by providing U.S. funding and expertise to help the former Soviet 
Union safeguard and dismantle its enormous stockpiles of nuclear, chemical and 
biological weapons, related materials, and delivery systems The Nunn Lugar program 
was claimed a success. Since its implementation significant reductions in missile 
reduction and security stockpiles and materials have occurred.7 Additionally, the 
Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan are all weapons free. Although work within the Soviet 
Union continues to be needed, and the problem now extends to other countries. 
According to the author of a joint U.S./Russia assessment of nuclear threats said, “If you 
look at the U.S. and Russia together, we own about 90% of the problem—more of the 
weapons, less of the nuclear materials. So it’s only right that these two countries share 
their expertise and look hard at ways to work together to lower the risks.”8  
The world changed once again after the 9/11 attacks in that the United States had 
enemies not part of a nation-state but willing to use means to inflict catastrophic damage 
on a grand scale. At this stage, the potential for the integration of terrorism and 
proliferation was fully realized. Osama bin Laden has called the acquisition of nuclear 
weapons or other WMD a “religious obligation.”9 In addition, evidence shows instances 
of Al Qaeda attempting to develop nuclear capability.10 Al Qaeda continues to “pursue 
its strategic goal of obtaining a nuclear capability.”11 Information seized in Afghanistan 
in 2002 revealed details regarding Al Qaeda’s efforts to acquire WMD. The captured 
documents reinforce assessments that al Qaeda is “highly determined” to obtain nuclear 
weapons and other WMD.12 
                                                 
7 The Nunn_Lugar scorecard can be accessed at http://www.dtra.mil/Missions/Nunn 
Lugar/scorecards.aspx 
8 Comments by Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, First Joint U.S.-Russia Assessment of Nuclear Terror Threat, 
Study Warns of Multiple Dangers, Calls for Urgent Action, Press Release, Belfer Center for Science and 
International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, June 6, 2011. 
9 Mowatt-Larssen, Islam and the Bomb, Religious Justification for and Against Nuclear Weapons. 
10 See Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, Al Qaeda Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat: Hype or Reality?, Belfer 
Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, January 2010. 
11 9/11 Commission Report, 380. 
12 David Albright, “Al-Qaeda’s Nuclear Program: Through the Window of Seized Documents,” 
Nautilus Institute Special Forum 47, November 6, 2002. 
 4 
Shortly thereafter, fears about Al-Qaeda’s desire to obtain WMD was 
compounded by the detection of the A.Q. Kahn  network, which had been able to create a 
transnational criminal network dedicated to funneling nuclear components and expertise 
to several non-nuclear weapons states. Several reports indicated he may also be 
cooperating with terrorist groups including Al Qaeda,13 although that report has not been 
confirmed in open source documents. The Khan network caused enormous damage to 
efforts aimed at stopping the spread of nuclear weapons. Not everything is known about 
Khan’s full client list. He visited 18 countries between 1997 and 2003,14 as well as 
Afghanistan, which was the base for several terrorist organizations at the time including 
al Qaeda.  
Now, this country is in the midst of the next wave framed by the reality of states 
like Iran, North Korea, and Syria—nation-states operating outside the non-proliferation 
regime to WMD programs. The rogue states are pursuing programs operating against 
international norms and despite international pressure. This situation increasingly creates 
potential opportunities for terrorists who may be seeking WMDs. These challenges are all 
framed by the impact of globalization, information exchange, and technology making 
infraction exponentially, harder to detect—and to stop.  
While no doubt exists that this nation now sees terrorism through new eyes and 
has a new understanding of the extent to which this country’s enemies will go, what 
remains is the question of how to leverage U.S. systems to prevent that from happening. 
It is crucial to ascertain how it is possible to leverage what are traditional diplomacy tools 
to be an effective counterterrorism strategy.  
                                                 
13 See for example Mowatt-Larssen, Al Qaeda Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat: Hype or 
Reality?, 17–18; The Indian Express, “Al-Qaeda Sought Assistance from A Q Khan: U.S. Reports,” 
September 3, 2009, http://www.indianexpress.com/news/alqaeda-sought-assistance-from-a-q-khan-us-
report/511914. 
14 Albright and Hinderstein, “Unraveling the A.Q. Khan Network and Future Proliferation Networks,” 
113. 
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B. THESIS OVERVIEW 
1. Problem Statement 
Until now, the main goal of U.S. non-proliferation policies has been to prevent the 
emergence of new nuclear nations; however, an emerging issue may go beyond the 
possibility of nuclear confrontation between nation-states and must now include a 
discussion of how to prevent terrorists and non-state actors from acquiring WMD to be 
used in asymmetrical warfare tactics. The multilateral treaty regimes that the international 
community has utilized for over almost a century to curb the proliferation of WMDs may 
not be enough to combat increased global threats. A major weakness of existing 
multilateral regimes that the next generation of nonproliferation instruments is attempting 
to address is trading, smuggling, and trafficking of WMD related materials.  
It appears as if a considerable gap exists between the theoretical aspects of the 
non-proliferation regime and its application for the express purpose of preventing WMD 
terrorism, both domestic and abroad. From a policy perspective, issues of WMD 
terrorism and non-proliferation are stovepiped and are dealt with as cause and effect, 
rather than different sides of the same coin. Related, non-proliferation scholars and WMD 
terrorist experts approach this issue very differently—from a nation-state paradigm based 
in theory and international norms vs. counterterrorism experts based in criminality and 
domestic security efforts.  
In a struggle to limit the spread of WMD, every available tool in the U.S. security 
arsenal must be used and linked to a comprehensive strategy that will help prevent non-
nation-states from developing or using WMD capabilities. Bridging the gap between 
diplomatic protocols and law enforcement efforts will lead to a systematic approach in 
counterterrorism, and thereby, close critical gaps.  
2. Argument/Hypothesis 
The current non-proliferation regime fails to address efforts needed to combat 
WMD terrorism adequately. Without connecting these two separate camps, gaps are 
created that may inadvertently create more opportunities for terrorists to exploit.  
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The current landscape of transnational terrorism requires a major shift in U.S. 
non-proliferation policies if it is to address the threat of WMD terrorism and the 
proliferation of weapons and materials adequately by non-state actors. Non-proliferation 
measures, cooperative threat reduction, and other arms control initiatives can help limit 
the opportunities for terrorists to acquire or develop WMD if written consciously to 
acknowledge and account for the risks of nuclear terrorism. Coupling international 
protocols with domestic security initiatives may provide a greater defense than either 
protocols or detection programs alone. 
Over the last several decades, the United States has made great strides in tackling 
conventional terrorism but not necessarily WMD terrorism, specifically. Strategies for 
preventive detection have been built on the domestic side, and non-proliferation efforts 
have continued to focus on the international policy level. The weaknesses of these 
treaties, including the lack of universality, verification and enforcement, and compliance 
are gaps easily exploited by terrorists. New layered approaches are needed to prevent 
evolving WMD threats. 
Even though the mention of terrorists potentially acquiring WMD due to 
proliferation issues by nations, the discussion is anecdotal at best. Measures to stop these 
threats have not manifested and been codified through negotiations and documents and 
international enforcement non-proliferation efforts. 
The central argument of this paper is that effective strategies on the state level are 
the requirement for meeting threats from non-state actors. Non-proliferation regime must 
be tied into domestic law enforcement and intelligence, and interdiction efforts. Solutions 
to this new WMD threat may look unconventional to the non-proliferation regime but 
these additions will make all aspects more secure.  
3. Research Questions 
a. Primary Research Question 
How can the traditional non-proliferation policy regime be connected to 
domestic homeland security efforts as an effective counterterrorism strategy? 
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b. Secondary Questions 
How can international/domestic protocols be revised to include the role of 
non-state actors? 
Can traditional diplomacy tools be leveraged to be an effective 
counterterrorism strategy? How can the United States make linkages with international 
diplomatic (strategic) policy and domestic prevention (operational) efforts? 
How to best maximize investments in counterproliferation programs to 
enhance protection of the homeland?  
4. Methodology  
It may be useful to establish a framework for how to better integrate international 
and diplomatic efforts that might lead to greater security. For purposes of this thesis, 
policy analysis will be conducted to identify policy options and alternatives. Academic 
research in the fields of history, security policy, political science, and military science, 
numerous studies by nongovernment agencies and think tanks, and public statements by 
government officials and official testimony, provide a plethora of data for this analysis.  
A qualitative (rather that quantitative) analysis was used to the study this issue of 
WMD terrorism in part because few data sets are available for analysis. Qualitative 
analysis focuses on identifying patterns and synergies in which the combined effect of 
several elements of the system is greater than the sum of the individual effects of each 
alone.15 Moreover, it is more appropriate in the case of WMD terrorism with a limited 
number of incidents, and therefore, small data set.  
Much of the debate of what is known or not known about WMD, especially 
radiological/nuclear, has also been hampered by the difficulty of trying to acquire 
evidence about such a sensitive subject, which has caused doubts about the adequacy of 
this nation’s knowledge and raised questions about whether nuclear proliferation can be 
                                                 
15 Michael Levi, On Nuclear Terrorism (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 9.  
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separated from other processes and phenomena.16 This body of work focuses on open 
source data and does not include a review of classified documents. Policy documents 
regarding international protocols, diplomatic agreements, and policy are readily available. 
Information on enforcement, breaches of security, vulnerabilities, and intelligence used 
for criminal investigations are not.  
5. Review of the Literature 
This literature review provides a reference base from which to understand both 
the non-proliferation policy regime and counter-proliferation policy as it relates to WMD 
terrorism. What can be derived from the literature is the following. First is the possibility 
of non-nation-state actors developing WMD capabilities, the second is the disconnect 
between the issues of nonproliferation and terrorism. The literature review also presents a 
current knowledge on the factors impacting a group’s inclination toward attacks using 
non-conventional weapons or WMD, and reviews the literature regarding the threat.  
An additional non-related trend appears in what is not written; that the majority of 
the literature regarding WMD terrorism predominately relates to nuclear terrorism rather 
biological and or chemical terrorism. As a general rule, the sources consulted for the 
literature review addressed WMD collectively, although a much greater emphasis is 
placed upon nuclear proliferation rather than chemical or biological weapons. This 
literature review addresses attacks utilizing biological and chemical agents, as well as 
nuclear materials. This literature review does not address the effectiveness of 
proliferation issues between nuclear weapons states. 
Biological and chemical terrorism appears to be a secondary concern within the 
literature reviewed. In addition, it does make it difficult to apply the term “WMD” term 
consistently across the entire spectrum of the CBRNE threat.  
                                                 
16 Tanya Ogilvie-White, “Is There a Theory of Nuclear Proliferation? An Analysis of the 
Contemporary Debate,” The Nonproliferation Review, Fall 1996, 43. 
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C. ANALYSIS 
Confusion often occurs due to the multi-faceted and complex nature of 
proliferation dynamics. Those involved in the debate have focused on trying to find 
solutions to what has been called the “proliferation puzzle. However, exactly what is 
meant by this term is not always made clear, and this lack of academic rigor has led to the 
misinterpretation of key contributions, and, ultimately, to theoretical confusion.17 When 
the complexities of this process are considered, it is not surprising to discover that none 
of the existing theories of nuclear proliferation provides a satisfactory explanation of 
proliferation dynamics, although many provide important pieces of the puzzle.18  
The central limitation of using the current arms control regime to prevent 
terrorists from acquiring WMD is that treaties proscribe and prohibit the activities of 
states, not sub-national groups. They focus on thwarting proliferation between states and 
provide only limited value for preventing the proliferation of weapons and weapons 
materials to terrorists and other sub-state entities. Treaties that require signatories to 
adopt national implementing legislation may be the most effective but even those 
arrangements “are hampered by the variances across countries in such legislation and 
states’ failures to provide the financial and political support to law enforcement 
authorities critical for effective implementation.”19  
At the most basic level, the non-proliferation treaties provide valuable normative 
prohibitions. Fundamentally, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the 
Chemical Weapons Convention constitute declarations that the international community 
bans germ and chemical weapons as taboo instruments of war. The norm against nuclear 
weapons contained in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is more ambiguous 
because it allows some states to retain nuclear weapons while prohibiting others from 
acquiring them.20 Nevertheless, its prohibitions, combined with the strictures of the 
                                                 
17 Ogilvie-White, “Is There a Theory of Nuclear Proliferation?, 4. 
18 Ibid., 43–45. 
19 John Parachini, “Non-Proliferation Policy and the War on Terrorism,” Arms Control Today, 
October 2001, http://www.armscontrol.org.  
20 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1968 Treaty on the Non-proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons, 1 July 1968, 729 U.N.T.S. 161, 21 U.S.T. 483 [Non- Proliferation Treaty]. 
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International Atomic Energy Agency, nuclear-weapon-free-zones, and other agreements, 
have contributed to a worldwide belief that nuclear weapons are not acceptable tools of 
war.21  
The non-proliferation regimes lack sufficiently strong norms against WMD when 
used outside of the nation-state construct. This normative deficit is manifested in both a 
lack of codification and legal measures to stop terrorist use and to a lesser degree to the 
international double standard on beliefs regarding the possession of WMD. International 
norms against the use of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons are certainly stronger, 
although of unclear potency in curbing their acquisition.  
All these norms have, of course, been violated at times by certain states that had 
pledged to uphold them. Norms do not shape the behavior of all states or individuals, but 
they shape that of some. They also provide a basis for which to disallow persons or 
groups not of a nation-state from ever legally pursuing the development for capabilities. 
Preventing acquisition, production, stockpiling, or use of chemical and biological 
weapons helps stigmatize them for states, as well as individuals and rogue groups. 
The most pressing case currently to be looked at for lessons are the circumstances 
surrounding Iran and North Korea—two nations taking bold steps to build nuclear 
programs outside of the non-proliferation regime and against the United Nations, IAEA. 
Iran’s nuclear program is one of the most polarizing issues in one of the world’s most 
volatile regions. While American and European officials believe Tehran is planning to 
build nuclear weapons, Iran’s leadership says that its goal in developing a nuclear 
program is to “generate electricity without dipping into the oil supply it prefers to sell 
abroad, and to provide fuel for medical reactors.”22 However, whether the international 
community agrees that Iran is enriching fuel for peaceful, or non-peaceful purposes, the 
real problem becomes in how to deal with Iran as a hostile nation operating outside the 
international proliferation protocols but also how to stop any technology, materials, or 
expertise from trickling onto the black market into non-state actors hands.  
                                                 
21 BBC News, “Iran ‘Resumes’ Nuclear Enrichment,” February 13, 2006, http://www.news.bbc.co.uk. 
22 New York Times, “NY Times Overview Iran’s Nuclear Program,” September 17, 2010, 
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/iran/nuclear_program/index.html 
 11 
The interruption of the A.Q. Kahn  network statement was a significant 
breakthrough for international efforts to uncover a secret network involving companies, 
countries, and specific technologies involved in such sales. The network of sellers, 
middlemen, and manufacturers is very large. The manner in which proliferators bought 
and sold equipment, and information is vital to assessing flaws in current non-
proliferation efforts in the illegal trading of nuclear technology.  
The budget to support counter-proliferation programs between the Department of 
Energy, Department of Defense and Department of State, the federal implementing 
agency, is roughly $1B annually.23 Domestically, the United States has spent another 
billion in investing in nuclear detection technology and building nuclear detection 
programs,24 in addition to creating an agency of Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, 
under DHS, to administer.25 Nevertheless, this technology is far from perfect and the 
chances of finding any such dangerous materials are virtually impossible without 
accurate intelligence information. Unfortunately, technology is not a silver bullet and is 
only effective if part of a comprehensive strategy to stop would-be terrorists from 
exploiting the materials to construct nuclear or radiological weaponry. Nor are the goals 
of this program linked, and nor is the domestic and international mission aligned. It is 
unclear as to how the U.S. government is prioritizing these efforts as prior to 2008, 
nuclear detection programs were averaging about half a billion dollars annually. Obama 
recently reduced that amount to about $300 million annually.26  
Often, U.S. government policy and the recommendations of non-proliferation 
analysts focus on a narrow set of proliferation causes and non-proliferation options. The 
policy instruments available for dealing with proliferation need to expand beyond 
international treaty centered measures and need to work in better harmony with their 
                                                 
23 Brian Finlay and Elizabeth Turpen, 25 Steps to Prevent Nuclear Terror: A Guide for Policy Makers 
(Washington, DC: The Henry Stimpson Center, 2007). 
24 Department of Homeland Security, Budget in Brief FY2007, Budget in Brief 2009, Budget in Brief 
2011. 
25 White House, National Security Presidential Directive 43/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 
14, RE: Domestic Nuclear Detection, April 15, 2005.  
26 Ibid.; Finlay and Turpen, 25 Steps to Prevent Nuclear Terror: A Guide for Policy Makers. 
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domestic security foundations. The theoretical and policy understandings of proliferation 
need to become more explicitly practical.  
Policy makers and experts have long recognized that the most powerful tools for 
preventing nuclear terrorism are those that directly deny nuclear materials and weapons 
to terrorists. Securing these weapons and materials as best as possible in states like 
Russia and Pakistan, and denying them from rogue states, such as North Korea and Iran, 
that may either be unwilling or unable to keep them out of the hands of terrorist, is 
difficult.27 This view is reflected in the literature, and confirmed in a major survey of 
leading experts on WMD.28 A growing realization of thought is being seen that a much 
broader defense can contribute to U.S. security. Much like 9/11. Nevertheless, while 
careful and sophisticated discussions of locking up materials and preventing proliferation 
are commonplace, the quality of this debate over broader defenses is far poorer. Some 
exceptions do occur, but mostly much of the attention is still devoted to the security of 
nuclear weapons and materials. Others have promoted a layered approach to defense 
against terrorism more generally but without delving into the details of the nuclear threat. 
This nation still largely lacks an understanding of how effective broader defenses can be 
against nuclear terrorism, and most importantly, how to go about designing them.29 
Challenges exist with international partners but are also stifled by this country’s own 
internal bureaucracy and governmental organization.  
D. ASSESSING THE THREAT 
The sheer magnitude of the consequence posed by a nuclear weapon in terrorist 
hands has spurred the intelligence community, military operations, and political leaders 
to combat a threat once dismissed as all but nonexistent. Are fears of WMD terrorism 
founded in solid analytical data or are they trumped up creative thinking by analysts bent 
                                                 
27 Levi, On Nuclear Terrorism, 5, See also, Richard Falkenwrath et al., America’s Achilles’ Heel 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1998); Graham Allison, Nuclear Terrorism (New York: Times Books, 2004); 
Charles Ferguson and William Potter, The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism (Monterey, CA: Monterey 
Institute fort the International Studies, 2004). 
28 Levi, On Nuclear Terrorism, 5; referencing Richard G. Lugar, The Lugar Survey on Proliferation 
Threats and Responses, Office of Senator Richard Lugar, Washington, DC, 2005.  
29 Levi, On Nuclear Terrorism, 5. 
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on dreaming up a worst-case scenario? The discussion regarding whether or not terrorism 
poses a viable threat falls into two ends of the spectrum. Proponents argue that the risk 
from WMD terrorism, especially nuclear is a low-probability, but plausible scenario. In 
2008, in one of his first speeches as President, Barack Obama told the American public, 
“the single most important security threat we face is nuclear weapons falling into the 
hands of terrorists.”30 When asked, “What keeps you awake at night?” Secretary of 
Defense Robert Gates, (who served under both the Bush and Obama administrations) 
answered, “It’s the thought of a terrorist ending up with a weapon of mass destruction, 
especially nuclear.”31  
However, opponents argue that a true nuclear threat is technologically infeasible, 
and would not have the desired effect. Further, they will argue that the history so far 
shows that terrorists have chosen conventional weaponry (even if deployed in a new way) 
as the preferred method. One prominent nuclear skeptic asserted that the intent and 
capability of terrorist groups is “fundamentally exaggerated, the likelihood of such a 
group to produce a nuclear weapon to be small and that policy maker are guilty of 
“atomic obsession,” which is counterproductive.32  
A more detailed analysis of the probability of nuclear terrorism follows in 
subsequent chapters. However, this paper relies on the assumption that WMD, including 
nuclear terrorism, is a possibility.  
This thesis is organized into six main parts. 
Chapter 1 lays out the key issues of inquiry and specifies the method for research. 
This first chapter summarizes some of the key issues that will be analyzed or fully in the 
rest of this paper. As background, the core documents that are the basis for the non-
proliferation regime, as well as key international documents relating to WMD terrorism 
                                                 
30 Brian Montopoli, “New Obama Add Focuses on National Security,” CBSNews, July 15, 2008, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-502163_162-4262407-502163.html. 
31 Graham Allison, “How to Keep the Bomb From Terrorists,” Newsweek, March 14, 2009. 
32 John Mueller, “The Atomic Terrorist, Assessing the Likelihood,” Prepared for presentation at the 
Program on International Security Policy, University of Chicago, January 15, 2008. For more see Brad 
Roberts, ed., Hype or Reality? The “New Terrorism” and Mass Casualty Attacks (Alexandria, VA: 
Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, 2000), 207–224. 
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and studies that comprehensively reviewed efforts in WMD terrorism are also included. 
Definitions regarding WMD and the non-proliferation regime are included to provide the 
reader with a common understanding of the terms used throughout this paper.  
Chapter II provides a comprehensive analysis of the literature to provide a base 
from which to understand both the non-proliferation policy regime and counter-
proliferation policy as it relates to WMD terrorism. Additionally, the core documents that 
serve as the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime—the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Biological Weapons Convention—
are reviewed through the lens of emerging proliferation and terrorist threats to analyze 
potential gaps in the core documents. Key United Nations resolutions regarding terrorism 
and WMD that were passed after the 9/11 attacks are also reviewed, in addition to UN 
resolutions following 9/11.  
Chapter III analyzes the how great the threat of WMD (particularly nuclear) 
terrorism actually is. This chapter looks at who may be most likely to commit such an act, 
how they may do it, and whether the terrorist intent (and desire) matches their capability 
to execute such a plot effectively. The examination looks at the nexus between 
proliferation and terrorism, not only analyzing which terrorist groups may be most likely 
the perpetrator, but also by nations of concern, to complete a history of supporting 
terrorists, known proliferation efforts, or weak governments, to increase the opportunities 
for terrorists.  
Chapter IV establishes WMD terrorism as a growing threat fueled by broader 
trends of the 21st century, including emerging patterns in extremism and globalization in 
an increasingly complex environment. The increasing convergence of issues of terrorism, 
proliferation, and WMD issues highlighted in this chapter are fueling the odds of WMD 
terrorism occurring and making it increasing difficult to detect the threats. This chapter 
highlights five issues that must be incorporated into a non-proliferation framework 
design.  
Chapter V assesses current activities, initiatives, and programs aimed at 
preventing WMD proliferation and terrorism, at the two distinct approaches to 
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counterproliferation vs. counterterrorism, which often both address WMD issues from 
differing perspectives. The second half of the chapter examines the history of efforts to 
combat terrorism and weapons proliferation by reviewing some of the key global treaties, 
reports, and domestic efforts to evaluate which may be most effective. Both approaches 
highlight the continuing evolution of these current strategies, as well as expose gaps in 
the strategies that often grow in stovepipes.  
Chapter VI summarizes the research analysis, and indicates that while neither the 
non-proliferation regime—nor its core agreements—should be abandoned, they do need 
to be reinvented to reflect changes in the new world following the end of the Cold War 
and emergence of transnational terrorism. The paper concludes and makes 
recommendations to move forward in the era of new proliferation challenges and 
highlights areas of for additional research.  
E. DEFINITIONS  
• What is a WMD? 
Currently, no single, agreed upon definition for “WMD” from official government 
sources exists. The term “weapons of mass destruction” was originally a Soviet military 
term euphemistically used to denote nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. It is now 
widely used, usually in reference to chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons, despite 
debate over its appropriateness and accuracy.33 
The U.S. legal code defines “weapon of mass destruction” as “(A) any destructive 
device as defined in section 921 of this title (i.e., explosive device), (B) any weapon that 
is designed or intended to cause death or serious bodily injury through the release, 
dissemination, or impact of toxic or poisonous chemicals, or their precursors, (C) any 
weapon involving a biological agent, toxin, or vector (as those terms are defined in 
section 178 of this title), and (D) any weapon that is designed to release radiation or 
radioactivity at a level dangerous to human life.”34 
                                                 
33 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Weapons of Mass Destruction: The 
Terrorist Threat, by Steve Bowman, CRS Reports RL31332 (Washington, DC: Office of Congressional 
Information and Publishing, March 7, 2002). 
34 U.S. Legal Code (18 USC §2332a). 
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The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) further explains this definition by 
stating, “WMD is often referred to by the collection of modalities that make up the set of 
weapons: chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive (CBRNE). These are 
weapons that have a relatively large-scale impact on people, property and/or 
infrastructure.”35 However, the Department of Justice (DOJ) states that any amount of 
CBRN or explosives, no matter how small, constitutes a WMD. Even innate devices or 
hoaxes can have WMD aspects.36  
Recently, the definition is being interpreted as interchangeable with CBRNE. For 
instance, although the National Strategy for CBRNE Standards does not provide a 
specific definition of WMD, it links the terms CBRNE and WMD interchangeably in 
listing recent attacks and is beginning to replace WMD with the more modern term: 
Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives (CBRNE) 
agents remain a grave threat to U.S. citizens. As outlined in the 2010 
National Security Strategy, there is no greater danger to the Nation than a 
terrorist attack with a weapon of mass destruction. The threats are myriad: 
the 1995 Tokyo subway Sarin attacks, the Bacillus anthracis attacks of 
2001, multiple ricin toxin mailings, concern about unguarded nuclear and 
radiological material worldwide, and the attempted New York City Times 
Square bombing of 2010.37  
Recently, the military has also moved away from the traditional battlefield 
definition of WMD to account for CBRNE whether or not they can be categorized as 
WMD:  
Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear consequence management 
(CBRN CM) can be described as the overarching United States 
Government (USG) capability and the strategic national direction, to 
prepare for, respond to, and recover from the effects of a chemical, 
                                                 
35 Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Weapons of Mass Destruction-Frequently Asked Questions,” 
(n.d.), http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/terrorism/wmd/wmd_faqs. 
36 Albert J. Mauroni, “Homeland Insecurity, Thinking About CBRN Terrorism,” Calhoun, September 
2010, http://calhoun.nps.edu/public/handle/10945/24991. 
37 National Science and Technology Council Committee on Homeland and National Security, 
Subcommittee on Standards, A National Strategy for CBRNE Standards, May 2011. 
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biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) incident at home or abroad, 
and whether or not it is attributed to an attack using WMD (WMD).38 
The United Nations introduced the concept of “weapon of mass destruction” for 
Conventional Armaments in 1948 to distinguish nuclear weapons from conventional 
forms. Any weapons should be included that have “characteristics comparable in 
destructive effects to those of the atomic bomb;” hence, also chemical and biological 
weapons.39 The term WMD is still used more widely under international conventions and 
law. The United Nations’ definition, in contrast to the U.S. legal code, underscores the 
destructiveness inherent in a real WMD when it describes, “atomic explosive weapons, 
radioactive material weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons, and any weapons 
developed in the future which have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to 
those of the atomic bomb or other weapons.”40 
The Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996, also known as 
the NLD (Nunn-Lugar-Domenici) Act defines a “weapon of mass destruction” as “any 
weapon or device that is intended, or has the capability, to cause death or serious bodily 
injury to a significant number of people through the release, dissemination, or impact 
of—(A) toxic or poisonous chemicals or their precursors; (B) a disease organism; or (C) 
radiation or radioactivity.”41 The Robb-Silberman Commission also chose to apply this 
same definition in its report regarding Intelligence and Weapons of Mass Destruction.42 
                                                 
38 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3–41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear 
Consequence Management, June 21, 2012, I–1. 
39 Commission on Conventional Armaments (CCA), UN document S/C.3/32/Rev.1, August 1948, as 
quoted in UN, Office of Public Information, The United Nations and Disarmament, 1945–1965, UN 
Publication 67.I.8, 28. 
40 Ibid., S/C.3/32/Rev. 1.  
41 Congressional Record, Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996, also known as 
the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Amendment (Amendment No. 4349; Senate June 26, 1996; House June 27, 
1996). 
42 Executive Order no. 13328, Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States 
Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, 555, February 6, 2004. 
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F. DISCUSSION  
Establishing a definition of WMD raises a number of questions: does it depend on 
the type of weapon used or the results achieved with that weapon? What constitutes 
“mass destruction” (physical, destruction, casualties, disruption)?43 The U.S. legal code 
definition focuses on the non-conventional nature of the weapon rather than clearly 
demarcating how much destruction the weapon should cause before it is considered a 
WMD.44 For others, particularly in the wake of the World Trade Center airliner attacks, 
the term WMD has come to include any attack means capable of inflicting mass 
casualties.  
It is important to define “WMD” because this label can mask substantial 
differences between chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons in terms of their lethality 
and other impacts, in their ease of acquisition and use, and in their potential appeal to 
individuals with specific motivations.45 It also obscures the ways in which the precursor 
materials to these weapons might be used to affect a population in a way that does not 
seek to exploit the full lethal potential of actual weapons.46 However, the label also 
reflects the important similarities among these weapons. If developed and employed with 
a high level of technical skill, they can create effects quite distinct from those associated 
with more conventional forms of weaponry.  
Commonly, the term WMD is reserved for non-conventional weapons. However, 
WMD may be a misleading terms when linked to terrorist groups since they are far less 
capable than nation-states to take chemical, biological, radioactive, and nuclear materials 
to the next level.47 In using the term in regards to terrorists or outside of formal nation-
state programs, perhaps the term “WMD” seeks to be more aspirational than literal. 
                                                 
43 Gavin Cameron, “WMD Terrorism in the United States: The Threat and Possible 
Countermeasures,” The Nonproliferation Review, Spring 2000, 163. 
44 Charles D. Ferguson, WMD Terrorism” Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Future of 
Non Proliferation Policy, ed. Nathan Busch and Daniel Joyner (The University of Georgia Press, 2009), 24. 
45 Brad Roberts, “Deterrence and WMD Terrorism: Calibrating its potential contributions to Risk 
Reduction,” Institute for Defense Analysis, IDA Paper P-4231, June 2007, 4. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ferguson, WMD Terrorism” Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Future of Non 
Proliferation Policy, 25. 
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Authors and subject matter experts also define WMD in slightly different ways. 
Many define it strictly in terms of non-conventional, large-scale nuclear, biological, and 
chemical weaponry. Some include conventional weapons; others do not. In the trend to 
use CBRNE rather than WMD, other experts avoid the problem by discussing nuclear, 
biological, and chemical weapons rather than WMD.48 Jessica Stern suggests that the 
term WMD means weapons capable of killing many people at one time.49 Hoffman in 
Inside Terrorism, equates WMD with nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons;50 
although, over time, his writing has evolved to clearly delineate the distinctions between 
WMD and non-conventional weapons.  
Still further, although the “nexus” concept originated in the decade before 9/11, it 
became a driving force behind U.S. strategy in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. 
Nevertheless, by interlacing the terrorism and proliferation agendas, catastrophic or mass-
casualty terrorism has become synonymous with WMD terrorism. Critics claim this 
diverts attention from potential attacks of equal lethality employing more-readily 
obtainable conventional means. 
However, the term is still relevant because perhaps it is important to use WMD 
because extremists have embraced the term for their own use. In 2003, a Saudi cleric 
issued a fatwa regarding the moral case for mass casualty attacks on noncombatants. It 
has been set out in a fatwa entitled, “A Treatise on the Legal Status of Using Weapons of 
Mass Destruction on the Infidels.”51 Indeed, Bin Laden stated in an interview, that “it is 
the duty of Muslims to possess them [WMD],” and that “the United States knows that 
with the help of Almighty Allah the Muslims today possess these weapons.”52  
48 Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, and Bradley Al Thayer, America’s Achilles Heel: 
Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998). 
49 Jessica Stern, The Ultimate Terrorists (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 4. 
50 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 196. 
51 Robert Wesley, “Al-Qaeda’s WMD Strategy After the U.S. Intervention in Afghanistan,” Terrorism 
Monitor (Jamestown Foundation) 3, no. 20 (2005) or find OBL Time Magazine, December 1998.  
52 Interview rebroadcast on al-Jazeera, September 20, 2001. 
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For purposes of this thesis, “WMD” is used to describe chemical, nuclear, 
nuclear, and radiological forms of weapons. The definition was derived by focusing on 
the means or type of weapon, rather than the outcome (destructiveness). 
This author concedes that these weapons may not lead to mass casualties or major 
destruction but whose use, or even attempted acquisition, will have far-reaching political, 
psychological, and economic impacts. The term CBRN may be used interchangeable at 
points in this paper. CBRNE captures the concept of unconventional weapons while 
stepping away from the hype and hysteria and implied destruction of WMD. Looking at it 
this way permits a broadening of traditional categorization to include radiological and 
CBRNE weapons also, which are far more assessable to terrorists than state-level WMD.  
• Nonproliferation vs. Counter-proliferation Efforts 
States have constructed policies, and political and legal normative frameworks at 
the national and international levels aimed at regulating the production and stockpiling of 
WMD sensitive material within states, as well as their spread through the increasingly 
globalized channels of international trade to other state and non-state actors.53 The non-
proliferation regime is broadly constructed as “interlocking networks of bi-lateral and 
multilateral alliances, security assurances, treaties, agreements, regulations, voluntary 
controls, and norms that have been constructed over six decades.”54  
The character and orientation of these non-proliferation policies have changed due 
to shifting world politics and events. The end of the Cold War and terrorist attacks have 
forced a restructuring of the nonproliferation polices and laws of many states, as well as 
the structures of international organizations and treaty regimes. Global treaties and 
institutions are supported by implementation elements, such as export controls, national 
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laws and regulations, economic and security assurances, sanctions, and regional 
arrangements.55 
Non-proliferation activities may be broadly described as efforts calculated . . . to 
slow the proliferation of WMD-related technologies and preferably to effect a reversal of 
proliferation trends through requiring disarmament of existing material stockpiles.56 
Counterproliferation is the most recent development in terminology and activity related 
to combating WMD. Counterproliferation refers to military efforts, enforcement efforts, 
or similar proactive efforts to combat weapons proliferation by precluding specific actors 
from obtaining WMD-related materials and technologies, or to degrade and destroy an 
actor’s existing WMD capability.57  
Nonproliferation most often takes the form of treaty mechanisms, export controls, 
and inspection regimes. Counterproliferation represents efforts to cut-off WMD materials 
from being obtained by certain actors or destroying certain actors’ WMD capabilities or 
related materials.58  
The current administration of the United States has promoted a 
counterproliferation approach that places a greater emphasis on proactive coalition-based 
activities, or even unilateral activities as opposed to traditional non-proliferation efforts 
based on multilateral treaties and diplomacy. 
The combating WMD framework is based on a counterproliferation strategy 
developed in response to the threat of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons 
to military forces in the 1990s; however, its scope was broadened after 9/11 to address 
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concerns relating to homeland security.59 Counterproliferation consists of weapons or 
systems that could destroy an adversary’s chemical, biological, or nuclear facilities. It 
comprehensively describes the collective activities conducted by U.S. government 
agencies to prevent foreign governments and other organizations from obtaining WMD 
or from acquiring the materials, technology, and knowledge necessary to fabricate a 
WMD. 
• Nonproliferation (and disarmament) and counter-proliferation 
Issues of nonproliferation and disarmament are intertwined. Perhaps most closely 
related and widely discussed are nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear disarmament. 
Proliferation is the term used to describe the spread of weapons and weapons-related 
materials, technology, and information. Therefore, nonproliferation attempts to stop that 
spread.60 
Confusion often occurs due to the multi-faceted and complex nature of 
proliferation dynamics. Those involved in the debate have focused on trying to find 
solutions to what has been called the “proliferation puzzle” but exactly what is meant by 
this term is not always made clear, and this lack of academic rigor has led to the 
misinterpretation of key contributions, and, ultimately, to theoretical confusion.61 When 
the complexities of this process are considered, it is not surprising to discover that none 
of the existing theories of nuclear proliferation provides a satisfactory explanation of 
proliferation dynamics, although many provide important pieces of the puzzle.62  
Proliferation unchecked could lead to an increased risk of terrorism—or at least 
increased risk of non-state actors able to leverage chemical, biological, or nuclear 
weapons. The shift from nation-states to non-state actors changes the dynamics of 
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nonproliferation. It is this shifting perception of threat that requires attention to link 
nonproliferation to the broader counterterrorism effort. 
G. EARLY COMMISSIONS RELATED TO THE TERRORISM THREAT 
Several Commissions both prior, and post 9/11, made detailed recommendations 
regarding terrorism and the possibility of WMD use in terrorist acts. Of note are the 
Bremer Commission, the Hart-Rudman Commission, the Gilmore Commission, and the 
9/11 Commission. All four of the commission reports discussed made key 
recommendation regarding anti-terrorism policy, steps to protects against and prepare for 
terrorist attacks, as well as intelligence and congressional oversight.63  
The National Commission on Terrorism (The Bremer Commission) pre-dated the 
events of 9/11 and was one of the first commissions to review the evolving threat of 
terrorism. This early commission was created by Congress and led by Ambassador Paul 
Bremer III. The Bremer Commission Report, released in June 2000, concluded that 
international terrorism would impose an increasingly dangerous and different threat to the 
American homeland. The Commission said that today’s terrorism seeks to inflict mass 
casualties, is less dependent on state sponsors, and are forming loose transnational 
affiliations that make terrorism attacks more difficult to detect and prevent,64 and that 
this new type of terrorism would require significant “enhanced efforts.” The report also 
clearly names state sponsors of terrorism including Iran and Syria. Among the 
Commission conclusions were that the first priority for the United States is to prevent 
terrorist attacks and stated that the U.S. intelligence and law enforcement communities 
must use the full scope of their authority to collect intelligence regarding terrorist plans 
and methods.65 In regards to WMD, the report stated that a “terrorist attack involving a  
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biological agent, deadly chemicals, or nuclear or radiological material, even if it succeeds 
only partially, could profoundly affect the entire nation. The government must do more to 
prepare for such an event.”66  
The U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (USCNS/21), also 
known as the Hart-Rudman Commission, was chartered by Secretary of Defense William 
Cohen in 1998 to provide a comprehensive review of U.S. national security requirements 
in the 21st century. USCNS/21 was tasked “to analyze the emerging international 
security environment; to develop a U.S. national security strategy appropriate to that 
environment; and to assess the various security institutions for their current relevance to 
the effective and efficient implementation of that strategy, and to recommend adjustments 
as necessary.”67 Released on January 31, 2001, the Hart-Rudman Commission may have 
been the most exhaustive and comprehensive review of U.S. national security strategy 
since the National Security Act of 1947.  
Nevertheless, absent a national consciousness of the terrorist threat, both these 
reports failed to garner national attention or generate a great deal of reform. Although 
both these reports foreshadow what lies ahead, neither specifically details how to combat 
this emerging threat.  
The Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism 
Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, otherwise known as “The Gilmore 
Commission,” began its work prior to 9/11 but completed its review after the new 
terrorism threat had been realized in the United States in 2001. The Commission released 
its first report in December 1999 and concluded in December 2003 with its fifth and final 
report. The legislation creating the Gilmore Commission directed it to assess federal 
efforts to enhance domestic preparedness and highlight deficiencies in federal programs 
for responses to terrorist attacks.68 The First Annual Report focused on “assessing the 
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threat” in which it noted that a trend towards increasing lethality in terrorism over the 
past ten years has occurred and that terrorists may feel less constrained from using WMD 
in an attempt to cause mass casualties, especially following the precedent setting attack in 
1995 by the Aum Shinrikyo.69 “For the Gilmore Commission, the Aum Shirikyo attack 
marked a turning point in the history of terrorism requiring a “reexamination of the 
motives and means by which terrorists would attempt to accomplish their aims.”70 
However, over time and with the events of 9/11, the Gilmore Commission focus 
morphed from strictly addressing WMD attacks and instead focused on high-probability, 
low consequence attacks. The Gilmore Commission concluded that despite this increase 
in attention and funding, the nation still lacked a comprehensive national strategy that 
could guide efforts to design integrated national domestic preparedness plans to combat 
terrorism.71 Moreover, that national plans must recognize that state and local authorities 
usually provide the first response to terrorist events.72 Perhaps most significant was the 
application of the term WMD, which was substituted for chemical, biological, 
radiological, or nuclear weapons (CBRN).73 For the first time, the term WMD became 
part of the domestic lexicon with a broad application, and even included novel threats, 
such as cyber-terrorism.74  
For instance, Article VI of the NPT dictates that each of the parties to the treaty 
undertakes the mission to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating 
to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and 
on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international 
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control. In most ways, these policies are complementary and not in competition, 
however; they also remain disconnected and non-dependent and fail to fully leverage 
opportunities for international cooperation. 
A latent link exists between the failure of Article VI of the Non Proliferation 
Treaty and the growth of nuclear terrorism. The NPT came into force in 1970 with a 
mission to end proliferation. It is comprised of articles in which each member state is 
bound to adhere to for the treaty to be successful. In spite of this, Article VI—the good-
faith clause—has been manipulated, ignored, or misused. As long as nuclear states party 
to the treaty fail to abide by Article VI, all the honest measures to discontinue nuclear 
smuggling to rogue groups will at no time reach its full potential.  
Foreseeably, disagreements over how to interpret this article is still debated 
between nuclear weapon states that believe that mere agreements to lower the quantity of 
their nuclear stockpiles satisfied Article VI and the ‘beneficiaries’—non nuclear weapon 
states that believe that these states have not met the requirements of the good-faith article. 
However, it is not the relevant argument. The argument should include all nations, both 
NWS and NNWS. If in good-faith, honest steps are taken to rid the world of nuclear 
weapons, and subsequently, nuclear material (not used for peaceful purposes), 
proliferation by rogue groups will be much more difficult and the nuclear black market 
will run itself out of business. Nonproliferation has to begin to mean all WMD. States 
have to understand their actions may intentionally, or unintentionally, fuel the terrorist. If 
the non-proliferation and counterterrorism communities begin to understand that their 
goals are not mutually exclusive, and in fact, are the same. Nevertheless, they also have 
to understand it is the means to get there in addition to the end goal, which should work 
along the same track.  
1. The 9/11 Commission and WMD
The 9/11 Commission was specific in sounding the alarm regarding the threat of 
the potential use of WMD by terrorists. “The greatest danger of another catastrophic 
attack in the United States will materialize if the world’s most dangerous terrorists 
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acquire the world’s most dangerous weapons.”75 Therefore, the Commission 
recommended that the international strategies adopted to combat Islamist terrorism 
should be combined with parallel efforts effort to prevent and counter the proliferation of 
WMD.76 Specific measures included strengthening counterproliferation efforts to enable 
the “capture, interdiction and prosecution of such smugglers;” expanding the 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) by leveraging the intelligence and planning 
resources of NATO, as well as extending participation to non-NATO countries such as 
Russia and China; and finally to continue to support, in an expanded capacity, 
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program.77 It also recommended a Commission to more 
fully investigate WMD proliferation threats in a separate report.  
The Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 
Proliferation and Terrorism—or the Graham/Talent WMD Commission, as it is known—
is a legacy of the 9/11 Commission. A bipartisan, independent commission, chaired by 
two former Senators, was focused on examining efforts on stopping the spread of WMD. 
The famously issued warning in 2008 stating, “that unless nations acted decisively and 
urgently, it was more likely than not that a WMD will be used in a terrorist attack 
somewhere in the world by the end of 2013.”78 It also predicted that the terrorists’ 
weapon of choice would be biological, rather than nuclear.79 It called upon the 
administration to take 13 steps to reduce America’s vulnerability to such an attack.80  
H. TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS 
President Obama touched on the complex issue that now drives weapons 
proliferation and their application to terrorism: 
75 9/11 Commission Report, 380. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid., 380–381. 
78 Bob Graham, Jim Talent, Graham Allison, Robin Cleveland, Steve Rademaker, Tim Roemer, 
Wendy Sherman, Terry Sokolki, and Rich Verma, World at Risk, The Report of the Commission on the 
Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism (Graham/Talent WMD 
Commission) (New York, NY: First Vintage Books, 2008), xv. 
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in Chapter V. 
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We, too, have a choice to make. As the world has become less divided, it 
has become more interconnected. And we’ve seen events move faster than 
our ability to control them—a global economy in crisis, a changing 
climate, the persistent dangers of old conflicts, new threats and the spread 
of catastrophic weapons.81  
Nuclear terrorism poses a grave threat to global security, but seeking a single 
defense strategy falls short. The current non-proliferation regime fails to address efforts 
needed to combat WMD terrorism adequately. Without connecting these two separate 
camps, gaps are created that may inadvertently create more opportunities for terrorists to 
exploit. 
What U.S. policymakers need to create an integrated defensive system that takes 
advantage of the terrorists’ weaknesses and disrupts their plots at every stage. It is fallacy 
to believe that terrorism can be eliminated or that thousands of miles of U.S. borders, not 
to mention the borders of U.S. allies, can be sealed. Initiatives to secure nuclear weapons 
and materials are vital, but they will always fall short unless tied to intelligence and 
international protocols. “Traditional” non-proliferation policy efforts address the issues 
through international diplomatic means but fails to connect to domestic efforts for 
security and detection ventures in the United States.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. CONTEXTUALIZING THE LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review provides a reference base from which to understand both 
the non-proliferation policy regime and counter-proliferation policy as it relates to WMD 
terrorism. In assessing the literature, two key issues arise to frame the discussion of 
terrorists’ proliferation relative to nonproliferation and the terrorist threat. First is the 
possibility of non-nation-state actors developing WMD capabilities, and second is the 
disconnect between the issues of nonproliferation and terrorism.  
This literature review also addresses a third sub-topic; that of presenting current 
knowledge on the factors impacting a group’s propensity toward attacks using non-
conventional weapons or WMD.  
This review does not address the effectiveness of proliferation issues between 
weapons states but is instead limited to those proliferation issues that impact WMD 
terrorism.  
An additional non-related trend appears in what isn’t written; that the majority of 
the literature regarding WMD terrorism predominately relates to nuclear terrorism rather 
than biological and or chemical terrorism. As a general rule, the sources consulted for the 
literature review addressed WMD collectively although a much greater emphasis is 
placed upon nuclear proliferation rather than chemical or biological weapons. Although 
this literature review examines attacks utilizing biological and chemical agents, as well as 
nuclear materials, many studies also described WMD as including chemical, biological 
and nuclear (and on rare occasion also radiological) but more often than not, used a 
majority of examples regarding nuclear, but no other substances. Biological and chemical 
terrorism appear to be a secondary concern within the literature reviewed. Moreover, it 
does make it difficult to apply the term “WMD” consistently across the entire spectrum 
of the CBRNE Threat.  
 30 
The remainder of this summary considers these overarching challenges in further 
detail, as they are manifested across the nuclear, biological, chemical, and nuclear 
(missile) regimes in relation to the existing literature.  
B. CHALLENGES TO THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME 
The non-proliferation regime is much broader in scope than the NPT and 
comprises a wide range of legal and political instruments. International treaties generally 
fall within four categories: (1) those that prevent nuclear explosive testing, (2) those that 
prohibit the development, manufacturing, deployment, or stationing of nuclear weapons 
in certain regional zones, (3) export control guidelines, and (4) those that collectively 
comprise the mechanisms for the global governance of nuclear energy.82  
A systematic examination of the diverse challenges to the nuclear, biological, 
chemical, and missile non-proliferation regimes reveals that although manifested in 
different ways and degrees of severity, most types of challenges are common to all 
regimes. None enjoys universal adherence or compliance.83 All are of limited efficacy in 
meeting their established goals, yet it remains uncertain whether even the complete 
fulfillment of their objectives would be sufficient to sustain nonproliferation.84 Coupled 
with the new challenges, such as terrorism, the regime has significant gaps including a 
lack of comprehensive initiatives to grapple with the new security threats in a world 
without superpowers and post 9/11.  
Moreover, security and political imperatives may overshadow the influence of 
non-proliferation regimes in key regions of the world, while national and international 
developments have significant negative consequences for the regimes. Linkages between 
sensitive technologies, non-proliferation regimes, and conflict-ridden regions create 
vicious cycles in which progress toward one non-proliferation goal may undermine 
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prospects for success in another. International disagreement regarding tactics, strategies, 
and goals, may hinder the international cooperation necessary to sustain the regimes and 
to evolve the regime to be able to deal with new and emerging threats in the WMD world.  
C. PERSPECTIVES ON NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION 
To understand better the issues of WMD terrorism, it is first necessary to review 
the existing literature and theory on nuclear proliferation. Since its inception, non-
proliferation literature specifically focuses on why states pursue nuclear capabilities and 
which non-proliferation efforts are best suited to achieve sustainment, maintenance, 
and/or reversal of these state sponsored programs. The literature on proliferation was not 
as vast and varied 10–15 years ago and centered almost exclusively on proliferation as an 
international policy tool. In the most classic sense, the academic literature of proliferation 
is discussed in terms of preventing states from “going nuclear.” Although few definitive 
conclusions exist, the studies largely break these reasons into three factors: (1) 
technological—that is the scientific capability to develop nuclear programs, (2) external 
determinants that emphasize the willingness rather than the ability, and are heavily 
influenced by a state’s security concerns, and (3) domestic determinants that include 
issues, such as democracy, status, and economics that may influence the desire to develop 
a nuclear program.85  
The realist approach to WMD proliferation centers on security concerns. A fairly 
broad consensus stated that nation-states that face a strong security threat will develop 
nuclear weapons.86 Kenneth Waltz argues that fears about nuclear proliferation are 
exaggerated, “more may be better” since a new nuclear state will wisely use their 
weapons to deter other states from attacking.87 Scott Sagan, the leading proponent of  
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organizational theories of international politics, argues, “more will be worse” as new 
nuclear states will lack the organizational structures to ensure safe and rational control of 
their weapons.88  
The concept of deterrence can be defined as the “use of threats by one party to 
convince another party to refrain from initiating some course of action.”89 A threat serves 
as a deterrent to the extent that it convinces its target not to carry out the intended action 
because of the costs and losses that target would incur. In international security, 
deterrence is based in diplomacy and has served as a cornerstone to U.S. nuclear policy 
through the Cold War. However, with the end of the Cold War and the end of the 
superpowers paradigm, the theory of nuclear deterrence and proliferation stands in 
unknown territory. As Waltz articulates, his belief is that:  
New nuclear states will be more concerned for their safety and more 
mindful of the dangers than some of the old ones have been. Until 
recently, only the great and some of the major powers have had nuclear 
weapons. While nuclear weapons have spread, conventional weapons have 
proliferated. Under these circumstances, wars have been fought not at the 
center but at the periphery of international politics. The likelihood of war 
decreases as deterrent and defensive capabilities increase. Nuclear 
weapons make wars hard to start. These statements hold try for small as 
well as big power. Because they do, the gradual spread of nuclear weapons 
is more to be welcomed than feared.90  
The opposing view is that relying on nuclear weapons to deter greater conflict is 
flawed and bound to fail catastrophically at some time. With his arguments, Sagan tries to 
counter the “deterrence as security” theory by discussing that the gradual spread of 
nuclear weapons to additional states might be a good thing as nuclear deterrence is the 
only way to maintain stability in conflict situations. The risk of deterrence failures is too 
big, especially in military-run and weak civilian governments.91 
                                                 
88 Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 48–49. 
89 K. Huth, “Deterrence and International Conflict: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Debate,” 
Annual Review of Political Science 2, (1999): 24–25. 
90 Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 45.  
91 Scott Sagan, “The Perils of Proliferation: Organizational Theory, Deterrence Theory and the Spread 
of Nuclear Weapons,” International Security 18, no. 4 (Spring 1994): 66–107. 
 33 
Why nation-states may choose to go nuclear, and what it is necessary to do to 
manage that situation, is relevant to this study only in terms of how that may impact non-
state actors to acquire nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons capability. Conspicuously 
absent in the literature of the foundational debates on proliferation is the role of non-state 
actors or terrorism. 
During the Cold War and in the immediate years following its demise, the 
discussion regarding nuclear weapons falling into the wrong hands was largely limited to 
“rogue nations” that would either be willing to gain nuclear capabilities from others or 
may be willing to give terrorist groups access to weapons or materials. However, these 
discussions were always framed from a nation-state perspective. Along with increased 
incidents of global terrorism, in a dynamic and uncertain security environment, emerging 
nuclear and other WMD threats—both proliferation and terrorism are seen as growing 
dangers giving rise to increasing global security. However, after the security environment 
changed in 2001, a growing concern arose regarding how non-state actors fit into this 
picture of proliferation and whether terrorists would ever try to develop WMD capability. 
The fallout from nation-state proliferation in a new security environment heavily 
focused on terrorism include unsecured nuclear materials as seen in the former Soviet 
Republics, states with poor control over nuclear stockpiles, states that may be unwilling 
to keep nukes from terrorists, such as North Korea, unstable nations like Pakistan that 
make its stockpiles vulnerable, and knowledge transfers, such as was seen in the A.Q. 
Khan network that originated in Pakistan. Various State Department threat assessments 
conclude that although terrorist organizations will continue to seek a WMD capability 
independent of state programs, sophisticated WMD knowledge and resources of a state 
could enable a terrorist capability.92  
Graham Allison highlights the nuclear threats posed both by states and by non-
state actors. His focus shifts between blocking terrorist access to fissile material and 
denying the emergence of new nuclear weapons states. Allison proposes a number of 
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varied measures, especially for keeping fissile materials out of the hands of terrorists.93 
While more strongly securing materials at their source to deny terrorist (and also rogue 
state) access to materials is largely recognized as the most powerful tools in preventing 
WMD terrorism, (especially nuclear terrorism) discussion is lacking on a broader defense 
strategy. If U.S. policymakers hope to grapple with the full range of nuclear terrorist 
threats, they will need a more complete discussion of the differences between these 
dangers, and a prioritized set of recommendations.94 Effective policy discussion will 
require a discussion regarding the differences in terrorist motivations and how these 
differences may impact effective strategies to stop them. 
Former head statesmen including George Schultz, William Perry, Henry 
Kissinger, and Sam Nunn have lately taken up the cause of nonproliferation and 
disarmament and cited the danger of nuclear terrorism as a main concern for the need for 
new security measures.95 As stated in the documentary, “The Nuclear Tipping Point, “the 
accelerating spread of nuclear weapons, nuclear know-how, and nuclear material has 
brought us to a ‘tipping point.’ We face a very real possibility that the “deadliest weapons 
ever invented could fall into dangerous hands.”96 George Schultz makes it clear that the 
threats of further nuclear terrorism weighted heavily in his judgment in his writings on 
nuclear disarmament.97  
Absent total nuclear disarmaments, recommendations are made for maintaining a 
safe, secure and reliable nuclear arsenal.  
 
                                                 
93 Graham Allison, “How to Stop Nuclear Terror,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2004.  
94 William Potter, Charles D. Ferguson, and Leonard S. Spector, “The Four Faces of Nuclear Terror 
and the Need for a Prioritized Response,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2004.  
95 George Schultz, William J. Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, “A World Free of Nuclear 
Weapons,” Wall Street Journal, January 4, 2007, A15; George Schultz, William J. Perry, Henry Kissinger, 
and Sam Nunn, “Toward a Nuclear Free World,” Wall Street Journal, January 15, 2008, A13. 
96 George Shultz, Henry Kissinger, Bill Perry, and Sam Nunn, Nuclear Tipping Point, Movie, 
Produced by Nuclear Security Project. 
97 See interviews of George Schultz in “Confronting a Nuclear Tipping Point” interviewed by Bernard 
Gwetzman, Council on Foreign Relations, March 12 2010; Sarah van Gelder, “George Shultz: No Nuclear 
Weapons,” in A Just Foreign Policy, Summer 2008, as quoted in Yes!.  
 35 
But as we work to reduce nuclear weaponry and to realize the vision of a 
world without nuclear weapons, we recognize the necessity to maintain 
the safety, security and reliability of our own weapons. They need to be 
safe so they do not detonate unintentionally; secure so they cannot be used 
by an unauthorized party; and reliable so they can continue to provide the 
deterrent we need so long as other countries have these weapons. This is a 
solemn responsibility, given the extreme consequences of potential failure 
on any one of these counts.98 
However, details on how this is accomplished, or what the threat actually is, 
remains speculative, at best.  
D. THE INTERNATIONAL WMD NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME: A 
REVIEW OF THE CORE DOCUMENTS AND TREATIES 
Three multi-lateral treaties form the basis for the WMD non-proliferation regime: 
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention, and the 
Chemical Weapons Convention. However, these treaties do not directly regulate non-
state actor behavior and the requirements outlined in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the Biological and Toxins 
Weapons Convention (BTWC) leave substantial gaps, especially given the less than 
universal adherence to these NBC weapons-related treaties. 
1. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
Before discussing the successes and failures of the non-proliferation regime, it is 
first important to discuss the foundations of this regime, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty. The NPT serves as the historical cornerstone for the non-proliferation regime.99 
As ratified in 1970, the NPT is focused on three strategic areas: (1) to prevent the further 
proliferation of nuclear weapons (state-based approach), (2) disarmament of existing 
arsenals, and (3) to encourage and coordinate peaceful uses of nuclear technology.100 
Presently, 188 states are parties to the NPT, which has become the most widely 
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subscribed to international treaty in history.101 Four countries with nuclear weapons have 
chosen to remain outside the treaty regime: India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea.102 
North Korea is the only state to have withdrawn from the NPT, which it did in 2003.103 
Given the wide–ranging and multi-faceted nature of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, 
the relationship to the NPT is both philosophical and practical.104 The NPT is limited and 
it does not create any administrative structures or enforcement mechanisms to support 
it.105 Its role is to offer an opportunity for states that do not possess nuclear weapons to 
make legally binding commitment to remain that way. The treaty’s mandate is to provide 
all of the member states with the means to pursue nuclear energy, while prohibiting the 
production of nuclear arms and eliminating existing arsenals. This treaty is also attributed 
with setting the global attitude towards nuclear arms, and beginning the series of nuclear 
disarmament talks between the United States and Soviet Union during the later years of 
the Cold War. 
The IAEA functions in concert with the NPT as an autonomous international 
organization under United Nations (UN) auspices that was founded in 1957.106 The 
IAEA provides the verification mechanisms that monitor the obligations of the non-
nuclear weapons states under the NPT. Within the world’s nuclear non-proliferation 
regime, the IAEA’s safeguards system functions as “a confidence-building measure, an 
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early warning mechanism, and the trigger that sets in motion other responses by the 
international community if and when the need arises.”107 
Over the past decade, IAEA safeguards have been strengthened in key areas. 
Measures aim to increase the likelihood of detecting a clandestine nuclear weapons 
program and to build confidence that states are abiding by their international 
commitments. In 1997, the IAEA Board of Governors agreed to a program to strengthen 
and extend the classical safeguards system. The measures boosted the IAEA’s ability to 
detect undeclared nuclear activities, including those with no connection to the civil fuel 
cycle.108 Some could be implemented based on IAEA’s existing legal authority through 
safeguards agreements and inspections. Others required further legal authority to be 
conferred through an “Additional Protocol” as it became known.109  
Since China’s entry to the nuclear club, five additional states have successfully 
developed the bomb (India, Pakistan, Israel, South Africa, North Korea), although one 
(South Africa) subsequently made the decision to dismantle its nuclear weapons 
capability. An additional three states (Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine) chanced into the 
possession of nuclear weapons after the collapse of the Soviet Union and decided to 
relinquish them. Many more states have initiated nuclear weapons programs and then 
reversed their decisions. One state has lost their nuclear program through international 
intervention and military force (Iraq), and at least one other (Iran), is believed to be trying 
to develop nuclear weapons,110 as it holds both the capability and intent to develop 
nuclear weapons. Although its leaders insist at this time that the program is being 
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developed for peaceful energy purposes only, evidence strongly suggests that Iran 
possesses both the intent and capability to develop a nuclear weapons.111 
Currently, three countries, India, Pakistan, and Israel have never signed the 
treaty.112 Of the countries that have signed the NPT, only North Korea has ever 
withdrawn from it.113 This treaty has defined the global attitudes towards nuclear 
weapons and nuclear energy since its inception, and the international community has 
often ostracized those countries that have not complied with it. Its influence cannot be 
understated, but many believe that its future may be in doubt. The treaty was put into 
effect in 1968, and it was decided that it would be put up for review every 25 years. At 
the first review conference in 1995, it was decided that the treaty would be extended 
indefinitely, and that reviews would be held every five years afterward.114 However, 
while the Treaty deals the acquisition and of Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) and Non 
Nuclear Weapons States (NNS), it in no way mentions proliferation issues outside of the 
nation-state framework anywhere in the 11 articles in the Treaty.115 
Utilizing multilateral agreements, such as the NPT and various export control 
instruments, the United States and its allies have sought to dissuade states from initiating 
nuclear weapons programs in the first place—building norms against nuclear 
proliferation and making proliferation practically more difficult. In spite of these efforts, 
however, the intervening four and half decades have seen numerous states pursue nuclear 
weapons to varying degrees of success. 
2. Governance Regimes to Contain Biological and Chemical Weapons  
Nuclear weapons are sometimes referred to almost exclusively under the non-
proliferation regime. However, chemical and biological weapons are also part of the 
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WMD non-proliferation regime as part of an expansive definition under WMD and 
CBRNE. CBW are weapons whose intended means for causing harm is either the toxicity 
of chemicals or the infectivity of disease-causing micro-organisms.116 Legal definitions 
have evolved over time. The 1947 United Nations definition of WMD embraces only 
“lethal” chemical and biological weapons,117 whereas the CBW disarmament treaties of 
1972 and 1993 do not have a delineation between dealing with “lethal and non-lethal” 
and all CBW alike.  
One author asserts that the term “nonproliferation” is problematic in its 
application to CBW because in his words, “international law is now either approaching, 
or depending on one’s point of view, has long since reached the point at which any 
possession of CBW is illegal.”118 To use the term “nonproliferation” in the context of 
CBW term is to imply that the regime is failing.119 The alternate argument is that 
nonproliferation is applicable because threats do exist and CBW weapons are possible. 
For instance, in the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq decided to use chemical weapons against Iran and 
Iran decided to deploy chemical weapons in response.120 Incidents, such as use in the 
Iran/Iraq War,121 Iraq’s use against its Kurdish population,122 or Syria’s admitted 
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stockpile of chemical weapons,123 and alleged biological weapons program,124 or any 
other rogue nation with the intent to develop a program, makes it necessary to keep 
proliferation efforts current.  
The 1925 Geneva Protocol builds on earlier international agreements, and is 
widely considered to have become customary international law, thereby becoming 
binding on all states whether they have or have not formally joined the treaty.125 The 
Geneva Protocol is an international treaty whose members have agreed among 
themselves not to use CBW against one another. However, one key difference between 
nuclear weapons and chemical and biological weapons is that no state has the authority to 
legally possess CBW under the 1925 Geneva Protocol and has been upheld under several 
supplemental United Nations resolutions.126  
The Cold War escalated WMD as an offensive weapons race between the Soviet 
Union and the United States. Under the auspices of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament 
Conference and its successor entities, diplomats returned to negotiations aimed at 
banning such weapons. Following the conclusion of the NPT in 1968, the UN 
disarmament community and the arms control community more broadly turned again to 
the CBW topic. At that time, a long-standing stalemate was broken with the decision to 
separate the problems of chemical and biological weapons, in the belief that the 
biological problem was more susceptible to rapid negotiation.127 
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The two documents were developed in the latter half of the 20th century, 
the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention 
(CWC). Together, the BWC and CWC form the core of the CBW governance regime.128  
3. The Biological Weapons Convention
For decades, the effort to combat the problem of biological weapons (BW) has 
been at the margins of the global nonproliferation and disarmament effort, which 
reflected a widespread notion that the problem they posed was not particularly severe, as 
well as confidence that the strategy in place to address the problem was, by and large, 
effective. 
The BWC was ratified in 1975.129 Signatories agree to renounce germ weapons to 
“exclude completely” the possibility of such weapons being used against human beings, 
animals, or plants. The BWC uses a general purpose criteria and extends to all 
“microbrial or other biological agents or toxins whatever their origin or method of 
production, of types and quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective 
or other peaceful purposes.”130 The BTWC builds on the prohibitions against the use of 
biological weapons as agreed in The Hague Declaration of 1899,131 the Treaty of 
Versailles in 1919,132 and the Geneva Protocol, when in 1925,133 negotiators agreed to a 
ban on the use, but not possession, of chemical and biological weapons. The BWC is a 
multilateral treaty of indefinite duration open to any country. The BTWC bans the 
development, production, acquisition, transfer, retention, and stockpiling of biological 
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and toxin weapons, as well as referencing the already existing prohibitions against their 
use. It was the first multilateral disarmament treaty to ban an entire category of weapons, 
and 163 states are parties to the convention,134 with 13 additional treaty signatories.135  
State parties to the BWC are obligated not to develop, produce, stockpile, or 
otherwise acquire or obtain microbial or other biological agents or toxins of types and in 
quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful 
purposes.136 State parties are also required to “destroy, or to divert to peaceful purposes, 
all agents, toxins, weapons, equipment, and means of delivery.”137 Finally, state parties 
may not “transfer to any recipient, and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce to 
manufacture or otherwise acquire any of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment, or 
means of delivery”; and to take necessary measures to prohibit the above within their 
own territories.138 Enforcement mechanisms for the BWC are troubling, as with the 
IAEA to the NPT, and the OPCW to the CWC, no such organization to the BTWC exists. 
Efforts in the mid-1990s were unsuccessful in establishing legally binding 
protocols. Today no formal verification regime or monitoring body for the BWC exists. 
Instead, the convention relies on cooperation and confidence building measures among 
states.139 The 2006 Review Conference has made positive progress on efforts towards 
universalization but progress on the implementation of the BWC has been slower due to 
the lack of a formal verification mechanism.140 Also at issue remain verification and 
compliance issues.  
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4. The Chemical Weapons Convention 
Ratification of the BWC was followed in 1993 by the CWC, which entered into 
force in 1997.141 Formation of the CWC took many years, which demonstrates the slow 
motion of large multilateral treaty regimes. Negotiations towards the CWC stretch back 
to 1980, while the actual treaty was concluded and opened for signature in 1993. As per 
treaty provisions, the CWC entered into force after being ratified by the 65th state party, 
thus bringing the treaty into force in 1997.142 
As the full convention title describes, states parties to the CWC are prohibited 
from developing, producing, stockpiling, acquiring, transferring, and using chemical 
weapons directly or indirectly under any circumstances.143 It is prohibited to assist, 
encourage, or induce others to engage in the banned activities as well. Article II of CWC 
limits the chemicals covered under the treats to “toxic chemicals and their precursors” 
and continues to define a toxic chemical as “any chemical which through its chemical 
action on life processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation, or permanent harm to 
humans or animals.”144 
The CWC created the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 
(OPCW) as its monitoring and verification body.145 The convention requires states 
parties to implement national legislation of CWC provisions and establish a national 
authority to oversee the implementation.146 Issues of noncompliance are dealt with by the 
OPCW, which may take measures ranging from requesting a state party to redress a 
particular situation to a referral of the situation to the UN Security Council.147  
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The Persian Gulf War brought matters to a political head when Iraq’s 
unconventional weapons led to a major international effort to strengthen the global treaty 
regime by expanding the authority of the IAEA, bringing to rapid conclusion negotiation 
of the CWC, and by strengthening the BWC through the addition of a monitoring 
protocol. However, while providing extensive declaration, verification, compliance, and 
enforcement mechanisms to combat the use and proliferation of chemical weapons, the 
CWC regime is still a work in progress. Challenges for the CWC include the effects and 
consequences of potential destruction deadline violations, increasing the adoption of 
domestic legislation by states parties, and dealing with many states’ increasing interest in 
developing and possessing riot control agents.  
Of issue to both the BWC and the CWC is the adapting to terrorist threats since 
the convention has limited applicability to non-state actors. Currently, the impact of 
technological change on the problem is of increasing concern, as the diffusion of 
advanced technologies empowers new BW actors, creates new BW possibilities, and 
undermines the viability of traditional arms control approaches. Indeed, as the Aum 
Shinrikyo cult in Japan was the first (and only) documented biological and weapons 
attack by a non state actor. Nevertheless, a host of militia-related activities in the United 
States has signaled rising terrorist interest in biological weapons. In a recent statement, 
President Obama cited that the Syrian program has the potential for CBW to fall into the 
terrorist and militant hands.148  
Despite the reduction of threats as an increasing number of states fulfill their 
commitments under international conventions, a small number of states still maintain 
declared and undeclared stockpiles, and even active BW and CW programs. A 
biotechnology revolution is making biotechnology more readily available and presents a 
potential future proliferation risk. Dual-use chemical processes also present a series of 
ongoing challenges. Both present opportunities for not only for nation-states but also for 
terrorist groups.  
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E. TERRORISM IN THE PROLIFERATION LITERATURE 
A review of the core documents and literature reveal that proliferation concerns 
are built upon a nation-state paradigm. The role of individual (non-governmental actors) 
were not considered threats for WMD terrorism and instead only referenced threats from 
nation-states resulting in war.149 Until very recently, the non-proliferation regime never 
even considered non-state actors. However, with the advent of 9/11, the international 
community began to consider how to include elements to combat terrorism in the 
existing, and evolving norms. No multilateral regime before the PSI and Resolution 1540 
directly addressed these crucial avenues by which WMD materials are traded. The matter 
was largely left to law enforcement and border patrol in individual nation-states.150 
One of the first acknowledgements of terrorism as a security threat was in the 
2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction National Security 
Presidential Directive 17, (NSPD-17), which the president signed in September 2002.151 
In it, the strategy stated “WMD (WMD)—nuclear, biological, and chemical,—in the 
presence of hostile states and terrorists represent one of the greatest security challenges 
facing the United States.”152 According to the strategy, the Bush Administration’s 
approach to dealing with WMD rests upon “three pillars:” counterproliferation, 
nonproliferation, and WMD consequence management.153 In his statements, President 
Bush said,  
We will not permit the world’s most dangerous regimes and terrorists to 
threaten our Nation and our friends and allies with the world’s most 
destructive weapons.154 
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F. 2010 NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW 
Despite the language put forward in the Strategy to Combat WMD by the Bush 
Administration in September 2002, in the Nuclear Posture Review released just eight 
months before 9/11, declassified portions contained no mention of “preventing nuclear 
terrorism.”155 However, in 2010, the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) released by the 
Obama Administration places the prevention of nuclear terrorism and proliferation at the 
“top of the policy agenda.”156  
In his April 2009 speech in Prague, President Obama highlighted 21st century 
nuclear dangers, declaring that to overcome these grave and growing threats, the United 
States will “seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.”157 The 
2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) outlines the Administration’s approach to 
promoting the President’s agenda for reducing nuclear dangers and pursuing the goal of a 
world without nuclear weapons as he outlined in his 2009 speech in Prague. The NPR 
describes fundamental changes in the international security environment, and focuses on 
five key objectives of the U.S.’ nuclear weapons policies and posture. 
• Preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism 
• Reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in U.S. national security 
strategy 
• Maintaining strategic deterrence and stability at reduced nuclear force 
levels 
• Strengthening regional deterrence and reassuring U.S. allies and partners 
• Sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal158 
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The NPR reflects the President’s national security priorities and the supporting 
defense strategy objectives identified in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review. Most 
importantly, for the first time, a national strategy clearly recognizes America’s nuclear 
arsenal, and the threat of nuclear terrorism are interconnected issues, and that unless 
proliferation trends are reversed, the likelihood of terrorists obtaining nuclear weapons 
increases, which indicates that it may mean that the manner in which the United States 
handles its nuclear weapons will have to change. As is stated in the 2010 NPR: 
As President Obama has made clear, today’s most immediate and extreme 
danger is nuclear terrorism. Al Qaeda and their extremist allies are seeking 
nuclear weapons. We must assume they would use such weapons if they 
managed to obtain them. The vulnerability to theft or seizure of vast 
stocks of such nuclear materials around the world, and the availability of 
sensitive equipment and technologies in the nuclear black market, create a 
serious risk that terrorists may acquire what they need to build a nuclear 
weapon.159 
For the first time, the United States explicitly stated its approach to preventing 
nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism to include three key elements. The first is to 
“seek to bolster the nuclear non-proliferation regime and its centerpiece, the NPT, by 
reversing the nuclear ambitions of North Korea and Iran, strengthening International 
Atomic Energy safeguards and enforcing compliance with them, impeding illicit nuclear 
trade, and promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy without increasing proliferation 
risks.” The second includes an acceleration of efforts to implement policies to secure all 
vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide in four years, and finally to strengthen arms 
control efforts—including the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, ratification of the 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and negotiation of a verifiable Fissile Material 
Cutoff Treaty—as a means of “strengthening our ability to mobilize broad international 
support for the measures needed to reinforce the non-proliferation regime and secure 
nuclear materials worldwide.”160 
Relative to goals specific to terrorism is the call for enhancing national and 
international capabilities to disrupt illicit proliferation networks and interdict smuggled 
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nuclear materials, and continuing to expand U.S. nuclear forensics efforts to improve the 
ability to identify the source of nuclear material used or intended for use in a terrorist 
nuclear explosive device. Also of note is the renewed commitment of the United States to 
hold any state, terrorist group, or other non-state actor fully accountable that supports or 
enables terrorist efforts to obtain or use weapons of mass destruction, whether by 
facilitating, financing, or providing expertise or safe haven for such efforts.161 
G. UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS 
Following the U.S. lead, the international community also reacted with a 
comprehensive response to transnational terrorism and the WMD terrorism by using the 
United Nations.  
Directly reflecting the concerns that the 9/11 attacks could have been even more 
devastating if the terrorists would have had access to chemical, biological, or nuclear 
weapons, the United Nations adopted Resolution A/57/83 in 2002, which was the initial 
resolution adopted by the international community to reflect the need to measure to 
prevent terrorists from acquiring such weapons and their means of delivery. The 
resolution language stated that actions were taken based upon a deep concern for “the 
growing risk of linkages between terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, and in 
particular by the fact that terrorists may seek to acquire weapons of mass destruction.”162 
1. UN Resolutions 1540 and 1977 
In 2004, the UN Security Council took its first formal decision on the danger of 
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, particularly to non-state actors. 
Adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 on April 28, 2004 
established binding obligations on all states to refrain from providing any form of support 
to non-state actors seeking WMD, to adopt, and enforce effective laws that prohibit non-
state actors from any involvement with the proliferation of WMD, and to take effective 
measures to prevent WMD proliferation—including security measures, border controls, 
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and law enforcement efforts to prevent illicit trafficking in WMD, their means of 
delivery, and related materials.163 Subsequently, the General Assembly adopted the 
International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, which was 
opened for signature in September 2005.164 
Resolution 1540 represented the first time WMD proliferation was declared to be 
a threat to international peace and security and that non-state actors were specifically 
considered a non-proliferation threat under United Nations protocols. The resolution, 
adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, is legally binding on all UN member 
states. In view of its universal reach and mandatory character, Resolution 1540 exceeds 
previous generic nonproliferation arrangements, which only apply to participating nation-
states, and in most cases, rely on nonbinding guidelines.165  
“By virtue of its universal scope and mandatory nature, Resolution 1540 marks a 
clear departure from previous nonproliferation arrangements and adds a novel layer to the 
non-proliferation regime.”166 This resolution is exceptional in that every UN member 
state is compelled to criminalize the proliferation of WMD (to non-state actors in its 
national legislation, and to establish effective domestic controls to prevent such 
proliferation. “‘Gravely concerned’ by the threat of illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical, 
or biological weapons and their means of delivery, and related materials.”167 
Resolution 1540 requires all states to implement measures aimed at preventing 
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... all States shall take and enforce effective measures to establish domestic 
controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological 
weapons and their means of delivery, including by establishing 
appropriate controls over related materials.168 
In addition, acknowledging that Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups have openly 
announced aspirations to acquire WMD capabilities, the resolution determines that: 
…… all States, in accordance with their national procedures, shall adopt 
and enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit any non-State actor 
to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use 
nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery, in 
particular for terrorist purposes, as well as attempts to engage in any of the 
foregoing activities, participate in them as an accomplice, assist or finance 
them.169 
Chapter VII of the UNSCR 1540, if fully implemented, is intended to help ensure 
that no state or non-state actor is a source or beneficiary of WMD proliferation. UNSCR 
1540 also calls on states to cooperate in preventing the illicit trafficking of NBC weapons 
and related materials, and provide assistance to other states that lack the capacity to 
implement the resolution.170 All states have three primary obligations under UNSCR 
1540: (1) to prohibit support to non-state actors seeking such items, (2) to adopt and 
enforce effective laws prohibiting the proliferation of such items to non-state actors, and 
(3) to prohibit assisting or financing such proliferation. Resolution 1540 recognizes “the 
need to enhance coordination of efforts on national, sub-regional, regional and 
international levels in order to strengthen a global response to this... threat to international 
security.”  
Most notably, Resolution 1540 obligates states to adopt domestic control 
measures to enact controls that include: (a) measures to account for and secure such 
items, (b) effective physical protection measures, (c) effective border controls and law 
enforcement efforts, and (d) effective national export and trans-shipment controls over 
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such items.171 The resolution further calls upon states to promote dialogue and 
cooperation on nonproliferation,172 and to take cooperative action to prevent illegal 
trafficking.173  
In April 2011, the Security Council extended the mandate of UNSCR 1540 for 10 
years.174 The passage 1997 of UN Resolution strengthens the implementation for 
Resolution 1540 by extending for 10 years the mandate of a key international committee 
that has been helping countries build capacity to combat WMD. The vote signaled the 
United Nations Security Council’s commitment to the long-term goal of ensuring 
member states take all necessary action to prevent the spread of WMD and upholds the 
three primary obligations under the resolution: (1) prohibiting support to non-state actors 
seeking WMD, (2) adopting and enforcing effective laws prohibiting the spread of WMD 
to non-state actors, and (3) enforcing effective measures to control WMD.175 
2. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1887 
The Security Council took a third and noteworthy action on September 24, 2009 
when it adopted unanimously UN Security Council Resolution 1887. UNSCR 1887 
reaffirms that the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery are threats to 
international peace and security and shows agreement on a broad range of actions to 
address nuclear proliferation, disarmament, and the threat of nuclear terrorism.176 
The Council reaffirmed, in particular, its strong support for the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, calling on states that were not yet signatories to 
accede to it.177 It also called on state parties to comply fully with their obligations and to 
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set realistic goals to strengthen, at the 2010 Review Conference, all three of the Treaty’s 
pillars—disarmament of countries currently possessing nuclear weapons, non-
proliferation to countries not yet in possession, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy for 
all.178  
However, although the resolution incorporates language on disarmament 
measures, critics note that resolution failed to deliver on any substantial framework for 
progress on achieving President Obama’s call for nuclear disarmament as articulated in 
Prague.179 Arguing in essence, that the resolution fails to gain new ground and essentially 
only reaffirms many of disarmament commitments—essentially non-legally binding 
political statements—by the nuclear weapon states (NWS) during both the 1995 Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 NPT Review 
Conferences.180 
Although 1887 is a reflection of the more “traditional” efforts directed toward 
nonproliferation, it impacts WMD proliferation by broadly supporting better security for 
nuclear weapons materials to prevent terrorists from acquiring materials essential to make 
a bomb by locking down vulnerable nuclear weapons materials,181 minimizing the civil 
use of highly enriched uranium to the extent feasible, and encouraging the sharing of best 
practices as a practical way to strengthen nuclear security. The resolution for the first 
time underscored the Security Council’s authority and vital role in addressing the threat 
to international peace and security posed by the spread of nuclear weapons and 
underscoring the Council’s intent to take action if nuclear weapons or related material are 
provided to terrorists. 
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H. TRENDS IDENTIFIED IN LITERATURE REGARDING WMD ATTACK 
While this section examines some of the basic literature on trends and thoughts 
from prominent scholars on the issues impacting the desire for terrorists to pursue WMD 
for operational purposes, a more detailed examination of WMD terrorism as a threat is 
discussed in Chapter III.  
Within the last decade, the literature on terrorists’ option to potentially acquire 
chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) weapons has witnessed a 
resurgence. Scholarly and practical analyses to the potential of a catastrophic attack using 
WMD have been driven in part by specific incidents. The 1995 Aum Shinrikyo sarin 
nerve gas attack on a Tokyo subway,182 the discovery of the extensive operations of the 
A.Q. Khan network, early evidence of Al Qaeda’s desire to develop WMD programs,183 
and the May 2003 fatwa issued that justified the use of nuclear weapons against the 
United States,184 have all led experts to re-examine earlier conclusion regarding 
terrorists’ use of WMD.  
Since 9/11, a gradual shift in thinking among scholars about the terrorist threat 
has started to appear in the literature. First, that the threat from terrorists acquiring a 
WMD weapon (or the material to make one) is greater than that of a nation-state strike 
against the United States. In fact, in December 2001, a National Intelligence Estimate 
(NIE) warned, “The Intelligence Community judge[s] that U.S. territory is more likely to 
be attacked with WMD WMD using non-missile means—most likely from terrorists—
than by missiles.”185 Secondly, the routine maintenance and deployment of nuclear 
weapons, as well as an increase in covert weapons programs throughout the world, 
increases the likelihood of nuclear terrorism.  
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Although attacks with WMD are plausible, the historical record of the use of 
unconventional weapons is quite limited.186 The few historical cases of terrorist interest 
in, and acquisition of, CBRN weapons make for a comparatively small data set from 
which to formulate general conclusions about the potential for terrorists to use 
unconventional weapons successfully. As one researcher assesses, “In the absence of 
hard data, there are few facts and too many assumptions being made about terrorist 
WMD plans and intentions.”187 
The literature sustains a confluence of trends that could result in an increased risk 
of an attack involving WMD. Four such broad trends repeated throughout the literature 
include the following.  
• The emergence of a new type of terrorist and a resurgence in religiously-
inspired terrorism. Ad hoc terrorist groups motivated by religious 
conviction, jihadists, violent right-wing extremists, and apocalyptic groups 
all of whom are fueled by extremist religious ideologies that rationalize 
destruction and vengeance as both a means to an end, as well as tools to 
achieve a better world.188  
• The dissolution of the Soviet Union, which created a black market in 
weapons, their materials and components, and technical knowledge.  
• Advances in technology and the dissemination of such information reduce 
the difficulty of conducting a WMD attack. An increasing number of state 
weapons programs and dual use technologies in across the WMD 
spectrum have materials more accessible.  
• Finally, a related trend is the involvement of organized crime networks in 
nuclear smuggling and trafficking.189 Globalization is making it easier for 
criminal networks to share information and to operate undetected in illegal 
trade by increasing the capacity of terrorist groups to organize themselves 
into transnational networks for the purpose of coordinating operations 
across different continents.  
As one expert testified before Congress, certain organized crime groups are said 
to have already established links with terrorists. If terrorists manage to find a trusted 
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criminal group in possession of, or capable of providing, SNM in a quality and quantity 
sufficient for the production of a crude nuclear explosive device, or chemical or 
biological agent, the prospect of a WMD attack could become a reality.190 
The overarching consensus is that most terrorist groups will prefer conventional 
weapons to WMD. Such a WMD attack is generally regarded as a “low-probability-high 
consequence” scenario but because of the changing nature of modern day terrorism, 
WMD attacks cannot, nor should not be discounted. A leading expert in terrorism 
emphasizes that catastrophic consequences of a WMD attack require continue vigilance 
and analysis. As stated by Bruce Hoffman: 
Competing motives, such as those raised by religious terrorism, coupled 
with potential opportunity, e.g., ease of access to both the information and 
material required to fabricate and employ CBRN weapons—could portend 
for a bloodier and more destructive era of terrorism in the future. ... A 
combination of unforeseen developments and unexpected technological 
breakthroughs could launch terrorism on a higher trajectory toward greater 
levels of lethality and destruction, perhaps involving even CBRN 
weapons.191 
However, later writings of Hoffman assess the WMD threat a bit differently and 
do not necessarily link increasingly violent terrorist attacks with an automatic escalation 
to the use of CBRN weapons. Despite al-Qaeda’s long interest in acquiring chemical, 
biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons, on the infrequent occasions that it 
or affiliated groups have tried to deploy crude versions of these weapons, their efforts 
have fizzled. In his more recent assessment, Hoffman and his colleague rank mass-
casualty attacks involving true WMD as unlikely to happen.192  
Only one of these trends identified in the literature directly addresses the question 
of motivation, which as Hoffman has observed, remains elusive in comparison to studies 
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of requisite technical capabilities and countermeasures.193 Richard Falkenwrath 
suggested that the study of terrorism is useful for a variety of things, such as 
understanding motivation, but that it could not provide tactical warning, assess threats, or 
set priorities. These predictions are limiting in their linear rational, “a straight line 
projection of the future from the past,”194 and are, therefore, not necessarily part of solid 
predictive analysis.  
One researcher noted that in dealing with this issue, much of the literature has 
been marred by a tendency to “comfortably reiterate the same threat mantra without 
examining more closely certain underlying assumptions.”195 A terrorist groups’ assumed 
preference for conventional weapons over WMD does not replace the need for on-going 
sophisticated threat assessment on motivation: (1) Would terrorists want to cause mass 
casualties, (2) If so, would they choose use nonconventional weapons?, (3) How would 
using WMD help meet their goals and objectives when used against a particular target?, 
(4) How does the terrorist group perceive the impact of using WMD? In answering these 
questions, authors tend to qualify their conclusions against the characteristics of specific 
groups and targets rather than characterizing terrorists as a single monolithic entity.196  
The divide makes more sense when juxtaposed against “old-style” or “traditional 
“terrorist groups, such as ETA,197 the IRA, and the various ‘red’ terrorist cells operating 
in Western Europe during the Cold War, and emerging “new style” threats, such as al 
Qaeda and it affiliates, or Aum Shrinyko, and other apocalyptic sects. As Hoffman 
explains, in the Cold War paradigm, terrorist groups operated under direct control or at 
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the behest of a foreign government, or claimed ethnic or nationalist aspirations. Such 
groups were conservative in their operations, and slow to innovate in their escalation of 
lethality, targeting choices, or skill in defeating countermeasures to conventional high-
explosive attacks.198 “Traditional” terrorist groups sought to preserve their eligibility for 
a seat at the post-conflict negotiating table. In short, these groups regarded themselves as 
fundamentally part of the political process, not separate from it.199 In marked contrast to 
the more traditional terrorist groups, who rationalized its use of violence as an instrument 
for achieving strategic political goals, the violence employed by new terrorist groups is 
far less discriminating and far more lethal as a consequence. New terrorist groups, 
particularly religiously motivated ones, may be freer of such constraints and may see 
WMD terrorism not just as a tool for political change, but a religious duty seeped in 
moral justification. As Cameron has observed, ideologically motivated groups adopt a 
polarizing “us” versus “them” worldview, which offers a moral justification for mass-
casualty attacks.200  
Bruce Hoffman theorizes that the terrorist fundamentally sees himself as an 
altruist. “He believes that he is serving a ‘good’ cause designed to achieve a greater good 
for a wider constituency—whether real or imagined—which the terrorist and his 
organization represent.”201 While this argument is equally applied in both “traditional” 
and more “modern” terrorism groups, it sheds new light into the ease of justification of 
WMD incidents. 
In a separate essay, Hoffman argues that the growth of religious-inspired 
terrorism has already contributed to international terrorism’s increasing lethality and also 
that many of the constraints (both self-imposed and technical) that previously prevented 
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terrorist use of WMD are eroding as well.202 The combination of new motives, different 
rationales, and increased opportunities coupled with enhanced terrorist capabilities may 
lead to a new era of terrorist violence more dangerous and deadly than in the past. As 
Peter Chalk has observed: 
The prevalence of radical religious imperatives [ ... ] has significant 
implications for the lethality of terrorism. For the religious zealot, there is 
essentially no reason to show restraint in the perpetration of violence. The 
main objective is to inflict as much pain and suffering as possible, with the 
enemy typically denigrated as fundamentally evil and beyond all 
redemption.203 
While general agreement exists among scholars and experts regarding the trends, 
researchers are split on their calls for concern. Potter, Levi, Stern, and Falkenwrath all 
assess the danger of WMD attacks as strong concern and realistic threat.204 In the Belfar 
Institute’s report entitled, “Islam and the Bomb,” its leading researcher states, “…al-
Qaeda’s WMD ambitions are stronger than ever.” In addition, “this intent no longer feels 
theoretical, but operational.”205 Richard Falkenrath has argued that scholars focusing on 
terrorism were skeptical of the WMD threat largely because in his view, they regarded 
the threat of WMD terrorism as “highly unlikely and distracting”—a judgment they based 
on observations of the past.  
In contrast, traditionalists have a more conservative call for concern. Experts, 
such as Jenkins, maintain that the WMD threat is greatly exaggerated.206 Cameron 
echoes this conservative view that the threat to the United States by the use of WMD has 
been “overstated and misrepresented.”207 
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I. CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS VS. WMD WEAPONS 
Researchers have generally concluded that terrorists appear more likely to choose 
to employ conventional weapons over non-conventional weapons and will likely choose 
to use what they can readily acquire rather than to go through the technically complex 
process of making weapons from scratch or stealing them from a state’s arsenal.208 In 
describing the potential of terrorist groups to graduate to more sophisticated weapons, 
and the commitment to acquiring nuclear weapons reflects what a RAND Cooperation 
study called the “inexorable escalation “of terrorist goals.209  
In examining whether or not terrorists may prefer conventional weapons is a 
critical correlation not a causality. Whereas evidence exists that the lethality of terrorist 
attacks is increasing (in terms of frequency, number of fatalities and casualties, and the 
places and victims targeted), the resort to WMD does not necessarily follow. As Jenkins 
asserts: 
There is, however, no inexorable linear progression that takes one easily 
from the currently identified spectrum of potential subnational nuclear 
terrorists to actual subnational nuclear terrorists, or from the nuclear 
incidents that have occurred thus far to nuclear actions of greater 
consequence.210 
However, in Cameron’s words, groups have not achieved their “killing potential” 
using conventional weaponry.211 Graham Allison has prophetically observed “You can’t 
kill four million Americans by flying airplanes into buildings.”212 
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Most terrorist groups will weigh choices based on rationality and cost-benefit 
analysis. It must be asked, what can terrorists accomplish with WMD that they may not 
accomplish through more conventional means?  
The use of nonconventional weapons may largely depend upon on the desired 
mission outcome. Palfys research suggest that if the group’s objective is to specifically 
produce large amounts of casualties, they will prefer employing conventional weapons 
systems, while others who are more focused on inciting fear, panic, and general 
disruption—regardless of the amount of resultant casualties—may be more tempted to 
use unconventional weapons.213 
As discussed above, the use of WMD weapons may be fueled by radical religious 
motivation. In similar research by Mowatt–Larrsen, targeted specifically toward militant 
Islamists, he found that the group will employ a rationalized risk-gain assessment in 
gauging its level of interest, motivation, and justification. This expert concludes that the 
“ideology of militant Islamists is extreme, but it is not irrational.” “The motivation to 
possess and use WMD flows logically from an extreme, but very rational set of concrete 
goals that are based on a certain interpretation of history and religion.”214 
However, the use of a CBRNE weapon need not necessarily lead to mass 
casualties. Such a weapon deliberately limited to a small-scale immediate impact could 
have a disproportionate long-term consequence, for example, by generating fear and 
alarm at unprecedented levels.215 Cameron agrees, writing that a group seeking 
widespread coverage absent widespread devastation or casualties might resort to low-
level nonconventional weapons.216 Nevertheless, a convincing claim downgrading the 
likelihood of a WMD attack is that previous documented attacks employing biological, 
chemical, or radiological agents, have not achieved mass destruction. The lack of terrorist 
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incidents involving WMD could thus prove prohibitive; however, it can also signal that a 
successful attack could spawn imitative attacks.  
Jenkins also alludes to the prestige factor, that in attaining a nuclear capability, 
the terrorist group imitates governments whose arsenals place them among the world’s 
major powers, and renders the terrorist group “legitimate” in the eyes of their goal-
sharing constituencies. The terrorist group’s desire to unleash forces with long-term 
consequences may make a WMD device more attractive than conventional weapons. In 
particular, the prestige associated with acquiring a nuclear capability is unmatched by 
chemical or biological weapons. A nuclear device would set a terrorist organization apart 
from any other group, would compel governments to take the terrorists seriously, and 
would represent a “quantum leap” in terrorist attacks.217  
As previously stated, the literature equivocates over terrorists’ resort to WMD. 
The authors giving higher credence to the threat of a WMD attack acknowledge the 
difficulties a terrorist group would need to overcome to acquire, weaponize, and 
successfully conduct an attack resulting in mass casualties. Nor do the authors 
documenting terrorist groups’ preferences for conventional weapons discount entirely the 
threat of a WMD attack. A conclusion drawn from the literature is the imperative for 
improved threat assessment. Certainly, the quality of data collected to analyze specific 
terrorist groups, their ideology and motivations, their targets, their messages, their 
audiences, and their long-term goals, as well as tactical aims, is critical to an accurate 
assessment.  
J. CONCLUSION 
A complex of factors shapes a group’s propensity to acquire and use 
unconventional weapons. Due to a lack of statistical data on WMD incidents, the 
literature is large on speculation but low on quantitative analysis. However, the 
qualitative data substantiates the picture of low-probability, high consequence threat for 
which comprehensive policy measures are required. Yet, despite the policy relevance and 
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the multitude of examples to work from, little work has been done to identify the general 
conditions and strategies to prevent either nuclear terrorism or proliferation of other 
WMD, such as chemical and biological. The data also demonstrates a gap between 
international policy measures and the federal domestic initiatives designed to thwart the 
same problem.  
Although it is important to temper assumptions about the “inevitability” of WMD 
terrorism, it is equally important not to let the pendulum swing too far in the other 
direction and to discount it completely. Just as the issue of WMD accessibility for 
terrorist groups is contested, so too is the question of whether such groups would actually 
choose to employ WMD in certain circumstances. Skepticism towards the notion that 
terrorists will seek to use WMD is largely predicated on accepting the assumption that it 
may be too difficult or complicated a process. A related assumption is that groups will be 
motivation to increase capabilities and lethality in this linear fashion. A final related 
assumption is that once terrorists gain access to WMD materials, they will therefore be 
able to successfully construct and deliver such a weapon to a target.218 The literature 
tends simply to accept a premise either that WMD terrorism is only “a matter of time,” or 
that it is too difficult to be of real concern. However, this viewpoint is no substitute for 
detailed and measured threat assessment.  
Non-state terrorist groups with nuclear weapons are conceptually outside the 
bounds of a deterrent strategy and present difficult new security challenges. In looking at 
the challenges presented by non-state actors in relevance to WMD terrorism, the policies 
designed to address problems fail in several key areas: (1) the risks of non-state actors’ 
procurement of nuclear materials, (2) the potential for collaboration between state and 
non-state actors as an avenue to WMD proliferation, (3) a lack of international policy 
instruments and enforcement mechanisms to keep pace with the threat, and (4) failure to 
integrate all aspects of policy making to prevent WMD terrorism.  
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III. THE THREAT OF WMD TERRORISM—WHO, WHY AND 
HOW CAPABLE. IS IT REALISTIC TO THINK THAT 
TERRORISTS WOULD GO NUCLEAR? 
A. THE NEXUS BETWEEN PROLIFERATION AND TERRORISM 
In this modern nuclear age, “nuclear actors straddle a single spectrum of risks.”—
At one end are advanced nuclear arsenals of superpower nations—at the other—terrorist 
groups constructing a crude nuclear weapons.219 In between lie rogue nations cultivating 
illicit nuclear weapons programs and others who hope to opt in as a nuclear world to 
develop new energy sources. The complex interactions between states and groups both 
within and outside of the non-proliferation regime make managing nuclear threats 
difficult.  
The historical record of terrorists WMD capabilities is small and complicated by 
significant information gaps. The size of the limited dataset and the considerable 
unknowns about the cases where groups have sought these capabilities make it to difficult 
to assess accurately the nature of the danger and to anticipate new developments in the 
nature of the threat. However, it is known that terrorist groups have indeed tried to 
acquire WMD weaponry and that both a “supply” and “demand” side exists to this 
nuclear black market in addition to the continuing efforts to make stockpiles of both 
materials and weapons as secure as possible. Understanding how and why—essentially 
the “nexus” between proliferation and terrorism—are key to better building programs and 
protocols to lessen the risks.  
A terror attack using nuclear weapons could be achieved several ways: the theft of 
an intact nuclear weapon, stealing fissile material to construct an improvised nuclear 
device (IND), an attack or sabotage against a nuclear facility, or the release of a “dirty 
bomb” using radioactive (but not necessarily nuclear) materials.220 Although WMD 
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terrorism remains rare, the Central Intelligence Agency has reported for the last several 
years that terrorist interest in WMD is growing, as is the number of potential 
perpetrators.221 
B. NUCLEAR MATERIALS—THE KEY INGREDIENTS 
While significant efforts have been made to shore up nuclear supplies and 
unsecured materials, and the proliferation of nuclear technology have become a 
significant problem over the last decade. Access to nuclear experts, critical materials, and 
facilities has become a real possibility for a terrorist group. Worldwide hundreds of 
locations hold nuclear weapons or weapons grade material222 (but due to the secrecy of 
these facilities, the exact number is unknown). One Congressional report on terrorism by 
the Congressional Research Service warned that terrorists could “obtain HEU from the 
more than 130 research reactors worldwide that use HEU as fuel.”223 As of 2007, an 
estimated four out of five research reactors used to produce HEU for civilian use lacked 
adequate security to protect against sophisticated thieves, while only around one-third of 
HEU-fueled research reactors have had all their HEU monitoring removed.224 The report 
noted that the nations of “greatest concern as potential sources of weapons or fissile 
material” are widely thought to be Russia and Pakistan.225 Terrorists will obtain 
plutonium or HEU wherever the combination of their strength and the security system’s 
weakness makes it easiest to steal.226 
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In 2009, the global stockpile of HEU was about 1,600,000 kg, enough for more 
than 60,000 nuclear weapons; the global stockpile for (separated) plutonium (Pu) was 
about 500,000 kg., which is also sufficient for more than 60,000 weapons.227  
So far, the majority of illicit trafficking cases where “plutonium” was offered for 
sale actually involved sealed radioactive sources, other radioisotopes, or even non-
radioactive materials. Only two known cases involved dangerous forms of plutonium. In 
May 1994, 6.2 grams of plutonium of suspected military origin was found in the garage 
belonging to a businessman in Tengen, Germany, and in August 1994, 363 grams of 
mixed plutonium-uranium oxide (MOX) powder were seized from smugglers at the 
Munich International Airport upon their arrival from Moscow.228 
Recorded thefts of nuclear materials appear in open source literature. The IAEA 
released data from its Illicit Trafficking Database that confirms 15 cases of nuclear 
trafficking in 2008 alone.229 The IAEA has also reported 1,266 incidents of illicit 
trafficking over the last 12 years. These incidents involved 99 countries and included 18 
incidents involving special nuclear highly enriched uranium or plutonium trafficking.230 
However, analyzing HEU and plutonium trafficking is challenging because credible 
information on key aspects of nuclear trafficking investigations is not always available, 
and because a concern exists that not all such events have been detected by authorities.231  
Despite terrorists’ known interest in acquiring nuclear materials for building a 
nuclear weapon, so far, however, no open source evidence links terrorist organizations 
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with the known cases of illicit trafficking in HEU or plutonium.232 However, what 
known cases of stolen or recovered material do show is that weapons-useable nuclear 
material, and especially HEU, remains in illicit circulation from thefts that presumably 
occurred in the 1990s. Therefore, this HEU should be considered potentially available for 
terrorists, possibly in the quantity sufficient for the production of a crude nuclear 
explosive device.233 
The diffusion of scientific and technical information regarding the assembly of 
nuclear weapons has increased the risk that a terrorist organization in possession of 
sufficient fissile material could develop its own nuclear weapon. The complete 
production of a nuclear weapon strongly depends on the terrorist group’s access to fissile 
material and scientific expertise, which may come in the form of black market 
proliferators, or technical knowledge gathered from nuclear experts involved in a national 
nuclear program.234  
1. HEU vs. Plutonium—The Preferred Terrorist Ingredient 
HEU and plutonium are the two types of special nuclear material (SNM) needed 
to make nuclear weapons, and are the key ingredients terrorists would need and most 
likely seek to construct a possible IND.  
Uranium mined from the ground must be extensively processed, or enriched 
before it can be considered weapons-grade material.235 Plutonium occurs naturally only 
in trace amounts, and therefore, must be produced in a nuclear reactor.236 The capability 
to create either HEU or plutonium capabilities “from scratch” are widely considered 
beyond the capability of even the most sophisticated terrorist;237 therefore, the common 
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belief is that terrorists would most likely try to attempt to acquire material from existing 
stockpiled sources through the diversion, theft or purchase on the black market. HEU 
exists in much greater quantities, and is used for both weapons and energy programs, 
which is why it is thought to be the primary desired target for terrorists and explains 
many of the existing policies intended to secure HEU stockpiles. HEU was termed by one 
report as the “Holy Grail” of terrorists.238 
The amount of HEU needed to make a nuclear weapon varies with the degree of 
enrichment and the sophistication of the weapon design. In general, the higher the 
enrichment level, the less HEU is needed to make a bomb.239 For a HEU-based nuclear 
weapon, two basic design options exist, a “gun-type” weapon where two pieces of HEU 
are brought together quickly and explode, and an “implosion weapon,” where a sphere of 
HEU is rapidly compressed in a highly symmetrical manner. Gun-type weapons are far 
simpler in design and could likely be built by some terrorist groups. The second is more 
difficult technically but requires less HEU.240 Plutonium-based nuclear weapons only 
work as implosion weapons, with more sophisticated weapons using less plutonium.241 
Open source estimates vary but “The Global Fissile Missile Report” estimates that 
only 25kg of HEU or 8kg of HEU are required to create one crude nuclear bomb.242  
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Aside from detailing the technical/scientific aspects and hurdles a terrorist has to 
build a nuclear weapons, these figures are important because they do impact the optimum 
implementation of preventive/defensive strategies developed to stop such incidents from 
occurring. It also helps with the intelligence aspect of nuclear terrorism to determine real 
threats from false ones.  
C. CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL THREATS 
Chemical and biological warfare programs are much easier to hide and much 
cheaper to start than nuclear programs.243 When it comes to the feasibility of using 
biological or chemical weapons, states (and perhaps terrorists) may be more likely to 
have the resources, technical capabilities, and organizational capacity to assemble the 
people, knowledge, material, and equipment to produce such weapons and to be able to 
deliver them clandestinely to valued targets. The State Department has generally assessed 
that off acts of terrorism involving chemical agents posed a notable difficulty given the 
easy access to toxic materials used in industry. 
Today’s chemical terrorism threat ranges from the potential acquisition 
and dissemination of chemical warfare agents with military delivery 
systems to the production and use of toxic industrial chemicals or 
improvised dissemination systems for chemical agents,” the report says. 
“The growth and sophistication of the worldwide chemical industry, 
including the development of complex synthetic and dual-use materials, 
makes the task of preventing and protecting against this threat more 
difficult.244 
Indeed, an attack with a chemical effect is just as likely to involve conventional 
explosives in unconventional ways against “soft targets” that could have catastrophic 
chemical or nuclear results, such as conventional attacks against nuclear or chemical 
facilities in the developing or developed world alike. Nonetheless, “mustering the 
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resources and capabilities to inflict a devastating blow with biological agents has proven 
to be a formidable task even for states.”245  
The report also assessed biological threats, stating,  
Developing a mass-casualty bioterrorism capability presents some 
scientific and operational challenges,” though “motivated scientists with 
university-level training” could provide the requisite knowledge for such a 
capability, the report states.246 
Specific warning came regarding access to biomaterials and warned that 
“international laboratories that store and work with dangerous pathogens are often not 
adequately secured.”247  
Chemical and biological proliferation threats did not attain the priority of nuclear 
proliferation until the late 1980s following the first Gulf War and Iraqi use against Iraqi 
Kurds and Iran.248 Indeed, the chemical and biological attacks are past events committed 
by non-state actors. In October 2006/2007, Iraqi insurgents experimented in using 
chlorine in conjunction with conventional vehicle-borne explosive devices. The attacks 
resulted in hundreds of injuries and some deaths but were not a viable means of inflicting 
massive loss of life mostly due to unrefined delivery systems. In the days following 
September 11, anthrax attacks targeted Congress and the media killing five people and 
infecting 17 others. According to the FBI, the ensuing investigation became “one of the 
largest and most complex in the history of law enforcement.”249 The suspect was a 
scientist who worked in the government’s biodefense lab and was declared the sole 
culprit of the crime by the FBI. Bioweapons experts who later viewed images of the 
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attack anthrax saw no indication of “weaponization.” In addition, subsequent tests by the 
national laboratories confirmed that the attack powders were not weaponized.250  
A relatively new concern is “agroterrorism”—the use of biological agents against 
agricultural targets. The recent outbreaks of foot-and-mouth and “mad cow” disease in 
Europe have demonstrated the tremendous economic damage done to agricultural 
markets even when these epidemics occur naturally. Agroterrorism also provides the 
opportunity to inflict significant economic and social disruption, as well as potential 
human injury (disease and sickness). It is generally agreed that no way exists to guarantee 
protection against agroterrorist attacks; the targets and opportunities are too many. 
Consequently, significant attention must be paid to rapid detection and remediation.251  
Chemical and biological attacks may be easier. Ambassador Ronald Lehman of 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories discussed the phenomenon of latency, and 
unexercised potential to develop WMD. He noted that gaining nuclear weapons latency 
was more difficult than achieving chemical weapons latency, which was in turn, more 
difficult than gaining the latent ability to produce biological weapons.252  
D. WHO WOULD DO IT? 
As one researcher summarized, “We are in the paradoxical position of having a 
clearer understanding of the interior of the atom than we do the interior of the mind of a 
terrorist.”253 The lack of quantifiable data in relation to this new breed of terrorism, and 
WMD use, make it difficult to predict future incidents. However, the very lack of 
documented cases since 9/11 can lead to an inaccurate assessment that terrorists will not 
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chose to use this tactical option. What has been learned is the extent to which an enemy 
motivated by political and religious ideologies will go to be heard. What is not known is 
how to predict accurately who will use such a tactic and what exact circumstances will 
compel them to take such a risk.  
The post-9/11 era and the shadow of terrorism being launched on a massive scale 
by a terrorist group have transformed the way this nation’s adversaries are perceived. No 
longer are threats to U.S. national security only seen through the lens of nation-state 
confrontation. According to one researcher: 
Some of these entities, with transnational character and motivations that 
go beyond normal political goals, have show a willingness to employ any 
available weapon to cause maximum damage to civilian targets. There is 
no reason to believe that they would balk at the use of nuclear weapons or 
biological ones, which have less predictable, less immediate, and less 
controllable effects.254 
Al Qaeda has understandably been the primary focus of this country’s attention 
since 9/11. Under the leadership of Osama bin Laden, Al Qaeda, declared its intention to 
conduct further mass-casualty attacks on the United States and its allies. Substantial 
evidence is found in statements by Al Qaeda leadership.255 Evidence of attempting to 
build capability in developing dirty bombs can be found in the June 2002 arrest of 
suspected al Qaeda associate Abdullah al Muhajir, also known as Jose Padilla. Padilla 
was arrested by U.S. authorities for scheming to develop and use a dirty bomb in an 
American city.256 According to U.S. officials, the plans that Padilla had to launch a 
nuclear attack were highly inaccurate. However, Padilla did not recognize the inaccuracy 
of the plans and took them to Al Qaeda leadership telling them of his desire to launch 
such an attack. In response, Abu Zubaydah apparently cautioned Padilla to “think 
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smaller”—to get some training and attack America with a so-called “dirty bomb,” a 
conventional explosive packed with radioactive waste that would spew when detonated. 
This demonstrates a lack of technical expertise, but a strong intent and desire.  
Another 9/11-scale operational plot managed by the Al Qaeda core leadership was 
the development of anthrax for use in a mass casualty attack in the United States, and was 
being developed parallel to the group’s efforts to achieve the same effect as using a 
nuclear bomb—perhaps as a back-up if nuclear ambitions were not realized.257 However, 
evidence regarding the Al Qaeda’s interest in pursuing biological toxins and poisons 
appears is more difficult to access.258  
In a study conducted by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey 
Institute of International Studies (MIIS), cited by Jonathan Tucker in Toxic Terror, 
terrorist use of chemical and biological weapons was demonstrated.259 MIIS identified 
six characteristics among the groups involved in documented chemical/biological 
weapons (CBW) incidents: charismatic leadership, no external constituency, apocalyptic 
vision, loner or splinter group, sense of paranoia/grandiosity, and preemptive 
aggression.260 The two common characteristics that appeared in all cases of actual CBW 
use were the lack of outside constituency and a sense of paranoia/grandiosity. Only a 
limited number of groups were motivated enough to employ CBW, amongst them 
“religious millenarian groups, small terrorist cells, and brutalized groups seeking revenge 
or facing destruction.”261 
However, other non-state groups—including Hezbollah, the Chechen separatists, 
and group cults “not on anybody’s radar screen,” may also have an interest in acquiring 
                                                 
257 Mowatt-Larssen, Al Qaeda Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat: Hype or Reality?, 6. 
258 Ibid. 
259 Jonathan Tucker, ed., Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000). 
260 Ehud Sprintzak, “The Great Superterrorism Scare” Foreign Policy Fall 1999; John Parachini, 
Combating Terrorism: Assessing the Threat, Congressional Testimony (Prepared Statement) before the 
House Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and 
International Relations, October 20, 1999. 
261 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Weapons of Mass Destruction: The 
Terrorist Threat. 
 73 
unconventional weapons for a mass-casualty terrorist attack.262 Most terrorists assess 
nuclear and other forms of WMD terrorism through the lens of their political goals and 
may judge that it may, or may not, advance those political interests.263  
Until recently, Hezbollah’s stated goal was the withdrawal of the Israeli military 
from southern Lebanon.264 One report cite that some believe that Hezbollah’s success of 
previous (conventional attacks) was due in great measure to its ability to learn and 
integrate new knowledge into its daily practices on multiple occasions. Hezbollah not 
only adopted new weapons and developed a sophisticated psychological warfare 
campaign; it also restructured itself to deal with increased Israeli pressure.265 In fact, 
Hezbollah’s Secretary-General, Sayyed Nasrallah, recently announced the right to 
possess any weapon, which makes the nexus between the Iran-Hezbollah nexus critical, 
especially if Iran were to realize its nuclear ambitions.266 
Also troubling, Hezbollah has been able to establish its own black-market 
infrastructure network to support its illegal activities (drug and weapons trafficking, 
smuggling contraband products, producing false documents, and money laundering) to 
general financial profits means to support its ideological motivations. Hezbollah’s global 
activities demonstrate how easy it would be for other terrorists to tap into its knowledge 
or even the even its underground black market network itself.267 
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Understanding Iran’s nuclear intentions assumes the added dimension of if 
and when Iran gets the bomb. A nuclear-armed Iran will pose new 
proliferation risks surrounding the possible transfer of nuclear capability 
and know-how from state to sub-state actors, such as Hezbollah and 
Hamas. Scant attention has been paid to the nuclear intent of surrogate 
groups and their collusion with Iranian insiders with access to nuclear 
facilities.268 
Rather than inspire terror for the sake of achieving limited political objectives, 
today’s terrorism is often fueled by extremist religious ideologies that rationalize 
destruction, vengeance, and punishment as both necessary ends in themselves and as 
tools to achieve a better world.269 Nuclear terrorism is most appealing to a group seeking 
highly visible and psychological results and that has little regard for the possible 
consequences.270 
In addition to al Qaeda, the other strong possibility is apocalyptic groups whose 
faith entails a deep belief in the need to cleanse and purify the world via violent upheaval 
to eliminate non-believers and think they have some role in bringing about the end of the 
world.271 These types of groups, driven by a religious passion, often have characteristics, 
such as charismatic leaders, isolation from the larger society, and a sense of paranoia and 
grandiosity that make them of a great concern as potential nuclear terrorists.272 The Aum 
Shinrikyo cult, which was actively pursuing a WMD program, is the best example. The 
Cult’s leader Shoko Asahara predicted a violent end to humanity, sparked by a nuclear 
cataclysm.273  
Nationalist/separatist groups, whose purpose is focused on achieving some type of 
political objectives for a given ethnic group, would benefit from having a nuclear bomb 
by providing them with a huge boost to the credibility and reputation. The possession of a 
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nuclear device may give them a sense of being equivalent to a state.274 In 1995, Chechen 
rebels placed a radioactive container in a park in Moscow. Despite their proven ability to 
acquire radioactive material, they stopped short of detonating a “dirty bomb.”275 
One such separatist group assessed as suspected of capability and willingness to 
use WMD is the Islamist separatists in the North Caucasus. For nearly two decades, these 
rebels have attempted to force Russian troops to retreat from Chechnya.276 However, in 
the past decade, radical Islam has transformed the conflict from primarily a struggle for 
independence to a “theater of operation in the broader global Islamist onslaught.”277 As 
the conflict continues to intensify in the region, it is increasing in both frequency and 
violence.278 The rise of insurgency in Russia’s Northern Caucasus threatens to destabilize 
the entire region as Russia continues to lose control, and as it becomes a significant base 
for Islamist terrorist organizations.279  
The capabilities of these networks remain robust enough to prompt Russia’s 
political, security, and military leaders to continue acknowledging that the threat of 
nuclear terrorism remains real and serious.280 As demonstrated by some of their previous 
attacks, such the Beslan school attack,281 the seizure of 700 patrons in a Moscow 
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theatre,282 and the Moscow subway bombing,283 these groups demonstrate they are 
prepared to inflict massive, indiscriminate casualties, and make no distinction between 
state or civilian targets to obtain their political goals.284 The Chechen separatists have 
clearly crossed the moral threshold between conventional and catastrophic terrorism.285 
As they increasingly struggle to put government forces on the defensive in the North 
Caucasus through acts of conventional terrorism and guerilla warfare, the motivation of 
more radical terrorist leaders to attempt acts of catastrophic terrorism increases. One 
researcher hypothesizes that since conventional attacks have not allowed rebels to 
achieve their goals, radical separatists may “see a catastrophic nuclear attack as their last 
chance to force Russia into leaving Chechnya,” and therefore, may resort to using WMD. 
While the plot to hijack the atomic submarine and the scouting of military nuclear 
facilities demonstrate these groups’ intentions, it is the attacks, facilitated by turncoats 
and executed by well-trained, well-armed terrorists—some of them desiring to achieve 
martyrdom via suicide attack—that demonstrate their capability to attempt acts of WMD 
terrorism. However, while no current compelling evidence exists that North Caucasus 
groups have focused on acquiring the expertise needed to make a crude nuclear bomb 
from HEU or plutonium,286 nor enough credible evidence that Chechen rebels have, or 
trying to, assemble a WMD weapon.287 It could only be a matter of time before either 
Chechen-based radical separatists acquire such expertise to place the last link in the chain 
of causation.  
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The most likely terrorist groups to develop and use nuclear capability are 
political-religious groups trying to advance a larger political agenda,288 but who morally 
justify their actions through religious doctrine.  
For apocalyptic thinkers, such as Osama bin Laden, Ayman Zawahiri, and Shogo 
Asahara, (Aum Shinryko’s cult leader), nuclear weapons represent the “enabling element 
in waging a struggle in which ordinary rules of conduct do not apply.” The religious pre-
justification of WMD is “required” as part of a “ritualistic process for introducing new 
rules into the conflict.” Apocalyptic jihadists hope a WMD attack would be seen by their 
constituency as a clear sign that “God is on our side”—victory is at hand.289 In fact, 
following the 9/11 attacks, al Qaeda released a video tape that referred to the 9/11 attacks 
as a “holy act.”290 
This great victory was possible only by the grace of God. This was not just 
a human achievement—it was a holy act. These nineteen brave men who 
gave their lives for the cause of God will be well taken care of. God 
granted them the strength to do what they did. 
Al Qaeda’s top leadership has made a sustained commitment to buy, steal, and 
develop fissile materials and expertise.291 In 2002, Al Qaeda’s documents supporting 
plans to obtain nuclear material were discovered during a raid in Afghanistan.292 In 1988, 
Osama bin Laden called the acquisition of nuclear weapons or other WMD a “religious 
duty.”293 Bin Laden’s justification was that even WMD (which are outlawed under 
Islam) are a justifiable means of countering the West’s monopoly of the bomb, the evil 
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political power of the United States,294 and to “prevent the infidels from inflicting harm 
on Muslims.”295 
Of note were the actions of Ayman Zawahiri—Bin Laden’s second in command 
in charge of operations. Both Bin Laden and Zawahiri shared a common belief that 
nuclear weapons would be desired for an “impending conflict” with the United States.296 
By 1992, reports are that al-Qaeda were already actively exploring opportunities to buy, 
build, or steal a bomb,297 although, their efforts during this period were only met by a 
series of scams and were ultimately unsuccessful. During the 1990s, Zawahiri traveled a 
great deal. During this period, it is rumored that in while in Afghanistan, Zawahiri may 
have been offered assistance by Khan’s network.298 Moreover, shortly before the 9/11 
attacks, bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri met with two senior Pakistani nuclear 
scientists to discuss nuclear weapons.299 Also, during this period, Zawahiri and his top 
lieutenants traveled extensively to Russia, Yemen, Malaysia, Singapore, and China. His 
associations during his travels, and own statements, suggest that he and his cohorts may 
have been hunting for WMD.300 
When the secret planning for 9/11 began, it was Zawahiri who personally directed 
al Qaeda’s development of chemical, biological, and nuclear programs. Additionally, the 
sophisticated anthrax project was also in late fall 2002. A terrorist cell associated with al-
Qaeda completed planning for a chemical attack on the New York City subway by 
utilizing a cyanide gas dispersal device called the “mob-taker.” Operatives sought 
permission from the al-Qaeda core to execute the attack. Ayman Zawahiri, who was 
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unaware of the plan in its earlier planning stages, called off the attack because he had 
“something better” in mind run personally by Zawahiri.301 However, while Zawahiri was 
involved in the operational aspects of the planning and development, he has also made it 
his mission to develop the religious case for using WMD.302  
In May 21, 2003, a Saudi cleric issued a fatwa on “A Treatise on the Legal Status 
of WMD Against Infidels.”303 However, after it release and its subsequent recantation, 
the status and meaning of the fatwa became unclear. Nonetheless, Zawahiri used this 
situation as an opportunity to reiterate his support for WMD terrorism. In March 2008, 
Ayman Zawahiri responded directly to Dr. Fadl with a book of his own posted on the 
Internet, entitled Exoneration. Zawahiri goes to great lengths to refute, essentially 
thought by thought, Dr. Fadl’s text.304 Indeed, Zawahiri tended to expand on the thoughts 
and ideas of al-Fahd by diving into a more comprehensive justification with even further 
citations.305 
For al-Qaeda, procuring a fatwa is part of a ritual process for an impending attack. 
The 1998 fatwa was issued in support of 9/11. The 2003 fatwa was published to 
accompany concrete operational planning underway at that time. In 2008, Zawahiri’s 
purpose is to issue a warning of an impending attack.306 As a cleric, al Fahd likely did 
not know the operational intent that rested behind his legal argument. However, Zawahiri 
makes his case for WMD on both religious and operational levels. As in bin Laden’s 
1998 fatwa, Zawahiri serves as both cleric and operational planner and understands the 
specific purpose for which the fatwa is being issued.307  
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E. WMD UNDER AL QAEDA’S NEW LEADERSHIP 
On June 16, 2011, al-Qaeda announced that al-Zawahiri had been selected as bin 
Laden’s successor.308 Since his ascension of Aymen Zawahiri to the senior leadership 
role in Al Qaeda Central, evidence (i.e., specific directive, public statement, or video 
tapes released) is lacking to sustain whether Zawarhiri still intends to follow the fatwa he 
issued in 2003 and whether al Qaeda is actively pursuing WMD for operational use in an 
upcoming attack. However, Zawarhiri’s long-term interest in the use of WMD and the 
role he played in the pursuit of developing al Qaeda WMD capability while working as a 
second in command cannot be ignored now that he is the leader.  
Assessments of whether al Qaeda will conduct an attack, agree that the intent 
remains but that the ability to pull off planning such a large-scale WMD attack may have 
been compromised by the Killing of Osama bin Laden.309 Nevertheless, these “remaining 
few leaders can still serve as the key drivers of al-Qaeda’s nuclear ambitions.” A recent 
report entitled, Islam and the Bomb, the author Rolf Mowatt-Larssen says that this nation 
should be especially worried about the threat of nuclear terrorism under Zawahiri’s 
leadership.310 As the former director of intelligence and counterintelligence at the U.S. 
Department of Energy, Mowatt-Larssen argues that al-Qaeda’s WMD ambitions are 
“stronger than ever.” Moreover, “this intent no longer feels theoretical, but 
operational.”311 “We must remember that Zawahiri’s arrogance and rigidness are not 
substitutes for determination and will.”312  
1. Motivation 
The question remains, why go nuclear when other WMD methods may be easier 
to achieve? A nuclear weapon is not required to inflict mass casualties. The 9/11 tactics 
killed over 3,000 people and the Oklahoma City bombing killed more people than any 
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WMD attack by a terrorist group so far.313 However, nuclear terrorism has a different 
fear factor and attracts much more publicity. Nuclear terrorism has the feature of 
achieving a unique type of public fear and trauma because of the negative association 
with almost anything nuclear. In addition to the sheer destructive impact of a nuclear 
explosion, the aura of fear and myth surrounding nuclear weapons holds unique 
psychological impact.314 
From a motivational standpoint, the acquisition of a working nuclear weapon 
would represent the ultimate capability for apocalyptic and political-religious 
terrorism.315 For a political-religious group, such as Al-Qaeda, the desire to control a 
weapon is two-fold: First, announcing the acquisition of a nuclear weapon would have an 
extraordinary psychological effect on the target audience. The credible threat caused by a 
terrorist group controlling a nuclear weapon would significantly bolster any political 
goals of the group and may lead to greater political capital. Second, both threatening to 
use the device, as well as actually strategically choosing to detonate that device, would 
both hold great political value. The psychological impact would be devastating and 
impact on survivors overwhelming.316 Brian Jenkins, in his thesis, states what he calls the 
“fission of fear.” By creating that fear in the imagination of the public, a terrorist 
organization, such as Al Qaeda, may become a terrorist nuclear power, without 
possessing a single nuclear weapon.317 
As Ken Waltz writes:  
If we believe that terrorists could, if they wished to, wield nuclear 
weapons to threaten or damage their chosen enemies, then the important 
question becomes: Why would they want to? To answer this question, we 
have to ask further what terrorists are trying to do and what means best 
suits their end.318 
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Over the last decade, many experts argue that terrorists are escalating their 
destructiveness.319 Researchers suggest that religious-inspired terrorists will be the most 
likely non-state perpetrators to use WMD due to a combination of new motives, different 
rationales, and increased opportunities coupled with enhanced terrorist capabilities, may 
lead to a new era of terrorist violence more dangerous and deadly than in the past.320 
Groups can stage devastating attacks using cheap and simple means, providing that those 
weapons or supporting technologies are appropriate to the goals the terrorist is seeking to 
achieve. In reality, the critical question is to start asking questions regarding what they 
hope to achieve.  
However, the motivations of political/separatist may vary slightly. Long-term 
conflicts and emotional motivation may evolve to accompany political goals. For 
instance, in the Chechen separatists’ movement, on-going warfare and high civilian 
casualties (often of family members) has made the separatists vengeful, and as such, 
turned the fight from one of independence to a quest for revenge against those who have 
wronged them,-a so-called “blood vendetta.”321  
So far, no precedence for a nuclear attack or major WMD attack has been set, and 
terrorist groups have had limited experience with any sort of WMD use; however, in 
general, terrorist groups, such as Al Qaeda, have demonstrated their willingness to make 
attacks larger and more dramatic.322 Although 9/11 ultimately used conventional means, 
the deployment of commercial airline into building was a new idea. Indeed, it was this 
type of thinking that was not routinely comprehended by analysts.  
2. Strategic and Tactical Considerations 
Homeland security threat assessments are consistent in assessing terrorists as 
strategic actors. They choose their targets deliberately based on “the weaknesses they 
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observe in our defenses and our preparedness.”323 Most terrorist groups access nuclear 
terrorism through the lens of their political goals and many judge that it does not advance 
their interests. Others may believe it would advance their goals under certain 
circumstances.324 However, terrorists may also weigh the risk of failure. Most who have 
studied terrorist decision making do not conclude that groups would be as willing to risk 
everything in pursuit of “spectacular results.”325 Bruce Hoffman furthers the operational 
argument by arguing that most terrorist groups are quite tactically conservative—”the 
organizational imperative to succeed imposes on some terrorist groups an operational 
conservatism that make an ironic contrast with their political radicalism.”326 
A plan to resort to some type of nuclear terrorism might not merely reflect a 
strategic decision—it might also be the result of organizational dynamics, ease of access 
to needed materials/targets, successful use elsewhere, or a leader’s obsession of holding 
the nuclear card.327 The assistance that the Pakistani nuclear scientist reportedly offered 
to Al Qaeda is an important case in point, as it would provide the terrorists with the 
technical personnel to explain and potentially operationalize some of the materials they 
were already collecting about nuclear capabilities and weapons, which makes it possible 
for them to make their rhetoric about wanting nuclear weapons a reality.328  
Many terrorism experts include an analysis regarding the importance of strategic 
thinking and operational risks on terrorist decision making. It appears “terrorist actors are 
often concerned about ‘operational risk’—they may be willing to risk or give their lives, 
but not for a futile attack.”329 
The organizational approach suggests a terrorist organization’s main goal is 
“survival,” like any other organization, such as a state institution or a commercial 
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enterprise. Hence, this approach explains terrorism as a result of an organization’s 
struggle for survival, usually in a competitive environment.330 In fact, “many terrorist 
organizations also appear to be risk-adverse, instead the emphasis is often on the group’s 
survival.”331 
The importance of operational success of a terrorist group is critical. Certain 
terrorist operations are much harder to execute successfully than others. For instance, 
detonating an improvised explosive device (IED) in a public park is more difficult than 
setting off an IED in a secured government building. Alternatively, constructing a pipe 
bomb is less technically challenging than building an improvised nuclear explosive 
device. A group that aims to do the first objective, rather than the latter, increases its 
chances of success. Although thinking about the ability for a terrorist groups’ chances of 
success (or failure) usually focus on the nature of the group or individuals involved, 
whether they are “good enough” to stage a particular operation depends on what they are 
trying to accomplish.332  
The threat of WMD terrorism may not be posed by the availability of weapons or 
the weapons themselves, but is rather evolves from the nexus between available weapons, 
tactical capabilities, and the desire, capacity, and ideological inclination within a group to 
execute an attack.333 A recent RAND report analyzes the factors that must be present for 
a terrorist attack to have the greatest chance of success. The findings suggest that the 
analysis must be examined within the context of the “match or mismatch” of three key 
characteristics: (1) terrorist group capabilities and resources, (2) the requirements of the 
operation it attempted or is planning to attempt, and (3) the relevance and reliability of 
security countermeasures. For a terrorist attack to have the greatest chance of success, the 
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following is necessary: (1) a match between its capabilities and resources and the 
operational requirements of the attack it is seeking to conduct, and (2) a mismatch of 
security countermeasures and intelligence/investigative efforts with both the group and its 
plans.334 The operational requirements of an operation are driven in large part by the 
tactical outcome the group wants and the type of target it is attacking.335 Decisions about 
what type of attack, what tactics it will use, how many people it targets, what type of 
attention it seek goes to the nature of what groups are seeking to accomplish.336 Success 
will in turn be affected by capability and will ultimately inform strategic decisions and 
vice versa.  
Brian Jenkins notes that for al Qaeda, in particular, that operations must be 
successful. He draws this conclusion from a religious perspective theorizing that, 
“Jihadists believe that God’s will is expressed in success and failure is to have God’s 
support.”337  
F. CAPABILITY VS. INTENT—DO THEY MATCH? 
No dispute has been raised that accessing nuclear weapons—either by theft or 
construction—while not impossible, does pose great difficulty for terrorist groups. 
Motivation alone cannot close the gap to nuclear terror, as it will also take a great deal of 
technical expertise and operational capability to achieve. Nevertheless, two former senior 
government counterterrorism officials argue that the “confluence of religiously inspired 
terrorism and technological diffusion will impel terrorists to overcome technical, 
organizational and logistical obstacles to WMD use.”338 
The key obstacle to building such a weapon is the availability of a sufficient 
quantity of special nuclear material (SNM) material—either plutonium or HEU. Some 
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experts believe that if allowed access to the necessary quantities of fissile material, 
extraordinarily capable groups could build a crude nuclear weapon. “Once you have the 
fissile material, it’s a matter of basic chemistry, basic machinery and a truck.” “You have 
to have some technical capability, but once you have those skills, it’s certainly within the 
grasp of the kind of sophisticated, planning-capable terror organizations out there.”339 
Experts have acknowledged the potential for non-state actors to build an IND for 
many years, and most concur with the view of the U.S. National Research Council that 
“crude HEU weapons could be fabricated without state assistance.” Much less agreement 
occurs among specialists, however, about how technically competent terrorists would 
have to be to make even a crude device or how large a team they would need.340  
It is for this reason that the Khan proliferation network was so dangerous. By 
acting as a middleman to provide the material and expertise, he was able to help states, 
and perhaps terrorists, cross the threshold into nuclear capability. The A.Q. Kahn  
network was essentially “an enabler” of the proliferation that fueled hostile nations and 
terrorist groups with the means to carry out nuclear attacks. The role Khan played was a 
dangerous role in that he was the link between turning “intent” into a “capability;” 
essentially, turning nuclear aspirations into nuclear realities. 
The correlation between the technology and the groups’ skills, and what the group 
is trying to do, is critical.341 To understand terrorist success and failure, it is therefore 
necessary to understand the characteristics of different operations that make them 
difficult or risky—and also therefore, raise the bar for group skills, technology, and so 
forth. 
During raids in Afghanistan, evidence surfaced that Al Qaeda was aggressively 
pursuing chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear information and material.”342 
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Although Al Qaeda’s nuclear aspirations have been detailed, this new evidence suggested 
that their CBW capability might have been more advanced than in the nuclear realm. One 
such piece of evidence comes from a 10 volume “Encyclopedia of Afghanistan 
Resistance,” which was found while coalition forces were inspecting a camp close to 
Jalalabad. The encyclopedia contains precise formulas for manufacturing toxins, 
botullinum, and ricin. The document also instructs would-be perpetrators in methods of 
disseminating the deadly materials.343 Ahmed Ressum, an Algerian man accused of 
planning to bomb the Los Angeles airport, testified that al Qaeda taught him to poison 
people by putting toxins on doorknobs, and that he engaged in experiments in which dogs 
were injected with a mixture containing cyanide and sulfuric acid.344 What can be 
concluded from captured documents, media reports, and U.S. government statements is 
that al Qaeda has obtained chemical agents, albeit probably in small quantities, and 
performed experiments on live subjects to determine the lethality of the substances. 
Manuals and testimony also indicate that al Qaeda has determined how to operationalize 
chemical and biological warfare.345 
On the nuclear front, Stephen Younger, director of the Defense Threat Reduction 
Agency, said extensive searches in Afghanistan showed Al Qaeda was interested in 
nuclear technologies, as well as biological and chemical weapons. Specifically, that “Al 
Qaeda leaders may have connections in other countries that already have the 
technological base for building nuclear weapons. They have the money to make such 
links…and they may have…access to people in countries with advanced technological 
capability.”346 In February 2004, Tenant noted, “more than two dozen terrorist groups are 
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pursuing CBRN materials.”347 In particular, Aum Shinrikyo and Al Qaeda and its 
associates figure most prominently among the groups that have manifested some degree 
of intent, experimentation and programmatic efforts to acquire nuclear weapons.348 To 
date, only these two groups have been able to achieve the scale of operations required to 
mount serious unconventional weapons programs.  
Aum Shinrikyo, the Homegrown Japanese cult, was able to elude intelligence 
agencies as they actively sought to develop nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.349 
Aum Shinrikyo managed to conduct the most significant terror attack by using WMD 
when the group’s followers released sarin gas on the Tokyo subway system. Although 
Aum Shinrikyo failed to yield the catastrophic results it was looking for, it nonetheless 
possessed financial and technical capability. Investigations after the dissolution of the 
group clearly showed that the group attempted to mine its own uranium in an attempt to 
gain weapons-grade nuclear material.350  
It is important to note that while the “desire” of AQ to acquire WMD is well 
documented in the literature, the assessments of its capability to actually acquire, fashion, 
and deploy such a weapon remain skeptical and inconsistent but summarized in the realm 
of “difficult” and unlikely but not improbable.  
The Central Intelligence Agency has reported that it is likely that most terrorists 
will continue to choose conventional explosives over WMD, but warns that the al-Qaeda 
network remains the greatest concern for the terrorist use of nuclear or other WMD 
weapons.351 The 9/11 Commission report documented Al Qaeda’s attempts to acquire 
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WMD capability.352 In Chapter 4 (?) of the report, officials in 1998 discussed reports that 
Bin Laden’s associates thought their leader was intent on carrying out a “Hiroshima.”353  
Documents and interrogations from military operations in Afghanistan have 
reinforced the assessment that the Taliban sought, and al-Qaeda, continues to seek, to 
develop biological weapons and obtain radioactive material for a radiological weapon.354 
The FBI’s National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) warned that “Al Qaeda and 
affiliated groups continue to enhance their capabilities to conduct effective mass-casualty 
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) attacks” and that Al Qaeda 
possesses “at least a crude capability to use” CBRN weapons.355 In 2003, 9/11 
mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed is captured in Pakistan, along with Ahmed Abdul 
Qadus Khan. Confronted with the evidence found during the raid, KS Mohammad 
provides confirming information on al Qaeda’s nuclear and biological weapons 
programs,356 and subsequent (leaked) documents show proof of Al Qaeda’s intention to 
detonate a “weapon of mass destruction” should Osama Bin Laden be killed or 
captured.357  
G. THE GROWING RISKS 
1. Nuclear Black Markets 
The lifeline for these illicit efforts is a nuclear black market comprised of skilled 
manufacturers, engineers and scientists, middlemen, and transportation and logistics 
channels all available for a price.  
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The fear of nuclear materials being available on the black market followed the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. On November 14, 2001, President Bush met Russian 
President Vladimir Putin and passed the Presidential Daily Brief containing an 
assessment of the proliferation threat. Bush asked Putin if he is certain that all Russian 
nuclear weapons and materials were secure. Putin responded with words to the effect: “I 
can only vouch for the security of nuclear materials in Russia after I assumed power.”358 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, long-standing concern has existed 
about the possibility of WMD proliferation to terrorists from the former Soviet states in 
which old research, production, and storage facilities remain with questionable safety and 
security procedures. A distressed Russian economy has created an opportunistic 
environment and led to a healthy black market to purchase fissile material, which 
increased the risk of an insider threat. Perhaps more significant, however, is the 
possibility that, given the ongoing travails of the Russian economy, poorly paid, 
disgruntled former Soviet scientists might attempt to sell their expertise in chemical, 
biological, and nuclear weapons on the “open market” to terrorists or rogue states.359 In 
short, a “vast supermarket of WMD material, hardware, and know-how had been opened 
as a consequence of the Soviet Union’s demise and presented the post-Cold War world 
with an enormous and immediate challenge.”360 Concerns about the proliferation from 
Soviet nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons facilities intensified in the wake of the 
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financial crisis that began in Russia in August 1998.361 Reports of Russian nuclear 
materials for sale on the black market, when combined with evidence of weaknesses in 
the security systems, have raised long-standing concerns about the possible theft or 
diversion of nuclear materials from these facilities. 
Indeed, despite efforts made in Russia to protect nuclear stockpiles, recent 
seizures show that it is still a serious concern. Seizures or attempted thefts of weapons-
grade material, uranium or plutonium, have been documented in the region since the 
Soviet Union collapsed. In every case, the material seized had not been missed and 
mostly the theft was made by an insider. A recent case in Georgia was shared with 
delegates to a NPR. Most details of the trial were kept confidential but wanted to 
demonstrate a real and current threat to those gathered to do next step.362 According to 
one researcher, “There has never been a good physical inventory. Accounting rules in the 
Soviet Union were not designed with an internal threat in mind,” The researcher 
continued to say, “No one registered that this material was missing and we still don’t 
know whether other material went missing.”363 Indeed, this exponentially complicates 
preventing the materials on the black market. 
According to the one such study, the WMD black market consists of three types 
of proliferators: “willful proliferators,” such as A.Q. Kahn  who intentionally sells 
sensitive information for profit, “willfully blind proliferators” who should know that their 
skills and materials may be used to advance a bomb-making program but fail to take due 
diligence to prevent such acts, and finally, “ignorant proliferators” who genuinely do not 
understand the consequences of their actions.364 Each of these scenarios takes advantage 
of opportunities in the supply chain and flourishes within an environment of lax 
government oversight and security mechanisms.  
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The nuclear trading network of A.Q. Kahn , the so-called father of the Pakistani 
bomb, marked a new front of nuclear terrorism. The network was able to expand its 
operation into a transnational illegal network to export gas-centrifuges, and production 
capabilities, as well as designees for nuclear weapons.365 For the first time, an 
individual—not a state—created a multi-national business that provided nuclear materials 
and technology to any willing buyer.366 The nuclear smuggling network managed to buy 
and sell nuclear weapons capabilities for two decades while eluding the world’s 
intelligence agencies and non-proliferations institutions. A.Q. Kahn  admitted to selling 
equipment and expertise to Iran, Libya, and North Korea367 and widely speculated it may 
have consulted with Syria. It is also known to have approached Al Qaeda with an offer to 
nuclear secrets prior to the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan.368 His visits to Afghanistan 
during this period have added to suspicions that Khan may have offered nuclear aid to Al 
Qaeda or other terrorist organizations based in Afghanistan at the time.369  
The Khan network demonstrated many things, such as a demand for nuclear 
supplies and equipment and knowledge existed, which could support an illegal black 
market with significant profits, that an illegal underground black market for WMD 
supplies could flourish, and that a transnational operation could operate without detection 
long enough to cause significant damage without detection from U.S. intelligence. 
Members of the network knew how to exploit loopholes in the export control system. 
Khan is said to have been motivated by financial gain by selling to mostly Muslim-
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countries. In addition to money, Khan may have also been motivated by pan-Islamism 
and hostility to Western controls on nuclear technology.370  
As the head of the Atomic Energy Agency, Mohamed ElBaradei said, “The 
information is now all over the place….as a result, it now seems far more likely that, 
sooner or later a rouge state or terror group will be able to obtain the ingredients and the 
designs for nuclear weapons.”371 A consensus that the A.Q. Kahn  network has not really 
been shut down but is in hibernation seems to be growing among experts. Other 
proliferation networks may also exist. 
Active state sponsors are probably the least likely scenario as conscious state 
decisions to provide nuclear material or weapons to terrorists is unlikely given that they 
would have to consciously decide to give up such a power once developed, even for 
(relative) modest financial gain. Given that, such an act would be disastrous.372 A 1997 
assessment made by the U.S. Department of Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) states), 
states, “Most of the state sponsors have chemical or biological or radiological material in 
their stockpiles and therefore, have the ability to provide such weapons to terrorist if they 
wish. However, we have no conclusive information that any sponsor has the intention to 
provide these weapons to terrorists.”373 That assessment was consistent with a 2010 
assessment, which said, we do not know of any states deliberately providing CBRN 
assistance to terrorist groups. Although terrorist groups and individuals have sought out 
scientists with applicable expertise, no corroborated reporting indicates such experts have 
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been able to develop advanced CBRN capability with the permission of any state 
sponsorship or government.374 
The specter of a nuclear, chemical, or biological attack by a terrorist group based 
in a failed state requires the development of capacity not just in states unable to exert 
effective control over territory, but also in those states that are potential sources of 
proscribed WMD-related technologies. Leakage of WMD technologies or expertise, 
rather than a direct transfer as an act of state policy, is the more probable route by which 
a terrorist group might acquire such capabilities for a mass-casualty attack and must be 
taken into account when developing counterproliferation strategies.375 In short, more 
states in possession of nuclear technology, material and expertise, increase the likelihood 
of terrorists being able to acquire the means to produce WMD. Countries with WMD 
capabilities and expertise, whether hostile or failed, present a particular vulnerability for 
terrorists to exploit. States also provide unintended opportunity. For instance, porous 
borders also provide a convenient route for illegal trafficking in drugs, weapons, people, 
and even nuclear materials, such as those in the in the North Caucus region,376 or 
Pakistan.377  
2. The Convergence between WMD-related Material Trafficking and 
Transnational Criminal Organizations  
Revelation about the A.Q. Kahn  network also fueled new concerns about the 
merging of international terrorist organizations with transnational organized crime. Many 
experts acknowledge that clear overlaps exist between international terrorist and 
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organized crime networks.378 Pointing out that terrorist organizations and organized 
crime had already cooperated in the narcotics trafficking, a number of analysts warned 
that organized crime might decide to channel WMD material to terrorists.379 In 
Congressional testimony, one terrorism expert testified that organized crime had “entered 
a new phase of complicity” with terrorist networks: 
Terrorist and criminal organizations rely on the same global 
transportation, communication, and financial infrastructures for illegal 
ploys. They take advantage of the same breakdowns in authority and 
enforcement in states under siege. They both seek increasing shares of the 
fortunes generated from narco-trafficking and other crimes.380 
Many reasons exist to fear such a connection including the financial means 
available to organized crime syndicates and well-established trafficking channels,381 and 
in some cases, connections to corrupt governments.382 Countries with a weak rule of law 
pose the greatest opportunities for organized crime networks to exploit.383 They have 
demonstrated capabilities to move almost any illegal product across multiple international 
borders undetected—it is not a stretch to conceive that these criminal organization would 
choose to apply the same networks through which they traffic narcotic and small arms. 
(for example) to trafficking in WMD if financial motivation is possible. 
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Much of the concern about a possible nexus between WMD trafficking, organized 
crime, and terrorism originally focused on the former Soviet Union in the 1990s. At the 
time, a large number of insufficiently secured nuclear, chemical, and biological facilities 
were located in close proximity to trafficking routes for drugs and small arms. Powerful 
radiation sources also are plentiful and inadequately protected.384 However, while a 
handful of significant cases existed, the full potential convergence between WMD-related 
material trafficking and terrorism was largely unrealized. However, one analysis over the 
2001–2006 period yielded other notable features.385 First, was the appearance of 
trafficking in chemical and biological material. Second, was that trafficking routes appear 
to have become more varied during the post-2001 period. Third, was that a few cases 
involved nuclear or radioactive material in combination with small arms (four cases) and 
narcotics (two cases), which may indicate a convergence between arms or drugs and 
WMD-related material. Fourth, in some of these cases, the nuclear or radioactive material 
was discovered by chance during an unrelated drug or financial investigation (which may 
indicate that the drug control and financial fraud enforcement agencies can also be useful 
instruments of proliferation prevention). Fifth, the data also includes a small number of 
cases involving opportunists who show a higher degree of organization. Several incidents 
involve groups of individuals who do not belong to an established organized crime group 
but collaborate for a specific operation, sometimes with the active participation of former 
law enforcement representatives. Finally, in addition, one out of four cases involves 
potent radioactive sources, particularly cesium-137 (37 cases) and stronsium-90 (six 
cases), which could be used for RDDs.386  
In 2011, the White House released its strategy to combat transnational organized 
crime,387 which notes, “transnational criminal organizations have taken advantage of our 
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increasingly interconnected world to expand their illicit enterprises.”388 Despite a long 
standing and successful history of dismantling criminal organizations, “not all of our 
capabilities have kept pace with the expansion of 21st century transnational criminal 
threats.”389 Therefore, this strategy is organized around “a single, unifying principle: to 
build, balance, and integrate the tools of American power to combat transnational 
organized crime and related threats to our national security—and to urge our partners to 
do the same.”390  
Although it does not call out WMD trafficking specifically as a threat linked to 
transnational organized crime, it does recognize the broad spectrum of threats, 
advantages, and opportunities created by its nature. Further, it recognizes that 
transnational criminal networks, such as organized crime groups, drug traffickers, and 
weapons dealers, at times share convergence points—places, businesses, or people—to 
“launder” or convert their illicit profits into legitimate funds.391 
“In a world full of transnational threats, transnational crime is in an ascendant 
phase... This lethal nexus of organized crime, narco-trafficking, and terrorism is a threat 
that the United States…..Today, right now, we have an opportunity for cooperation not 
just between the United States and Russia, but among all nations represented here today. 
It’s up to us to seize the moment...”392 
H. STATES OF CONCERN—COUNTRY PROFILES 
Although the primary concern for proliferation transformed from state sponsored 
terrorism to that of a non-state group or independent terrorist group, the challenges that 
rogue nations, nations with a history of supporting terrorists or those with weak or 
collapsing governments, certainly fuel many of the opportunities for these groups to 
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exploit. The potential linkage between terrorism and WMD proliferation is more apparent 
when examined in the context of known nations’ governance and history with 
criminal/terrorist activities. According to the State Department, “Although terrorist 
organizations will continue to seek a [WMD] capability independent of state programs, 
the sophisticated [WMD] knowledge and resources of a state could enable a terrorist 
capability.”393  
The challenges in acquiring nuclear materials also highlights the importance of 
the nature of terrorists’ relationships with states. One researcher succinctly summarizes 
these dynamics:  
States can cooperate actively, as al Qaeda did with the Taliban and 
Hezbollah does with Iran. States can take a mixed approach toward 
terrorist activity often balancing leadership opposition to terrorist groups 
with popular support for them. Some failed or weak states such as (at 
times) Somalia or the Sudan are incapable of controlling terrorists within 
their borders. Each situation provides a terrorist group with a stronger 
platform from which to launch a nuclear attack.394 
In fact, the U.S. Department of State currently designates two of the primary 
countries of proliferation concern, Iran and Syria, as state sponsors of terrorism.395 
Taliban-ruled Afghanistan would have made the list before 9/11, but was omitted for the 
simple reason that Washington never diplomatically recognized the Kabul regime.396 
Iraq, Libya, and North Korea have also shared the same designation in the not so distant 
past.397  
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Equally, or more troubling, given the current threat, is the one which designates 
nations that may provide “safe havens”398 from which terrorists are able to operate. Iraq, 
Pakistan, and Afghanistan are designated as terrorist safe havens.  
Only nine countries have nuclear weapons399 (some not part of NPT) but out of 
the nine that do, only two, Pakistan and North Korea, do analysts debate over what they 
might do with those arsenals or that they are secure.400 The BWC and CWC have high 
levels of compliance but more nations may be operating covert programs that often 
receive less attention and are harder to detect because much of the same technology is 
used in the private sector and labs.  
A large community of scholars holds that no state would transfer materials to 
terrorist groups.401 They argue that a state will be deterred by even a remote possibility of 
retaliation; this contention responds to the claim that a state might transfer weapons or 
materials in the pursuit of strategic aims. They also argue that problem states are 
normally dictatorships whose leaders do not want to relinquish control to terrorists, or 
moreover, those just below the top leadership would not have the authority to transfer 
materials or weapons. Finally, since nukes are expensive and difficult to acquire, a state 
that had successfully acquired them would not want to part with them.402  
Many researchers contend that no state would transfer materials to a terrorist 
group citing three key reasons, (1) a state will be deterred by even the prospect of 
retaliation, (2) most likely to occur under dictatorships whose leaders are highly unlikely 
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to relinquish control, and (3) top leadership would lack the authority to transfer 
materials.403  
Although this paper does not argue that these nations would officially use nuclear 
force or unconventional (WMD) force against the United States, they do each possess a 
unique set of political, social and economic circumstances that create security concerns 
and potential opportunities for would be terrorist organizations to exploit. To understand 
the top proliferation concerns better in relation to nation-states, a brief overview of each 
county’s potential linkage and key issues is included in this paper.  
1. Pakistan  
Over the last decade, Pakistan has made huge strides in growing their nuclear 
program. While Pakistan is currently considered a U.S. ally, no doubt exists that they 
have significant sympathies with the rest of the Middle East (and largely Muslim) world. 
Moreover, given the tense history of Pakistani-Indian relations, including a series of wars 
over Kashmir, India and Pakistan’s buildup of nuclear weapons is exacerbating the 
prospect of a dangerous nuclear arms race in South Asia that could lead to a nuclear 
conflict.404 
Pakistan has been a passive sponsor of terrorism, but also has a deficit of 
governmental capacity to control the Afghan border region fully, which allowed the 
Haqqani Network, the Quetta Shura, and Lashkar-e-Tayyiba to exploit the country to plan 
and direct operations.405  
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Sites with unknown security controls are ripe with government and military 
personnel who are sympathizers of the radical Islamic factions.406 The possibility of 
radical Islamists seizing control of Pakistan’s government, and therefore its nuclear 
arsenal, is also of serious concern.407  
The potential for WMD trafficking and proliferation remained a concern in 
Pakistan due to the porous borders and the challenging security situation and lack of 
knowledge regarding export licensing practices.408 Pakistan also constitutes a threat 
because it serves as a possible point of diversion. Pakistan has a small, heavily guarded 
nuclear stockpile. Substantial security improvements have been made in recent years, in 
part with U.S. help, but the specifics of this cooperation are classified. Immense threats 
remain in Pakistan from nuclear insiders with extremist sympathies, al Qaeda, or Taliban 
outsider attacks, and a weak state.409 The Umma-Tameer-e-Nau (UTN), founded by 
Pakistani nuclear scientists with close ties to Al Qaeda and the Taliban, was headed by 
Sultan Bahiruddin Mahmood, who had been in charge of Pakistan’s Khushabreactor.410  
Of course, Pakistan was the home of nuclear scientist A.Q. Kahn , who operated 
out of Pakistan. Kahn is responsible for the development of Pakistan’s uranium 
enrichment program and confessed to running a proliferation network ad to funneling 
sensitive nuclear technologies to Iran, Libya, and North Korea while in Pakistan.411 The 
Pakistani government was fairly uncooperative with the investigation which originally 
refused to arrest Kahn and has refused to let anyone other than Pakistani government 
                                                 
406 Jenkins, Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?.  
407 The A.Q. Kahn Network: Case Closed?, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on International 
Terrorism and Nonproliferation of the Committee on International Relations House of Representatives, 
May 25, 2006, 1. 
408 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Country Reports on 
Terrorism, “Chapter 2: Reports on East Asia and Pacific Overview.” 
409 Bunn, “Securing the Bomb 2010,” vii. 
410 Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, “Nuclear Security in Pakistan: Reducing the Risk of Nuclear Terrorism,” 
Arms Control Today, July/August 2009.  
411 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “A.Q. Kahn Nuclear Chronology,” Issue Brief, III. 
no. 8 (September 7, 2005): 1; David Albright and Corey Hiderstein, “Unraveling the A.Q. Kahn and Future 
Proliferation Networks,” The Washington Quarterly, Spring 2005, 111. 
 102 
officials interview Kahn.412 Kahn was sentenced to house arrest in 2004 but was declared 
a “free man” by a Pakstani court in February 2009.413 
Pakistan poses a major threat because of its terrorist networks, history of 
instability, and nuclear arsenal of several dozen warheads. Senator Graham and others 
assert that if terrorism and WMD were mapped today, “all roads would intersect in 
Pakistan.”414  
2. North Korea  
Attention has focused on North Korea ever since their covert nuclear weapons 
program was discovered in 1994. In 2002, a CIA report stated that evidence had been 
found indicating that they had begun constructing a centrifuge facility and embarked on 
an effort to develop a uranium enrichment program.415 In 2006, a team of visiting 
researchers noted, “We know very little about the DPRK nuclear stockpile and the 
nation’s nuclear strategy. DPRK officials stated the role of their nuclear weapons is to 
deter the United States and defend the sovereignty of their state.”416 What is known is 
that North Korea already has enough plutonium for several nuclear weapons, has 
conducted two nuclear tests, has pulled out of the NPT, and ejected international weapons 
inspectors.417 Concern has grown in tandem with the country’s deteriorating internal 
condition and rising tensions in South East Asia.  
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While the North Korean nuclear program may lead to rising nuclear tensions 
regarding power and security within the region, the risk of terrorism arising from that 
county’s program remains fairly low. In North Korea, a very small nuclear stockpile and 
a military state probably limit the risks of nuclear theft.418 What may be a greater threat 
is the risk of a failing state. The very real possibility of the collapse of the state could 
destroy whatever controls are in place and create a serious problem of loose nukes.419 
However, while it was once widely feared that a coup d’état during a leadership change 
could threaten the security of their weapons program, that threat failed to materialize after 
the death of Kim Jong-Il. In fact, in recent a recent interview, South Korean nuclear 
officials stated that they were “optimistic” that the new leader may be willing to restart 
negotiations to end its nuclear program420 after they broke down in 2008.421  
North Korea’s latent nuclear weapons program is rightfully the main point of 
concern for its neighbors and the international community but far less publicized is 
Pyongyang’s ongoing efforts to build upon its capabilities to produce and maintain 
chemical and biological weapons (CBW). Unclassified estimates of the chemical 
weapons (CW) arsenal are imprecise. The consensus seems to be that even though the 
North Korean stockpile does not appear to be increasing, it already possesses a 
substantial chemical arsenal sufficient to inflict massive civilian casualties on South 
Korea.422  
North Korea acceded to the Biological Weapons Convention in 1987, and the 
Geneva Protocol in 1989, but has not signed the Chemical Weapons Convention. While 
the international community has some diplomatic measures to deal with its nuclear 
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program, no direct mechanism is available for dealing with its chemical weapons and 
possible biological weapons. 
3. Iran  
At the time of this writing, Iran stands as the most prominent potential threat to 
the international community in terms of escalating its nuclear proliferation program. 
While Western officials have long asserted that Tehran is planning to build nuclear 
weapons, Iran’s leadership has insisted that its goal in developing a nuclear program is to 
for energy and medical purposes.423 However, the 2007 NIE found that Iran had been 
engaged in developing a nuclear weapons program. This program is believed to have 
included the full range of weapons development, from acquiring the raw nuclear material 
to working on a weapon with a delivery system.424 
In November 2011, the IAEA released its report on nuclear verification in Iran 
detailing a “credible” case that “Iran has carried out activities relevant to the development 
of a nuclear device” and that the project may still be under way.”425 The 2011 IAEA 
report was consistent with the findings in the 2007 NIE regarding a comprehensive 
weapons program in Iran prior to 2003426 and warned that Iran appears to be on a 
structured path to building a nuclear weapon.427 The report cited that the IAEA had 
amassed “thousands of documents, showing “research, development and testing 
activities” on a range of technologies that would only be useful in designing a nuclear 
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weapon.428 Previous IAEA assessments were very cautious on that claim and mainly 
pointed out that many uncertainties still existed concerning Iran’s real intentions. The 
activities documented in the IAEA report, including research related to nuclear warheads, 
underscore Iran’s claims that it is only seeking the peaceful use of nuclear energy are 
false.429 
Iran has continually defied the United Nations resolutions to stop enrichment 
practices. Iran’s warhead work also contradicts its obligation not to pursue nuclear 
weapons under the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), under which state parties 
commit “not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or 
other nuclear explosive devices.”430 The IAEA report reinforces what the non-
proliferation community has alleged for some time: that Iran engaged in various nuclear 
weapons development activities until 2003, then stopped many of them, but continues 
others.431 The report suggests that Iran is working to shorten the timeframe to build the 
bomb once and if it makes that decision.432  
International concerns with Iran’s intentions continue to grow. The IAEA’s2013 
report assessed that Iran had made progress across the board in its nuclear program, 
enriching more uranium and installing hundreds of next-generation centrifuges that could 
speed enrichment.433 
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Iran’s nuclear aspirations are certainly increasing tensions in the international 
community, and specifically, within the region. Concern is increasing among American 
officials that Israel may soon strike at Iran’s nuclear facilities.434  
However, should Iran’s actions to enrich uranium and to develop a nuclear 
weapons program be seen as an increased risk for WMD terrorism?—Not necessarily. 
Although Iran is actively pursuing an enrichment program, its stockpile and facilities are 
well guarded and the state is unlikely to fall into instability. Also, it is unlikely at the 
present moment that Iran has enough enriched uranium to transfer to anyone else for use, 
or that what it does have is enriched to a high enough level to be weapons grade. (HEU 
with enrichment levels as low as 20% and be used (at least in theory) in improvised 
weapons; although, most reactors use uranium enriched to up to 80%).435 However, if 
Iran does continue to produce HEU, that may create more and regional fears and may 
encourage other nations to follow suit to develop programs of their own;436 thereby, 
increasing the number of opportunities terrorists may exploit.  
The Iranian situation does highlight the long standing friction between the 
obligations of NPT Articles II and III (under which the NWS agree not to help NNWS 
develop or acquire nuclear weapons, and the NNWS permanently forswear the pursuit of 
such weapons) and Article IV of the NPT (Article IV acknowledges the “inalienable 
right” of NNWS to research, develop, and use nuclear energy for non-weapons purposes). 
It also supports the “fullest possible exchange” of such nuclear-related information and 
technology between NWS and NNW if legitimate peaceful energy programs are to be 
pursued.437,438 
Iran has been designated as a state sponsor of terrorism since 1984. Iran’s 
financial, material, and logistic support for terrorist and militant groups are well known.  
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Despite its pledge to support the stabilization of Iraq, in 2011, Iran continued to 
provide lethal support—including weapons, training, funding, and guidance—to Iraqi 
Shia militant groups that targeted U.S. and Iraqi forces.  
Iran provided weapons, training, and funding to both Hamas and Hezbollah, 
Hamas and other Palestinian terrorist groups, including the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) 
and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command. Since the end of 
the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah conflict, Iran has assisted Hezbollah in rearming, in direct 
violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701.439 Iran has provided hundreds of 
millions of dollars in support of Hezbollah in Lebanon and has trained thousands of 
Hezbollah fighters at camps in Iran.440 Iran has also provided training to the Taliban in 
Afghanistan on small unit tactics, small arms, explosives, and indirect fire weapons. The 
group’s robust relationships with the regimes in Iran and Syria, involvement in illicit 
financial activity, continued engagement in international attack planning, and acquisition 
of increasingly sophisticated missiles and rockets, continued to threaten U.S. interests in 
the region.441 Meanwhile, Hamas retained its grip on Gaza, where it continued to 
stockpile weapons that pose a serious threat to regional stability. Moreover, Hamas and 
other Gaza-based groups continue to smuggle weapon materiel, and people through the 
Sinai, and thus, take advantage of the vast and largely ungoverned territory.442 
In 2010, Iran remained unwilling to bring to justice senior al-Qa’ida (AQ) 
members it continued to detain, and refused to identify those senior members publicly in 
its custody. Iran has repeatedly resisted numerous calls to transfer custody of its AQ 
detainees to their countries of origin or third countries for trial.443 
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4. Russia and the Former Soviet Republics  
While the nuclear tension between the United States and the Soviet Union conflict 
that drove the nuclear arms race in both superpower nations has ended, the collapse of the 
Soviet Union brought new concerns regarding the security of those stockpiles. From the 
perspective of potential terrorism, the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991 
was much more problematic. After this time, many analysts grew concerned that nuclear 
weapons might be lost or stolen, or fall into the wrong hands.  
When the Soviet Union collapsed in late 1991, it reportedly possessed more than 
27,000 nuclear weapons, and these weapons were deployed on the territories of several of 
the former Soviet republics.444 All the nuclear warheads have now been moved to Russia, 
but Russia still has around 6,000 strategic nuclear weapons and perhaps as many as 
12,000 warheads for non-strategic nuclear weapons.445 
Several of the former soviet republics (FSU) states possessed tens of thousands of 
nuclear weapons, massive quantities of weapons-usable nuclear material, huge stocks of 
chemical munitions and biological agents, and a staggering quantity of delivery vehicles 
for WMD. According to Sam Nunn, one architect of the measure, three of the FSU 
countries—Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan—had more nuclear weapons on their 
territory than China, Great Britain, and France combined.446 
To assist the former Soviet Republics, and reduce the threat these weapons pose 
to the United States and the proliferation risks from nuclear weapons and materials in the 
former Soviet Union, Congress established the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat 
Reduction Program (CTR) in 1991. However, due to significant commitment work by 
Russia’s own efforts, and other international cooperative efforts, significant progress in 
Russia’s nuclear security has occurred. The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction 
aimed at reducing the threat of these weapons was an international effort, headed by the 
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United States, to assist with the former Soviet republics with the safe and secure 
transportation, storage, and elimination of nuclear weapons and secure stockpiles.447 This 
nuclear security initiative (known as The Bratislava Initiatives) completed in 2005, did 
much to secure nuclear security. Some estimate the over risk of nuclear threat to be a 
fraction of what it was a decade ago.448 While often considered a unique program with a 
limited scope, Nunn-Lugar has matured into a “complex and comprehensive” foreign 
policy and national security mechanism.449 
Many of these weapons were located outside Russia, but have since been returned 
to storage areas in Russia. The former Soviet republics of Ukraine, Belarus, and 
Kazakhstan—where the Soviets based many of their nuclear warheads—safely returned 
their Soviet nuclear weapons to post-communist Russia in the 1990s, but all three 
countries still have stockpiles of weapons-grade uranium and plutonium.450 Such was the 
status of Russian Nuclear security shortly after 9/11. While often considered a unique 
program with a limited scope, Nunn-Lugar has matured into a complex and 
comprehensive foreign policy and national security mechanism.451 
However, significant weaknesses remain in some areas. A major need still exists 
for consolidation, as Russia still has the world’s largest numbers of nuclear weapons sites 
and weapons-usable nuclear materials buildings, including the world’s largest fleet of 
HEU-fueled research reactors and its security measure face substantial threats from both 
insiders and outsiders.452 Russia is the only country in the world where senior officials 
have confirmed that terrorist teams have carried out reconnaissance at nuclear weapon 
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storage sites.453 In 2005, another Russian minister in charge of guarding nuclear facilities 
confirmed they had information that “international terrorists have planned attacks against 
nuclear and power industry installations” intended to “seize nuclear materials and use 
them to build WMD for their own political use.”  
5. Libya 
Libya is reported to have spent between $40 million and $100 million over an 
approximate five-year period purchasing nuclear weapons assistance from Pakistan.454 In 
October 2003, the seizure of uranium-enriched gas-centrifuge components bound for 
Libya demonstrated just how far the Khan network was able to traffic in nuclear 
components.455 Although Libya subsequently renounced nuclear weapons and gained 
compliance with the NPT, it became apparent what countries were able to access 
components should they have the desire.  
The Khan network provided material and expertise to produce fissile material. It 
also provided them with detailed nuclear weapons designs, component information, and 
weapons assembly instructions.456 In fact, a shipment of centrifuges to Libya were 
intercepted by U.S. authorities, who thereby, broke up the Khan network.  
6. Afghanistan 
The international community continues to work in concert with the International 
Security Assistance Force. The government of Afghanistan, in concert with the 
international community, continued its efforts to eliminate terrorist safe havens and build 
security, particularly in the country’s south and east where insurgents threatened stability. 
The Taliban, the Haqqani Network, Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin, al-Qa’ida (AQ), Lashkar-
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e-Tayyiba, and other groups continued to use territory across the border in Pakistan as a 
base from which to plot and launch attacks within the region and beyond.457 AQ 
leadership in Pakistan maintained its support to militants conducting attacks in 
Afghanistan and provided funding, training, and personnel to facilitate terrorist and 
insurgent operations. 
The government of Afghanistan holds no known sources of WMD, but the 
potential for WMD trafficking and proliferation was a concern in Afghanistan because of 
its porous borders and the presence of terrorist groups.  
7. Syria 
The best open source report indicate that Syria has a robust, decades-old chemical 
weapons program that has produced a variety of both mustard and nerve agents for use on 
multiple weapons systems ranging from missiles, rockets, artillery, and aerial bombs. A 
great deal of unconfirmed reporting also states that Syria may also have a biological 
weapons program. It is known that Syria also possesses North Korean long range delivery 
missiles, which makes Syria a forbidding regional threat, especially if the regime 
becomes seriously threatened and any WMD capability they may have susceptible to 
diversion of terrorist or other insurgent groups.  
Syria is suspected of having one of the most advanced chemical warfare (CW) 
capabilities in the Middle East.458 Syria is one of seven non-signatories to the CWC but 
admitted in 2012 to possessing a stockpile of chemical weapons, which it claims are 
reserved for national defense against foreign countries.459  
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Less is known about Syria’s suspected biological weapons program. Very limited 
open source information is available regarding Syria’s biological warfare (BW) 
capabilities but it is suspected that Syria is also associated with an active biological 
weapons research and production program. German and Israeli sources have asserted that 
Syria possesses Bacillus anthracis (which causes anthrax), botulinum toxin, and ricin. 
American sources have characterized Syria’s anthrax and botulism production capability 
as “probable.”460 According to one NATO consultant, Syria has worked on anthrax, 
plague, tularemia, botulinium, smallpox, aflotoxin, cholera, ricin and camelpox, and has 
used Russian help in installing anthrax in missile warheads.461 The consultant also stated 
“they view their bio-chemical arsenal as part of a normal weapons program.”462 
Assessments of Syria’s possible nuclear weapons program have caused 
disagreements pertaining to either CWC or BWC programs. Syria is a signatory to the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and has repeatedly attempted to purchase small 
research type nuclear reactors from China, Russia, Argentina, or other countries.463 Syria 
has allegedly received direct assistance from Russia (and formerly the Soviet Union), 
China, Iran, and North Korea in developing its WMD and ballistic missile programs.464 
Western agencies alleged that they had proof of a Syrian covert weapons program. In 
September 2007, the Washington Post reported, “…... a former Israeli official said he had 
been told that it was an attack against a facility capable of making unconventional 
weapons.”465 The report went on to claim that Israel had recently provided the United 
States with evidence—code named “Orchard”—that North Korea had been cooperating 
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with Syria on a nuclear facility.466 The evidence, said to come primarily from Israel, 
includes dramatic satellite imagery.467  
Pakistani investigators reportedly found that Khan’s middlemen offered help to 
Syria but never provided assistance in the end; an assertion still subject to scrutiny.468  
Based upon these assessments, on September 6, 2007, Israel bombed a site in 
Syria that it believed had been a nuclear reactor under construction.469 Damascus faces 
unresolved allegations that it illicitly tried to build a plutonium production reactor at a 
site destroyed by Israel in 2007. 
Reports about the intelligence leading to the bombing are conflicted. Initial 
Western press reports asserted that the Israeli air strike followed a shipment delivery to 
Syria by a North Korean freighter, and that North Korea was suspected of supplying a 
reactor to Syria for a nuclear weapons program. On October 24, 2007, the Institute for 
Science and International Security released a report that identified a site in eastern Syria’s 
Deir ez-Zor Governorate province as the suspected reactor. The report speculated about 
similarities between the Syrian building and North Korea’s Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific 
Research Center, but said it was too early to make a definitive comparison.470 On 
October 25, 2007, Western media said the main building and any debris from it following 
the air strike had been completely dismantled and removed by the Syrians.471 
After refusing to comment on the reports for six months, the Bush administration 
briefed Congress and the IAEA on April 24, 2008, saying that the U.S. government was 
                                                 
466 Kessler, “N. Korea, Syria May Be at Work on Nuclear Facility,” A12. 
467 David E. Sanger, “Bush Administration Releases Images to Bolster Its Claims About Syrian 
Reactor,” The New York Times, April, 25, 2008. 
468 Press Trust of India, “Khan Gave Nuke Tech to Three More Nations,” January 2, 2005.  
469 Israel claimed that the nuclear reactor was not yet operational and no nuclear material had been 
introduced into it. Top U.S. intelligence officials claimed low confidence that the site was meant for 
weapons development, noting that the site did not have a reprocessing faculty, but later comments by 
President Bush contradicted such an assessment.  
470 David Albright and Paul Brannan, “Suspect Reactor Construction Site in Eastern Syria: The Site of 
the September 6, Israeli Raid? Institute for Science and International Studies, October 23, 2007, 
http://www.isis-online.org/publications/SuspectSite_24October2007.pdf. 
471 William J. Broad and Mark Mazzetti, “Photos Show Cleansing of Suspect Syrian Site,” New York 
Times, October 26, 2007. 
 114 
“convinced” that Syria had been building a “covert nuclear reactor” “not intended for 
peaceful purposes.”472 The briefing included releases of satellite photographs of the 
bombed site and overhead and ground level intelligence photographs of the site under 
construction, including the alleged reactor vessel steel shell before concrete was poured 
and of the alleged reactor head structure. 
On November 26, 2008, the IAEA Board of Governors approved technical aid for 
Syria despite Western allegations that the country had a secret atomic program that could 
eventually be used to make weapons. China, Russia, and developing nations criticized 
Western “political interference” that they said undermined the IAEA’s program to foster 
civilian atomic energy development.473 The top U.N. nuclear official also strongly 
rebuked Western powers for trying to deny the request, saying this should not be done 
without evidence and merely on the existence of an investigation.474 
In recent months, the situation has created increasing concern within the United 
States and other Western states. President Obama and other policy makers have recently 
weighed in. In July 2012, two Senators issued a joint statement expressing their alarm 
over the movement of the chemical weapons and urged President Obama to “respond 
accordingly.”475 President Obama commented on the concern saying that if suspicions 
were true, that Assad is transferring chemical weapons from secure sites to the battlefield, 
it significantly raises the risks they may lose control over these weapons or that they may 
be compromised.476  
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We cannot have a situation in which chemical or biological weapons are 
falling into the hands of the wrong people. We have been very clear to the 
Assad regime but also to other players on the ground that a red line for us 
is, we start seeing a whole bunch of weapons moving around or being 
utilized.477 
I. CONCLUSION 
A complex set of factors shape a group’s propensity to acquire and use nuclear 
weapons. Religious and political goals do provide a dangerous motivating component, 
but the greatest danger occurs when the group also has technical capabilities, easily 
exploitable opportunities, and justification for mass murder to further those goals. 
Technical and scientific hurdles have proved daunting but experts warn that the odds for 
a successful attack could rise significantly in the future as determined foes intersect with 
advancing technology and people willing to advance their cause by sharing technology 
and materials. Moreover, as with all criminal enterprise opportunities, in this case, access 
to materials and knowledge is the key factor.  
CBRN materials and expertise remain a significant terrorist threat based on: 
terrorists’ stated intent to acquire and use these materials; the nature of injury and damage 
these weapons can inflict; the ease with which information on these topics now flows, 
and the dual-use nature of many relevant technologies and precursors, which makes them 
difficult to control.478  
While significant efforts have been directed toward securing CBRN material 
across the globe, the illicit trafficking of these materials persists, including instances 
involving highly enriched uranium.479 These examples suggest that caches of dangerous 
material may exist on the black market and that the international community must 
complement its efforts to consolidate CBRN materials and protect facilities with broader 
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efforts to detect, investigate, and secure CBRN materials that have fallen outside of 
proper control.  
Nuclear weapons and other WMD lie at the heart of what many fear to be the 
worst possible nexus of transnational crime and terrorism. As the Director of the National 
Intelligence testified:  
Over the coming years, we will continue to face a substantial threat, 
including in the U.S. Homeland, from terrorists attempting to acquire 
biological, chemical, and possibly nuclear weapons and use them to 
conduct large-scale attacks. Conventional weapons and explosives will 
continue to be the most often used instruments of destruction in terrorist 
attacks; however, terrorists who are determined to develop CBRN 
capabilities will have increasing opportunities to do so, owing to the 
spread of relevant technological knowledge and the ability to work with 
CBRN materials and designs in safe havens.480 
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IV. CURRENT CHALLENGES IN PROLIFERATION AS 
RELATED TO WMD TERRORISM 
A. THREAT CONVERGENCE 
Concerns about WMD proliferation are not new and are as old as the nuclear era. 
As was demonstrated in the literature review, the core documents, which still serve as the 
cornerstone for policy, were drafted decades ago. However, changes in the last decade 
have created a dangerous new world and have changed the rules of the game. Concerns 
over a proliferation/terrorism nexus took on new meaning after 9/11. Troubling are 
attempts—both covert and overt—by countries to gain nuclear technology for use in 
weaponry and energy that is expanding the stockpile of HEU and plutonium, which may 
be vulnerable. A related trend is the involvement of organized crime networks in nuclear 
smuggling and trafficking. As international organized crime networks increasingly 
overlap and even merge with terrorist networks, this could be a route for terrorists 
obtaining technology or nuclear materials.481  
The last decade of the 20th century was significantly enhanced by the rapid 
globalization of information technologies. In fact, the very trends driving globalization—
improved communications and transportation links—can enable development of extended 
proliferation networks that may facilitate the terrorist acquisition of WMD. 
Several dimensions of the WMD threat convergence problem are: (1) the risks of 
non-state actors procurement of nuclear materials, (2) the potential for collaboration 
between state and non-state actors as an avenue for WMD proliferation, and (3) the range 
of motivations and internal rationales that make WMD terrorism attractive to terrorist 
groups.482 This chapter highlights five issues that must be incorporated into the non-
proliferation framework design.  
                                                 
481 Gordon Corera, Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity and the Rise and 
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B. TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM AND THE RISE OF NON-STATE 
ACTORS  
Transnational or “international terrorism” began in 1968 with the hijacking of an 
El Al flight, which is generally regarded as the beginning of the era of modern 
terrorism.483 Terrorism in this era was defined by bold political statements made through 
the target selection of the terrorist group. Often, the attacks targeted national symbols, 
and the attacks led to crises that could prove catastrophic.484 The aforementioned 
incident, carried out by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), targeted 
innocent civilians and was used to attract the public’s attention for the terrorists’ political 
reasons of attempting to make the Palestinian issue known beyond the region.  
9/11 and the years following have served to define what the evolving threat has 
come to look like. No longer are terrorists willing to take planes and remove the 
passengers, as was the case in the 1968 hijacking described above. Terrorist attack 
lethality has increased drastically since those early days and this apparent desire for an 
ever-higher body count has led analysts of the phenomena to question early assumptions 
about the terrorists’ lack of desire for WMD.485 While the 1960s, 70s and early 80s were 
generally defined by the instrumental use of violence by terrorists, the rise of religious 
terrorism has brought these earlier assumptions into question. As noted, in Chapter III, 
terrorism itself has arguably shown a marked trend toward greater lethality. Terrorist 
trends toward a higher and higher body counts suggests that some terrorists may seek to 
obtain and use these non-traditional weapons.486 
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In the wake of these incidents, a new era of terrorism was perceived by experts 
and government officials alike who foresaw a potentially bloodier and more destructive 
age of violence emerging upon approaching the 21st century.487 This growing proclivity 
toward violence appears to be evidence of a portentous shift in terrorism, away from its 
traditional emphasis on discrete, selective attacks toward a mode of violence now aimed 
at inflicting indiscriminate and wanton slaughter. Certainly, such attacks as the 1993 car 
bomb attack that convulsed Bombay, India, the 1994 truck bomb explosion outside a 
Jewish community center in Buenos Aires, Argentina, the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. 
Murrah federal building in Oklahoma City, the 1996 suicide truck bomb attack against 
the Central Bank in Colombo, Sri Lanka, and the 1998 twin U.S. embassy bombings in 
Kenya and Tanzania,488 the 2001 attacks on the Pentagon and New York city, all 
illustrate this development. The combination of new motives, different rationales, and 
increased opportunities, coupled with enhanced terrorist capabilities, may lead to a new 
era of terrorist violence more dangerous and deadly than in the past.489 
In 1976, the CIA wrote a prophetic study entitled, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 
which concluded that globalization was an “irreversible trend” likely to aggravate the 
problem of terrorism in the coming years.490 However, the nature of transnational 
terrorism taught the nation not only about increasing violence, it also showed that 
terrorists are transnational criminals. Terrorist organizations are no longer constrained 
within a particular territory, or financially tied to a particular state.491 Al-Qaeda has 
emerged to embody the quintessential qualities of a transnational terror organization and 
9/11 attacks on the United States were transnational attacks by an organization that had 
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established and maintained a multinational presence in more than 50 countries. The 
capacity of transnational organizations to generate spectacular fear and cause intensive 
damage to a nation-state became fully evident on 9/11.  
The 2006 National Strategy to Combat Terrorism reflected on changes seen since 
9/11: 
Today, the principal enemy confronting the United States is 
a transnational movement of extremist organizations, networks, 
and individuals—and their state and non-state supporters - which 
have in common that they exploit Islam and use terrorism for 
ideological ends. This transnational movement is not monolithic. 
Although al-Qaida functions as the movement’s vanguard and remains, 
along with its affiliate groups and those inspired by them, the most 
dangerous manifestation of the enemy, the movement is not 
controlled by any single individual, group, or state.492 
In the weeks following the attacks, many criticisms pointed to a “massive 
intelligence failure” that had allowed the attacks to occur.493 One researcher wrote that 
the greatest intelligence failure of the 9/11 attacks constituted the inability on the part of 
intelligence and law enforcement agencies to grasp and understand that Al Qaeda 
represented a different type of terrorism, one “less anchored to specific geographic 
locations or political constituencies” and “one capable of achieving trans-global strategic 
reach in its operations.”494 The 9/11 attacks also exposed fundamental weaknesses of 
modern Western states, including vulnerable borders, inadequate immigration controls, 
and insufficient internal antiterrorism surveillance.495 Terrorism has now come to 
dominate the international security discourse. While the 9/11 attacks certainly revealed 
gaps in this nation’s terrorism prevention efforts and physical border controls,496 it also 
revealed fundamental gaps in U.S. strategy to deal with this new transnational threat.  
492 White House, “The 2006 National Strategy to Combat Terrorism,” 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nsct/2006/, 5. 
493 Senator Richard Shelby on the CBS News Show Face the Nation on September 16, 2001 (file 
accessed through Lexis-Nexis) as recounted by Paul Smith in Smith, “Transnational Terrorism and the al 
Qaeda Model: Confronting New Realities,” 33–46. 
494 Ed Blanche, “Al-Qaeda Recruitment,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, 14 (January 2002): 27–28 
495 A full discussion of the findings see The 9/11 Commission Report. 
496 Ibid. 
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The United States has re-conceptualized its international security strategy, and 
sought to distinguish terrorism fully from crime by “declaring it an act of war.”497 
Although threats have always existed between state actors, the emergence of terrorism as 
a viable and significant danger to the international community indicates that states are no 
longer the sole actors capable of initiating conflict while not being constrained in the 
same way states have traditionally been constrained. The 9/11 attacks have exposed the 
“asymmetric vulnerabilities of a highly interdependent global system.”498 
However, as this new threat of a transnational terrorism emerged post 9/11, few 
frameworks deal with this transnational threat. As noted in the literature review, a review 
of the core documents reveals that proliferation concerns are built upon a nation-state 
paradigm, which made the issue of dealing with transnational terrorism involving WMD 
all the more complex. According to Martha Crenshaw, prior to 9/11, the prevailing 
theories of international relations terrorism was not considered an important national 
security issue unless it united two dangers simultaneously, a threat to the U.S. homeland, 
and the use of WMD.499 She continues to explain that even the idea of terrorism itself 
was not a critically important issue accepted by “foreign policy specialists inside or 
outside of government.”500 Indeed, the 9/11 attacks required the entire global community 
to rethink its approach to terrorism.  
A challenge to the nation-state paradigm was highlighted in 2002/2003. The 
intelligence community posed a concern that Iraq may be a potential supplier of WMD to 
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terrorist entities.501 The United States lacked both the intellectual and organizational 
capacity to deal with the issue. President Bush wanted to remove Saddam Hussein 
through military action justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD.”502 However, 
when it was later found that while Saddam may have been developing the capability for 
such a WMD program, the justification had no connection to the terrorist attack.503 
However, perhaps poor intelligence is not the only reason for the flawed supposition. In 
the early days following 9/11, the nation lacked sufficient strategy outside of war to deal 
with transnational terrorism on this scale. Nevertheless, shifting the blame away from an 
autonomous, amorphous actor (Al Qaeda) back to a familiar nation-state antagonist (Iraq) 
was a way of shifting the balance of power back to a state-centric world and power 
balances within know international relations. This framework in limiting in that it 
allowed the United States to deal with terrorist groups only if they are proxies of the 
state,504 and may have led to inaccurate conclusions.  
C. THE IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION ON NON-PROLIFERATION 
NETWORKS 
A related trend is the involvement of organized crime networks in nuclear 
smuggling and trafficking.505 Globalization, the process of increasing interconnectedness 
among worldwide entities, serves as an important backdrop to the emergence of 
proliferation networks.506 Globalization is making it easier for criminal networks to share 
information and to operate undetected in illegal trade by increasing the capacity of 
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terrorist groups to organize themselves into transnational networks for the purpose of 
coordinating operations across geographic boundaries. 
The ability to sell weapons designs, as well as the availability of materials and 
dual use machines on the global black market, the availability of weapons designs on the 
Internet, and worldwide production capacity,507 are all direct results of the impact of 
globalization. 
While the origins of terrorism are multiple and complex, globalization stands out 
as the means by which networked terrorism transforms to have international reach. Just as 
multinational corporations have evolved in response to globalization by distributing 
functions and resources, transnational terrorist groups have followed a similar path.508 
The terrorist problem occurs in a context with many interacting entities and processes—
some aspects of the system are hierarchical, others are distributed, still others are 
networked. Terrorist organizations, such as al Qaeda, function as complex adaptive 
systems.509 This networked and distributed structure is one characteristic of transnational 
terrorism that has made the insurgency movements and rogue actors more difficult to 
isolate and identify, and ultimately, remove.510  
From a security standpoint, currently, the most salient aspect is that an event in 
one part of the world is far more likely than in the past to have repercussions elsewhere. 
This interconnectedness is what one scholar terms, “the Ahmadinejad effect,” in which 
minor actors can rise to prominence and gain popularity by threatening the security of 
land and people even very far away.511 Globalization has revolutionized how the world 
does business—including terrorists. Commercial and technological innovations have 
reduced international trade barriers, and widened transportation infrastructure. Extensive 
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Internet and cellular networks have fostered global communications. Technology has 
greatly facilitated the spread of highly sensitive information.512 Knowledge and 
information is easily shared over the Internet and is used in a number of ways including 
networking terrorists in different countries, recruiting jihadists, and spreading a 
radicalized agenda. The increasing ease of air travel, financial transactions, and trade may 
play a key role in enabling the emergence of complicated, global, proliferation networks. 
The ability to transcend borders means that the ability to move goods, services, and 
people internationally, is much easier.  
Technological advancements have been incorporated to further criminal 
capabilities and operations that harm U.S. citizens and interests, sometimes without even 
having a physical presence in country.513 These new types of actors have the operational 
capability to reach across international borders both physically and intellectually.  
Moreover, the time when only a few states had access to the most 
dangerous technologies is long over. Technologies, often dual-use, 
circulate easily in our globalized economy, as do the personnel with 
scientific expertise who design and use them. Therefore, it is difficult for 
the United States and its partners to track efforts to acquire components 
and production technologies that are widely available. We assess countries 
that are still pursuing WMD programs will continue to try to improve their 
capabilities and level of self-sufficiency over the next decade. Nuclear, 
chemical, and/or biological weapons or the production technologies and 
materials necessary to produce them may also be acquired by states that do 
not now have such programs; and/or by terrorist or insurgent 
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Paul Smith may summarize it best:  
Of greatest current concern is Al Qaeda which has been establishing and 
maintaining a multinational presence in more than 50 countries, directed 
by a base located (until recently) in Afghanistan. Like many multinational 
corporations, al Qaeda is both the product and beneficiary of globalization. 
The organization took advantage of the fruits of globalization and 
modernization - including satellite technology, accessible air travel, fax 
machines, the Internet, and other modern conveniences—to advance its 
political agenda. 
No longer geographically constrained within a particular territory, or 
financially tied to a particular state, al Qaeda emerged as the ultimate 
transnational terror organization, relying on an array of legitimate and 
illicit sources of cash, including international charities that were often 
based in the West.515  
Like many multinational corporations, al Qaeda is both the product and 
beneficiary of globalization. The organization took advantage of the fruits of 
globalization and modernization—including satellite technology, accessible air travel, fax 
machines, the Internet, and other modern conveniences—to advance its political agenda. 
No longer geographically constrained within a particular territory, or financially tied to a 
particular state, al Qaeda emerged as the ultimate transnational terror organization, 
relying on an array of legitimate and illicit sources of cash. Probably its most important 
bases of operation—from a financial and logistical perspective—were located not in 
Afghanistan or Sudan, but rather in Western Europe and North America, including in the 
United States itself.516 In fact, AQ actually has even used globalization as an explanation 
to justify its actions towards the West—”The Capitalist system seeks to turn the entire 
world into a fiefdom of the major corporations under the label of globalization in order to 
protect democracy.”517 
 
                                                 
515 Smith, “Transnational Terrorism and the al Qaeda Model: Confronting New Realities,” 33–46. 
516 Ed Blanche, “What the Investigation Reveals,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, 13 (November 2001), 
16–17; see also article by John Mintz and Rom Jackman, “Finances Prompted Raids on Muslims,” The 
Washington Post, March 24, 2001, A01. 
517 SITE Intelligence Group, “The Solution,” September 2007, http://counterterrorismblog.org/site-
resources/images/SITE-OBL-transcript.pdf. 
 126 
A related trend is the involvement of organized crime networks in nuclear 
smuggling and trafficking. Globalization has had a substantial impact on changing the 
paradigm for proliferation. As terrorists are now better able to move, goods, operations 
and people, they are also able to move operations and technology, and knowledge related 
to WMD. 
Initial information found in Libya identified roughly half a dozen workshops 
spread across Africa, Asia, and the Middle East that were making centrifuge 
components.518 These workshops would typically import the items needed, such as 
metals, equipment, or components. After the components were produced, they would be 
sent to Dubai under false certificate where they would be repackaged and sent to 
Libya.519 
The seizure of the BBC China en route to Libya and the revelation that it held 
uranium-enriched gas-centrifuge components, started to paint a picture of how Khan’s 
network operation captured many of these phenomena simultaneously. The shipment 
interdicted was arranged by a business middleman based in Dubai. The Malaysian firm, 
at the direction of Khan’s associates, established a factory in Shah Alam, Malaysia to fill 
this order. Foreign engineers who would travel to Malaysia periodically to assist with 
production provided technical assistance to the factory. The products were then shipped 
via Dubai to Libya, and ultimately were intercepted along the way on the BBC China, a 
German owned ship.520 Investigations showed that the Khan network was able to 
leverage the advantages of globalization to sustain its operations, and also, to avoid 
detection.  
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D. THE CHAIN OF CAUSATION 
To highlight the impacts globalization has on transnational crime and illegal 
proliferation networks, this paper looks at seven essential steps that a terrorist would have 
to take to be successful in an attack.521 Assumption from the research is that a WMD 
attack is a low-probability, high consequence, and for terrorists, not necessarily a first 
choice because they would likely face significant hurdles.522 While a group may obtain 
them through different paths, it would still need to carry out the escalation ladder 
(perhaps laterally, not necessarily sequentially).523 Achieving all seven steps would 
essentially complete the cycle of motive, mean, and opportunity.  
This section highlights those steps that may be easier to achieve because of the 
impacts of globalization. The other elements in this chain have been discussed throughout 
the paper. This part examines strictly WMD attacks through the hermeneutic of 
globalization, in addition to how globalization is impacting these types of terrorist events 
to find opportunities to interrupt the planning cycle to prevent such an attack.  
The seven steps are as follows.524 
• The terrorist group must decide to embrace violence to achieve its goals 
• These group must then choose to acquire CBRN weapons to advance its 
objectives 
• The group must then obtain the materials, such as chemicals, biological 
agents radioactive sources, or weapons-usable nuclear materials, to make 
CBRN weapons 
• Next the terrorist must acquire the requesting technical skills and 
knowledge either through learning or buying the services of technical 
experts 
                                                 
521 Aside from acquiring WMD material, these are the same steps used in steps in carrying out any 
terrorist attacks 
522 See research citations in Chapter III. 
523 Michael Levi talks extensively about the concept of “Building Blocks” or steps needed to 
undertake for a terrorist carry out a nuclear attack in chapter 3 of his book Levi, On Nuclear Terrorism, 27–
64.  
524 These steps are discussed throughout the terrorist literature individually but this list is pulled from 
Simpson, “WMD Terrorism.” in Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Future of International 
Nonproliferation Policy, 37–39. Michal Levi walks though similar steps through three broad categories; the 
acquisition of nuclear material, bomb building and transporting nuclear material and consequence 
management. 
 128 
• Then the terrorist group must combine the knowledge and skills with the 
CBRN materials to build an effective weapon 
• The group must next deliver the weapon or weapons to a target, such as a 
populated city or a place associated with political, military, or economic 
value 
• The CBRN weapon must then cause sufficient damage to achieve the 
terrorist group’s political, religious or other motivational goals 
A step-by-step look of how globalization may make achieving these steps easier 
follows.  
The first is the decision to embrace violence to achieve its goals. As this has been 
documented on paper, many groups (in theory and in practice) are willing to use violence 
to achieve their goals.525 In terms of globalization, it becomes easier for recruiting and 
spreading a violent message. The Internet is part of the process connecting aspiring 
terrorists with like-minded individuals or actual terrorists operating out of countries 
across the globe. After consolidating relationships over the Internet, the recruits can then 
plot and plan mass casualty attacks while remaining in contact with their handlers from 
removed locations.526 With the creation of the Internet and the “global village” it 
established, information could be exchanged nearly instantaneously. According to the 
United States Institute of Peace, the main ways that terrorist organizations employ the 
Internet is to spread propaganda, fundraise, recruitment, psychological warfare, data 
mining, and coordinating actions.527  
Secondly, these groups must then choose to acquire CBRN weapons specifically 
to advance their objectives. As said, it may or may not occur depending on a group’s 
political or religious motivations and assessment of risk and failure, but some may 
believe WMD terrorism would advance its goals under certain circumstances.528 
Although building a nuclear device remains an expensive, complex undertaking out of 
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reach for most organizations, a well-financed group that seeks to kill very large numbers 
of people may find it an “irresistible option.”529 However, given all that is involved in the 
complicated calculations of a terrorist organization’s operational choices, if a terrorist 
group decides to pursue the use of WMD, globalization certainly makes that decision 
easier to execute it. The globalized marketplace allows for the easier transfer of materials, 
tools, and expertise to be possible. The open global economy allows greater opportunity 
for connectivity and the transfer of goods and services.  
Third, the group must actually attempt to obtain the materials, such as chemicals, 
biological agents, radioactive sources, or weapons-usable nuclear materials, to make 
CBRN weapons. Historically, it has been the biggest focus on non-proliferation—efforts 
to physically secure materials, weapons, and expertise. Collaborative Threat Reduction 
programs, such as the Nunn-Lugar and G-8 and Materials Protection, Control and 
Accounting have comprised the basis for regime efforts. Again, globalization increases 
these opportunities for success and provides a platform on which to operate to all black 
market proliferation networks in a global market. For example, the A.Q. Kahn  was able 
to manipulate business and exploit holes in the global enforcement system.530 The Khan 
network succeeded for many years by exploiting weaknesses in export control systems 
and recruiting suppliers.531  
The financing of terrorism also plays an important role in WMD terrorism 
(especially nuclear terrorism) since it will take a lot of money to purchase either a 
weapon or special nuclear material on the black market,532 from money that would most 
likely be raised and spent in the global market. These integrated financial systems 
allowing global movements of money that can be easily exploited by criminals and 
terrorists. 
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Fourth, the terrorist must acquire the technical skills and knowledge either 
through learning or buying the services of technical experts. Information readily available 
on the Internet provides skills to make weapons (conventional and WMD) much more 
available to anyone with Internet access. Unemployed scientists are another concern since 
left without other options could be corrupted in working for entities willing to pay for the 
expertise. Technology diffusion, imply put, are deadly technologies that are now 
“spreading horizontally and descending vertically.”533 The problem is dramatically more 
widespread in terms of chemical and biological weapons technology. Hundreds of 
countries have an infrastructure that could be used for chemical weapons production. 
While only a dozen countries are believed to be pursuing biological weapons, many more 
could do so. All these challenges are exacerbated because of the dual-use nature of many 
of the underlying technologies.  
Fifth, the terrorist group must then combine the knowledge and skills with the 
CBRN materials to build effective weapons. Again, globalization makes all the pieces 
easer to connect. The global market allows access to the materials, and can link people 
with the technical experts to make them. International travel between countries is 
common. The global market makes moving parts, material, and weapons harder to detect 
under the guise of normal commerce.  
Sixth, the group must next deliver the weapon or weapons to a target. Once a 
weapon is complete, it is much more difficult to detect.534 Nuclear interdiction efforts at 
the ports, land borders, and random detection efforts exist, but finding a weapon that may 
be shielded, and without intelligence, is like trying to find a needle in a haystack. 
                                                 
533 Russell and Clary, Globalization and WMD Proliferation Networks: Challenges to U.S. Security, 
5. 
534 See U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Detection of Nuclear Weapons and 
Materials: Science, Technologies, Observations, by Jonathan Medalia, CRS Report R40154 (Washington, 
DC: Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, June 4, 2010); Testimony before the 
Subcommittee on the Prevention of Nuclear and Biological Attack and on Emergency Preparedness, 
Science, and Technology, Committee on Homeland Security, “Combating Nuclear Smuggling, Efforts to 
Deploy Radiation Detection Equipment in the United States and in Other Countries, House of 
Representatives, Statement of Gene Aloise, Director Natural Resources and Environment, Tuesday June 
21, 2005. 
 131 
Chemical and biological weapons have even more difficult indicators to detect. Also, the 
terrorist is required to travel. 
Finally, a WMD weapon must then cause sufficient damage to achieve the 
terrorist group’s political, religious, or other motivational goals. Even though this attack 
is a low-probability event, such an attack would have far-reaching and devastating 
consequences. Issues involved in the “right of boom” are also important to deal with 
because of the lasting impact they will have should it not be possible to prevent an attack, 
and subsequently, it will be necessary to deal with the consequences. Terrorism expert 
Brian Jenkins made famous the quote more than two decades ago, “Terrorists want a lot 
of people watching and a lot of people listening and not a lot of people dead.” Live 
international news coverage that would be broadcast around the world on live TV 
certainly would have international exposure to billions of people.535  
The Defense Threat Reduction Agency sponsored a project to assess the causes 
and consequences of the proliferation of WMD in the Middle East. In that report, a 
consistent theme in the research revealed issues related to how third-state and non-state 
entities assisted in proliferation activities,536 but there were more questions, than 
answers. James Russell, who served as the lead researcher on this project, argued that 
globalization had produced ungoverned spaces—holes—in the international system. 
States were no longer the “major controller or conduit” of global trade, financial, and 
information flows, which provides space and resources—a metaphorical “dark 
underbelly”—for non-state actors to exploit.537 
Certainly, the forces that come under the general heading of globalization can be 
counted upon to intensify over the next several decades and will create a deepening 
global interdependence.538 The result will most likely be a continued growth in the cross 
border flows of goods, services, people, technology, ideas, customs, and crime.  
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Weapons proliferation has its tentacles in all that is promising and dangerous in 
this new world economy. Globalization and nonproliferation and other efforts, such as 
intelligence, terrorist travel, and illegal commerce are most likely to intersect. However, 
red flags will not always be clear. One researcher summarized this problem:  
In some respects global trade has become more opaque rather than more 
transparent partly because of its volume, the number of import-export 
companies, the diversity of freight-forwarders, and the existence of flags 
of convenience which make the maritime industry itself non-
transparent.539 
E. TECHNOLOGY DIFFUSION AND KNOWLEDGE DISTRIBUTION  
Knowledge, which was formally only possessed by nation-states, is no longer exclusive, 
and now a growing number of non-state actors have access to sensitive materials and 
technologies. The information revolution and the impacts of globalization are felt on 
open and black markets leading some terrorist groups that lacked the global reach of a 
pre-9/11, including Al Qaeda, which has been able to form regional alliances, to share 
knowledge and technologies. The Kahn network was able to exploit loopholes in the 
export control system. The diffusion of manufacturing capability made activity difficult 
to detect. It also meant that countries may not have had adequate knowledge of nuclear 
technology or expert controls to detect illicit activity and were induced to either 
knowingly or unknowingly assist in the manufacture and distribution process.540  
In the post-Cold War environment, national security, economic interests and 
technology relate to one another in complex and cross-cutting ways. One reason for the 
biggest changes in WMD proliferation is technology. Weapons formally restricted to the 
arsenals of large industrialized nation-states are now within reach of small states and 
some non-state actors.541 The biggest danger may be that due to technology, that now  
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allows small, non-state actors to threaten virtually any state—including a superpower like 
the United States. The disruption of the A.Q. Kahn  network certainly showed that 
nuclear technology transfers were easier than anticipated.542  
The starting point is an appreciation that technology consists of more than just 
physical “things.” Harvey Brooks has defined technology as “knowledge of how to fulfill 
certain human purposes in a specific and reproducible way.” He continues to argue that 
technology “does not consist of artifacts but of the …knowledge that underlies the 
artifacts and the way they can be used in society.”543 In terms of WMD technology, it 
means possessing the human technical capital necessary to develop WMD capability.  
The knowledge and machinery for legitimate enterprise can often be hijacked for 
dangerous ends. In the nuclear realm, states still retain a heavy degree of control but in 
the chemical and biological world, much of the expertise and equipment is readily 
available in the private sector. However, even in this instance, the network of suppliers 
that collaborated with A.Q. Kahn  indicates that significant nuclear-relevant technologies 
could be acquired from non-state entities whether they are willing proliferators or 
unwitting collaborators. In fact, “nuclear components designed in one country could be 
manufactured in another, shipped through a third, assembled in a fourth, and designated 
for eventual turnkey use in a fifth.”544 The experience seems to indicate that it is not a 
geographically bounded problem. This diffusion of science and technology will only 
continue.545  
Now, technology diffusion is available via the Internet. The forces of 
globalization make it easier for anyone to acquire nuclear technology. Indeed, even 
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before the advent of the Internet, “nuclear secrets” were released publicly. For instance, 
in 1964, the Los Alamos Primer revealed many of the technical details of atomic weapons 
designs. Then, Progressive did the same for hydrogen weapons in the November 1979 
and January 1980 editions.546 Now, the Internet revolution makes it even easier to 
acquire key technical information.  
Technology certainly plays a role in recruiting new jihadists and in disseminating 
information. It is well documented that the Internet is used to recruit and to radicalize 
individuals and train them to execute terrorist acts.547 In part, thanks to the Internet, 
according to military and counterterrorism experts testifying on Capitol Hill.548 The 
Internet plays an important role in contemporary terrorism, as jihadists have effectively 
demonstrated. It allows global communications, which is critical to a movement 
determined to build an army of believers. It facilitates recruiting. It is accessible to 
seekers to reinforce and channel their anger. It creates online communities of like-minded 
extremists and engages them in constant activity. It is a source of instruction. It facilitates 
clandestine communication.549 
In summary, the information revolution has made critical technological 
information available to an increasing number of less capable states and some non-state 
actors. The significant barriers to entry that remain should not be minimized, particularly 
with regards to nuclear weapons, but it does mean that analysts and policymakers must 
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consider an environment characterized by the seemingly irreversible diffusion of 
technology.550  
In the face of these dynamics, the international community confronts a major 
challenge in managing global technology diffusion in a way that achieves international 
security goals while promoting commercial and other objectives.  
In the new security era, the problem extends well beyond weapons as they relate 
to proliferation. The problem facing the international community is “not about weapons 
systems but about the diffusion of technology—some advanced, some simple. All 
potentially lethal.”551  
F. DETERRENCE MAY NOT BE AN EFFECTIVE STRATEGY FOR NON-
STATE ACTORS 
Concerns about whether deterrence is an effective strategy against the security 
threats now faced have left policymakers and academics debating the very relevance of 
deterrence in the 21st century.552 When the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons 
of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism released The World at Risk Report, it 
warned that deterrence might not prevent a terrorist group from using WMD against the 
United States in the near future.553  
For the last half century, the concept of deterrence has served as a cornerstone to 
U.S. foreign policy and weapons complex doctrine. In the classic sense, deterrence has 
been defined as “persuading a potential enemy that he should in his own interest avoid 
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certain courses of activity.”554 During the Cold War, deterrence served as a foundational 
strategy to protect itself from Soviet aggression from both nuclear and conventional 
forces. The Cold War deterrence model rested on a “balance of terror,” with complementary 
superpower capability. During a speech in 1992, President Bush said: 
…for much of the last century, America’s defenses relied on the Cold War 
doctrines of deterrence and containment. In some cases, those strategies 
still apply, but new threats also require new thinking. Deterrence-the 
promise of massive retaliation against nations-means nothing against 
shadowy terrorist networks with no nation or citizens to defend.555 
Two types of deterrence exist. The first is “deterrence by the threat of 
punishment,” which compels the adversary to try to calculate whether the potential 
benefits of action are outweighed by the potential costs. The second is “deterrence by 
denial.” This mode relies on denying the adversary the perceived benefit of action.556 
However, deterrence can take on many subtle means that can differ in 
interpretation. One such definition involves persuasion of the enemy, such as 
“influencing the choices another party will make, and doing it by influencing his 
expectations of how we will behave.”557 It involves “confronting him with evidence for 
believing that our behavior will be determined by his behavior.”558  
According to military doctrine, deterrence “stems from the belief by a potential 
aggressor that a credible threat of retaliation exists, the contemplated action cannot 
succeed, or the costs outweigh any possible gains. Thus, a potential aggressor is reluctant 
to act for fear of failure, cost, or consequences.”559 These three concepts or strategies—
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fear of failure, cost, and consequences—each by itself or in any combination, are key in 
formulating options, including application of military power, to deter WMD use.560  
Perhaps, the most accurate definition defines deterrence as the “prevention of 
action by fear of negative consequences, for the purpose of convincing a party not to take 
some action by threatening the destruction of something he considers to be of great value, 
or by denying him achieving his objectives.”561 Traditional formulations of deterrence 
include aspects of both capability and will in assessing the credibility of a deterrent 
threat. They also require that the deterrent threat be communicated to the party being 
deterred.562 (In short, Credibility + Capability = Will) 
However, given the complexities inherent in conventional counter proliferation 
strategies, some value in rethinking models of deterrence appear in the world after 9/11. 
Deterrence is a psychological phenomenon. It must be determined how deterrence 
operated in the past and how it may differ with the new set of actors. Since today’s 
“enemies” are more likely transnational terrorists rather than nation-states (either 
superpowers or “rogue”), they may be motivated by different imperatives, and deterrence 
may not be an effective strategy to either compel terrorists to develop or use WMD 
capabilities. “The logic of deterrence that once kept state violence in some kind of check 
has no traction with loners and the cult leaders of global terrorism.”563  
A new “deterrence calculus” may be needed.564  
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In the case of non-state actors, how does this doctrine translate?, as terrorists may 
not have any goods they value that can be threatened to produce deterrence.565 Certainly, 
the unpredictability, rationality, and motivations of a non-state terrorist organization are 
not balanced on this premise.  
The National Security Strategy issued in 2002 summarized the prevailing view as 
follows: 
Traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy 
whose avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of 
innocents; whose so- called soldiers seek martyrdom in death and whose 
most potential protection is statelessness.566 
The 2006 National Strategy expanded to say: 
The new strategic environment requires new approaches to deterrence and 
defense. Our deterrence strategy no longer rests primarily on the grim 
premise of inflicting devastating consequences on potential foes. Both 
offenses and defenses are necessary to deter state and non-state actors.567 
In a report for the State Department entitled, Deterrence and WMD Terrorism: 
Calibrating its Potential Contributions to Risk Reduction, the author argues that 
deterrence is not irrelevant to the effort to combat terrorism and to reduce the risks of 
WMD terrorism. His assessment that “the shift in national guidance from 2001 to 2005 
makes good sense because the record suggests that deterrence has played a more 
important role in reducing the risks of terrorism than was understood in the immediate 
aftermath of 9/11.”568 
The report further assesses the effectiveness of applying deterrence to WMD 
terrorism to say that, “the role of deterrence is foundational to national security strategy 
in the way that it was in the Cold War. Deterrence is but one of many tools of influence 
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and sometimes not the most promising one.”569 However, should a low-probability high 
consequence WMD event occur, he offers three key judgments relative to deterrence, (1) 
deterrence may succeed in lowering the lethality of individual attacks with WMD, by 
inhibiting the cooperation of those most capable of developing and employing WMD in 
ways that reap their full lethal potential, (2) deterrence may succeed in curtailing 
campaigns of attacks. Such campaigns are the most certain way to reap the full lethal 
potential of WMD and seem particularly plausible with biological weapons, and (3) 
deterrence may induce the leadership of al Qaeda to utilize nuclear weapons, when and if 
they acquire them, only for purposes of deterrence and defense as they conceive them 
rather than for purposes of aggression and terrorism.570 
Some preliminary thinking on facets of these questions has already been done at 
senior levels of government. To cite in full the guidance on deterring WMD terrorism 
from the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism: 
A new deterrence calculus combines the need to deter terrorists and 
supporters from contemplating a WMD attack and, failing that, to dissuade 
them from actually conducting such an attack. Traditional threats may not 
work because terrorists show a wanton disregard for the lives of innocents 
and in some cases for their own lives. We require a range of deterrence 
strategies that are tailored to the situation and the adversary. We will make 
clear that terrorists and those who aid or sponsor a WMD attack would 
face the prospects of an overwhelming.571 
In considering the changing role of deterrence in the non-proliferation regime, one 
argument is that the extension of the discussion is that on a case-by -case basis more 
nuclear weapons may lead to greater stability.572 Again, this discussion involved nation-
states; however, the logic of the argument may extend to the individual actor, because the 
result depends on the internal stability, rationality, and command and control regime of 
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expected regimes.573 Looking at deterrence from this perspective begins to move the 
dialogue and motivations away from the old Cold War theories of application.  
One academic postulates that this debate is not an outright rejection of deterrence, 
but rather recognition of the need to craft different deterrence options for different 
adversaries,574 but is lacking a consensus on what that should look like. Richard Betts 
argued deterrence has “limited efficacy for modern counterterrorism” because al Qaeda 
does not mirror the top-down organizational construct that dominates militaries or 
governments.575 Others say that the idea of rationality simply does not apply to terrorist 
or non-state actors who represent radical groups that calculate “risks and rewards in 
ideological and religious terms.”576 One RAND study concludes that in facing the 
challenge of modern suicide terror attacks, “the concept of deterrence is both too limiting 
and too naive to be applicable to the war on terrorism.”577 
The application of a “tailored deterrence” theory would bridge the gap between 
academia and policy making. For one strategist, it represents, “a shift from a one-size-
fits-all notion of deterrence toward more adaptable approaches suitable for advanced 
military competitors, regional WMD states, as well as nonstate terrorist networks.”578 
“Deterrence is about influencing the perceptions—and ultimately, the decisions and 
actions—of another party; it is logical that requirements for deterrence will differ with 
each party that we might try to deter and may well differ in each circumstance or 
scenario.”579  
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In closing, the viability of traditional deterrence strategy may now be questionable 
with respect to these new WMD threats and actors. New questions need to be asked, such 
as what role might deterrence already be playing? What more can reasonably be asked of 
deterrence against such a diffuse and motivated enemy? As is with nature of most 
preventive measures, the cumulative effect of deterrence in the WMD terrorism is nearly 
impossible to predict but certainly, a new calculus must be considered.  
G.  CREDIBILITY AND INTELLIGENCE FAILURES 
As discussed above, attempts to manage these new types of terrorist threats have 
proven difficult. Since 9/11, the United States has struggled with how to situate the 
terrorist threat outside of the traditional state-centric paradigm. The Iraq War typified the 
struggle to re-imbed the networked threat of terrorism back into the familiar conflict 
models.  
The decision to invade Iraq was largely based upon the premise that its leader, 
Saddam Hussein, was attempting to develop, and may even possess WMD. Said 
President Bush just before the Iraq war began, “The Iraqi regime . . . possesses and 
produces chemical and biological weapons. It is seeking nuclear weapons. We know that 
the regime has produced thousands of tons of chemical agents, including mustard gas, 
sarin nerve gas, VX nerve gas.”580 Decision making at the executive policy level was 
largely based upon the 2002 NIE, other CIA documents, and highly classified 
Presidential daily briefings. The shortcomings of American intelligence assessment of 
Iraq’s WMD program greatly undermined American trust and credibility.581  
As is publicly known, the invasion proved fruitless—sufficient evidence of WMD 
programs were not found, nor was evidence supporting Iraqi intent to re-establish Iraq’s 
nuclear programs. Many pundits and the public dismissed that justification of going to 
war as part of President Bush’s larger political agenda. The miscalculation certainly led 
to speculation that the U.S. intelligence community was flawed in making accurate 
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assessments. In fact, the CIA noted that their assessment of Al Qaeda ties to Iraq, “rests 
on a bed of fragmented, conflicting reporting from sources of varying reliability.”582  
Between 2004 and 2008, the CIA produced six retrospective documents on the 
Iraq War. In 2008, the Senate Intelligence Committee released the report Postwar 
Findings About Iraq’s WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They Compare 
with Prewar Assessments Senate Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence. Key 
issues of inquiry included the quality of U.S. intelligence on Iraq’s WMD programs, the 
country’ links to terrorism (specifically the link to al Qaeda) and the “reasonableness, 
independence and accuracy” of the judgments reached by the intelligence community.583 
The committee noted that the CIA reviewed four possible intersections between al Qaeda 
operatives and the Iraqi regime—none of which suggested evidence of operational 
cooperation. In each instance, the CIA described the intelligence, which suggested the 
links, and also included information about the reporting, which led to continued 
skepticism.584  
This comprehensive retrospective, reviewed in both classified and unclassified 
information,585 followed the intelligence known prior to the 2003 invasion compared to 
what was known post-war. Its key finding concluded that “no established relationship 
between al-Qaeda leaders and Saddam Hussein before the 2003 war in Iraq.”586 The 
report's findings were largely based upon conclusions drawn from the 
Intelligence Community’s 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), which 
concluded that the information on Iraq’s’ WMD programs were either “overstated, or 
not supported by the underlying intelligence reporting.”587  
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The Robb-Silberman’s overall commission’s findings on the U.S. Intelligence 
regarding Iraq were damning:  
The Intelligence Community’s performance in assessing Iraq’s pre-war 
WMD programs was a major intelligence failure. The failure was not 
merely that the Intelligence Community’s assessments were wrong. There 
were also serious shortcomings in the way these assessments were made 
and communicated to policymakers.588 
In detailing the more precise problems the report cited two key flaws in the 
analysis, (1) “analysts skewed the analytical process by requiring proof that Iraq did not 
have WMD,”589 and (2) analysts did not question the hypotheses underlying their 
conclusions, and tended to discount evidence that cut against those hypotheses.590  
In telling comments regarding the The President’s Daily Brief (PDB), which have 
never remained highly classified and not reviewed, the commission hypothesized that 
they “likely conveyed a greater sense of certainty about analytic judgments than 
warranted.”591 
H. THE DIFFICULTY WITH WMD INTELLIGENCE  
In the area of proliferation in particular, such a failure to see beyond the 
Intelligence Community’s borders—and a failure to acknowledge what 
intelligence can and cannot do—has deprived the country of anti-
proliferation levers that it badly needs.592 
Intelligence is often best understood in hindsight, which means that gathering an 
accurate picture and accurately predicting threats related to WMD, particularly further 
complicates the intelligence and policy pictures.  
First, increased global trade flows mean a significantly larger volume of global 
transactions and actions for intelligence agencies and export controllers to scrutinize. For 
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intelligence, it means an increasing number of people, in an increasing number of 
facilities, with access to the capabilities necessary to make WMD weapons. It also means 
many more transportation and business transactions, which increases the “background” 
noise and makes it much more difficult to separate the “signal” from the “static” in the 
background,593 which makes analysis difficult.  
Indeed, the proliferation network of A.Q. Kahn  was able to exploit the gaps in the 
control system and operate throughout several different counties, which demonstrates the 
difficulties in being able to use intelligence to gauge intent and illicit activity. Intelligence 
estimates vary on how much was known of this threat. During most of the 1990s, 
Western Intelligence agencies had lost track of Khan and his activities.594 Questions 
remain about whether all the participants and workshops involved were identified and the 
full extent of their activities in manufacturing and supplying centrifuges known. Most 
disturbingly, it is possible that components for uranium enrichment plants have been 
produced but where not delivered to Libya; perhaps they were sent to other customers.595  
However, the biggest gap in the intelligence may have been the assessment of just 
how big of a proliferation player Khan and his network were. The notion of Khan as an 
actor within a national program (Pakistan) was the dominant mindset during this the 
1990s. “I think a lot a lot of people knew he was a player in the larger field of 
proliferation as well as in Pakistan but I don’t think they knew the extent until it was later 
revealed.”596 The idea of an individual transcending this role to become an independent 
international salesman was not yet appreciated. This analytic mindset that focused on 
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Khan as primarily a state actor and customer, rather than a salesman, led to some missed 
signals in the mid-to late 90s.597  
“What we didn’t realize was that AQ K was running a global corporation which 
transcended the national boundaries.598 This analytic frame of mind that Khan was a state 
player and customer rather than a salesman capable of acting independently as a criminal 
corporate enterprise may have distracted intelligence community from seeing signals that 
would have told them otherwise.  
For Iraq, the size and the complexity of the effort created a high “noise-to-signal” 
ratio, in which a tremendous amount of data for analysts existed, but who had difficulty 
sorting the useful from the irrelevant. Further, looking at the procurement effort—in 
many ways, the most visible aspect of a WMD program—has its limitations. Also, the 
difficulty in analysis of such technical information also plays a role. The Iraqi Post War 
Assessment document concluded, “A series of failures, particularly in analytic tradecraft, 
let to the mischaracterization of intelligence.”599 
Ambassador Ronald Lehman of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories 
discussed the challenges of such latency.600 He noted, “having such WMD potential 
complicates intelligence and policy since intelligence is forced to gauge intention, which 
is far more complicated than capability.”601 Procurement activity must still be converted 
into technological capability. Even if the Iraqi procurement effort was advancing after 
1999, it apparently had not translated into increased capabilities on the ground.602  
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Concerns were further exasperated in November 2007 by creating even more 
questions of American credibility with the release of the NIE on Iran’s nuclear program. 
The NIE contradicted key judgments from its May 2005 assessment, and incorrectly 
assessed Iran’s intent and capabilities and downplayed the threat posed by Iran’s nuclear 
weapon program.603 In addition, it may have exposed the intelligence community’s gap 
in knowledge about WMD program indicators. Most indicators focus on the nuclear fuel 
cycle and the stages of manufacturing a nuclear weapon, such as obtaining SME, and the 
weaponization of materials.604 Nuclear above ground tests are also an indicator, but by 
then, a program is much more advanced. Although most indicators of weaponization are 
ambiguous, some equipment or information can be considered a “smoking gun.”605  
Indications of a chemical or biological program may be even hazier and may have 
“few or no obvious external indicators.”606 Biological and chemical agents may have 
more legitimate uses and possession may not automatically indicate intention of a 
weapons program. Less regulation and no overarching enforcement mechanism, such as 
the IAEA, which requires international inspections,607 exist in the international 
community.  
In the midst of all the threat estimates and warning of potential for WMD 
terrorism and dangerous proliferation activities, Iraq serves as a great warning to policy 
makers. Despite the real threat that does exist is the chance that such threats may be 
exaggerated for intentional reasons, or because the analysis is based upon faulty logic, or 
incorrect technical information.  
One research attributes these intelligence failings in overestimates on a tendency 
toward “confirmation bias.” This confirmation bias serves to solidify with 
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overconfidence and inflation of what people already “think” they may know.608 This 
confirmation bias plays heavily in the traditional non-proliferation regime based in Cold 
War thinking. His point is not to deny that knowledge informs policy but to demonstrate 
that “certainty prevents imagination and creativity in politics and surely prevents any 
kind of shift from hope to audacity.”609 
I. CONCLUSION  
Entrepreneurs are simply those who understand that there is little 
difference between obstacle and opportunity and are able to turn both to 
their advantage.  
        —Niccolo Machiavelli 
WMD terrorism is a growing threat fueled by broader trends of the 21st century, 
including emerging patterns in extremism and globalization in an increasingly complex 
environment. The increasing convergence of issues of terrorism, proliferation, and WMD 
issues, highlighted in this chapter are fueling the odds of WMD terrorism occurring and 
making it increasing difficult to detect the threats.  
The criminal networks of transnational terrorists and complicated proliferation 
networks faced today are a very different enemy that what was faced just over a decade 
ago. The complex world in which they thrive is also very different. These groups are both 
a “product” and “beneficiary” of globalization. If policymakers and intelligence want to 
be able to interdict and stop the behavior, it must be necessary to exploit the same 
opportunities criminal networks and non-state actors have been able to exploit. It is 
crucial to think differently about the threats facing today’s world.  
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V. IMPLICATIONS FOR PREVENTION AND RESPONSE TO 
THREAT: THE HISTORY UNDER NON-PROLIFERATION 
POLICY 
This thesis analyzes the shift in nonproliferation and counter-proliferation regimes 
from multilateral treaty regimes (adhering predominately to traditional notions of 
sovereignty and state consent) to the more recent mechanisms, namely, the Proliferation 
Security Initiative and Resolution 1540. While acknowledging the weaknesses of the 
multilateral treaty regime previously used, this thesis questions whether the current 
mechanisms are adequate to address WMD threats since 9/11.  
A. APPROACHES TO COUNTERPROLIFERATION VS. 
COUNTERTERRORISM 
Global treaties and institutions are supported by export controls, national laws and 
regulations, economic and security assurances, sanctions, and regional arrangements of 
various types including nuclear free zones610 that are the foundation upon which the 
“classic” non-proliferation regime is built. On the other hand, counterterrorism programs 
have some basis in international law and norms, but since 9/11, a greater focus has been 
on national domestic efforts and law enforcement (i.e., interdiction) operations. The 
United States has adopted this approach while developing “homeland security” as a 
separate and distinct bureaucratic organization and discipline from national security or 
foreign policy. Nowhere are the differences between U.S. systems and others more 
apparent than in looking at this nation’s approaches to WMD policy.  
According to Paul Stockton, “Homeland security fundamentally differs from 
national security in that states and localities play the leading role in many homeland 
security missions, as opposed to federal agencies.”611 However, the non-proliferation  
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regime has traditionally only been defined in the sphere of international policy. The issue 
becomes how to frame the issues, which now encompass both national and international 
efforts, guidelines and programs.  
Counterterrorism and counterproliferation both address WMD issues from 
differing perspectives.612 The counterproliferation community largely focuses on nation-
states and the means of producing WMD materials and technology with long-term policy 
incentives, while the counterterrorism community focuses more on intelligence targeting 
of groups that may be seeking WMD material and technology. Both efforts are led by 
different agencies and have different funding streams.613 The Commission on the 
Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction 
concluded that the U.S. government has yet to successfully define the roles, missions, 
authorities, and the means of sharing information among this country’s national and 
homeland security organs including poorly coordinated information flow between the 
federal, state, local, and tribal level.614  
To attempt better coordination of terrorist threats and intelligence, several new 
bureaucratic organizations were created post 9/11. Those pertaining to intelligence is the 
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), which serves as the primary organization in 
the U.S. government for analyzing and integrating all intelligence pertaining to terrorism 
and counterterrorism, (except that intelligence that pertains exclusively to domestic 
terrorists and domestic counterterrorism).615 Noteworthy is that the NCTC is also 
responsible for conducting strategic operational planning for counterterrorism activities, 
integrating all instruments of national power, including diplomatic, financial, military, 
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intelligence, homeland security, and law enforcement activities within and among 
agencies.616 The NCTC is legally based per DNI directive and is based upon the 
implementation of a key recommendation of the Commission on the Intelligence 
Capabilities of the United States regarding the establishment of a national clearinghouse 
to manage and coordinate analysis and collection on nuclear, biological, and chemical 
weapons across the Intelligence Community.617  
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 established the 
position of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to serve as the head of the 
intelligence community and act as the principal adviser to the President on intelligence 
matters related to national security. The creation of the DNI separates the responsibilities 
of leading the intelligence community from heading the CIA, which had been combined 
in the position of Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) previously. As discussed in this 
report, the legislation gives the DNI new authorities and responsibilities that the DCI did 
not possess under prior law.618  
The National Counter Proliferation Center (NCPS) works with the Intelligence 
Community “to identify critical holes in our WMD knowledge—resulting from shortfalls 
in collection, analysis or exploitation - and then develop solutions to reduce or close these 
gaps.”619 It continues to define its mission as to help “identify long-term proliferation 
threats and requirements, and develops strategies to ensure that the Intelligence 
Community is positioned to address these over-the-horizon threats.”620 
These new bureaucratic creations are intended to enhance coordination among 
agencies (in this case, primarily intelligence agencies) but it is not difficult to see that 
even in a post-Sept 11 environment that agencies are having difficulty aligning and 
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establishing lines of authority under the new threat. Especially since the roles and 
responsibilities of agencies, such as the Department of Homeland Security and the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation have similar, yet distinct, goals, missions, and lines of 
authority. The distinction between counterintelligence and counterterrorism is subtle but 
important. Too often, these programs are in stovepipes that hinder effective lateral 
cooperation and/or insight.  
A second distinction is that which lies between domestic and international efforts. 
On the domestic side, counterterrorism efforts have largely focused on “CBRNE 
preparedness”—that is preparing first responders to deal with chemical, biological, 
radiological, nuclear and explosives,” from a “boots on the ground” perspective. For 
instance, Defense Secretary William Cohen’s intense interest in consequence 
management led to the concept of National Guard WMD civil support teams to assist 
state and local emergency responders after a WMD incident occurs.621 Whereas 
international efforts tend to take on issues of diplomacy, its enforcement efforts often fall 
within the realm of sanctions, including those placed on North Korea and Iran for the 
development of nuclear capabilities. Interdiction and detection efforts of potential threats 
within national borders are relatively new efforts without established frameworks. 
Conversely, securing efforts at either end makes work in the middle easier to enhance 
efforts. How “WMD” is addressed in a domestic setting is different from how “WMD” is 
addressed on a battlefield. The key is how to integrate the response to that threat within 
the context of homeland defense/civil support and major combat operations.  
B. INTERNATIONAL MECHANISMS 
The IAEA defines “nuclear security” as the prevention and detection of (and 
response to) theft, sabotage, unauthorized access, and illegal transfer of or other 
malicious acts involving nuclear materials and other radioactive substances.622 
Originally, the meaning of this term was directed towards efforts to stem the tide of 
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nuclear weapons escalation ending in a nuclear war between states. However, over time, 
the term has evolved to be more closely associated with the efforts to mitigate the risks of 
nuclear terrorism.  
In international diplomacy, the United States and other countries have worked to 
develop and strengthen a host of multilateral arrangements, including the Proliferation 
Security Initiative, U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540, the Global Threat Reduction 
Initiative, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, 
amending the U.N. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Nuclear Safety Program, the IAEA 
Committee on Safeguards and Verification, and most recently, the Global Initiative to 
Combat Nuclear Terrorism. These programs and others are designed to provide a multi-
layered “defense in depth” against nuclear terrorism.623  
Member states adopted the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in 
September 2006. The strategy, in the form of a resolution and an annexed Plan of 
Action,624 is a unique global instrument that will enhance national, regional and 
international efforts to counter terrorism. For the first time, all member states have agreed 
to a common strategic approach to fight terrorism, not only sending a clear message that 
terrorism is unacceptable in all its forms and manifestation, but also resolving to take 
practical steps individually and collectively to prevent and combat it. Those practical 
steps include a wide array of measures ranging from strengthening state capacity to 
counter terrorist threats to better coordinating the United Nations’ systems for 
counterterrorism activities. The adoption of the strategy fulfils the commitment made by 
world leaders at the 2005 September Summit and builds on many of the elements 
proposed by the Secretary-General in his May 2006 report.625 In fact, building state 
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capacities to address this threat is a goal of the United Nations. Law enforcement and 
intelligence communities within and across states are collaborating to address issues, 
such as the terrorist use of chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) 
materials, misuse of the Internet for terrorist purposes; improvement of border security, 
the detection and confiscation of forged travel documents, and the protection of the most 
vulnerable targets have all become new strategies.626 
Since 1963, the international community has elaborated 14 universal legal 
instruments and four amendments to prevent terrorist acts.627 Those instruments were 
developed under the auspices of the United Nations and its specialized agencies and the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and are open to participation by all 
member states. Of note is the 2005 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts 
of Nuclear Terrorism—or Nuclear Terrorism Convention, as it is more widely known. 
Adopted in 2005, the Nuclear Terrorism Convention was adopted under the 
auspices of the United Nations. It details offenses relating to unlawful possession and use 
of radioactive materials, and the use or damage of nuclear facilities.628 The convention 
requires parties to criminalize these offenses and to protect nuclear and radiological 
materials physically as recommended by the IAEA. In addition to these obligations, the 
convention is significant because it requires states to cooperate with one another and with 
the IAEA in their efforts to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear and radiological 
terrorism threats.629 The convention thus plays an important role in establishing nuclear 
security as an international norm and in legitimizing UN and IAEA authority in shaping 
and overseeing the nuclear security regime. The adoption and activation of this long-
awaited (and highly contested) instrument signaled a turning point in the evolution of the 
global nuclear security regime. However, the Nuclear Terrorism Convention is not 
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without its problems. Nearly five years have passed since the convention was adopted, 
and three years since it entered into force; yet, it has only 65 parties. Important states that 
have not signed include Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, and 
Vietnam. Moreover, of the nuclear weapon states, only China, India, Russia, and the 
United Kingdom have currently ratified it.630  
Global Partnership projects were initially conducted in Russia and Ukraine, and 
focused on destroying chemical weapons, dismantling nuclear submarines, disposing of 
nuclear weapons-usable material, and employing scientists who had worked on 
nonconventional weapons. The G-8 agreed in 2008 to expand the initiative’s activities 
worldwide and has increasingly engaged in threat reduction efforts beyond the four 
priority areas.631 Highlighting some of the changes in the nature of Global Partnership 
efforts since 2002, a State Department official stated, “now we’re in a new CTR 
environment that’s not as clear-cut as before,” and added that “we need time to figure out 
where the threats are, what the priorities are, and what to fund first.” The official said that 
the new CTR environment involved not only the expansion of activities outside the 
former Soviet Union, but also new efforts, such as biosecurity, radiological security, and 
export controls.632 
Another significant accomplishment occurred in July 2006 when the United States 
and Russia launched the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism to establish an 
international framework to enhance cooperation, build capacity, and act to combat the 
global threat of nuclear terrorism.633 This initiative is intended to help drive international 
focus and action to ensure the international community is doing everything possible to 
prevent nuclear weapons, materials, and knowledge from reaching the hands of terrorists. 
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By coordinating international efforts to detect, investigate, and respond to proliferation 
by non-state actors.  
C. COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAMS 
Collaborative threat reduction programs, which work collaboratively to secure 
weapons, material, and expertise, —are the areas in which the United States and others in 
the global community have focused most their efforts. The Nunn Lugar and G-8 efforts 
worked to reduce stockpiles significantly in the former Soviet Union states and then 
began to expand to others. Many experts characterize programs that secure materials at 
their source, including, most prominently, cooperative threat reduction, as “the most 
powerful tool available,” in nonproliferation.634  
In 1991, Congress authorized the DoD to establish the Cooperative Threat 
Reduction (CTR) program—the initial program of nuclear security assistance to Russia 
and the former Soviet states and the origin of some of the NNSA programs—to help 
Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan secure and protect former Soviet nuclear 
weapons.635 In 1991, Congress passed the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991, 
popularly referred to as the “Nunn-Lugar Act Cooperative Threat Reduction Act” 
authorizing U.S. threat reduction assistance to the former Soviet Union, because of 
concerns about the safety and security of Soviet nuclear weapons. The law’s objective 
was to “Facilitate, on a priority basis, the transportation, storage, safeguarding, and 
elimination of nuclear and other weapons of the independent states of the former Soviet 
Union.636 The legislation authorized funding to assist the former Soviet Union with its 
efforts to (1) destroy nuclear, chemical, and other weapons, (2) transport, store, disable, 
and safeguard weapons in connection with their destruction, and (3) establish verifiable 
safeguards against the proliferation of such weapons. By doing so, the United States 
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initiated preventive steps to halt the proliferation of nuclear material, chemical, and 
biological agents out of the former Soviet Union before it began by securing materials at 
their source.  
With demonstrated effectiveness, the Nunn-Lugar program has successfully 
reduced the number of stockpiles and “loose nukes” in the former Soviet Union. The 
U.S.-led PSI is often considered the prototype for a new, less universal, but more flexible 
and efficient nonproliferation strategy. However, by looking at terrorism as a possible 
outcome, it may be necessary to move some of that focus on smaller quantities and 
scientists. CTR can lessen opportunities and stop threat at the source. Yet, despite these 
proven successes, some experts believe that these collaborative efforts have not been 
afforded the financial resources or political support they warrant.”637  
In recent years, NNSA nuclear nonproliferation programs have focused increasing 
attention on the security of weapon-usable nuclear materials in countries beyond Russia 
and the former Soviet states. For example, the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) 
was created in 2004 to consolidate and accelerate NNSA efforts to secure and recover 
nuclear and radiological materials overseas and convert HEU-fueled research reactors in 
dozens of countries around the world. In fiscal year 2009, NNSA spent over $2 billion on 
its nuclear nonproliferation programs.638 The NNSA programs have engaged more than 
100 countries, and are seeking to increase nuclear security work with several countries 
where limited prior cooperation has occurred. However, the GAO found progress on 
some programs to improve nuclear security, including those in China and India, have had 
mixed outcomes of success due largely to “political sensitivities.”639 
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D. DECONFLICT: EVOLVING WMD STRATEGIES THROUGH THE LENS 
OF NATIONAL STRATEGIES 
The U.S. approach to nuclear threats has been evolving since the 1940s when 
nuclear capabilities were first introduced. However, following 9/11, the international 
community changed how it viewed WMD threats. In the wake of the terrorist attacks on 
September 11, 2001, seven new national strategies were developed and published to help 
guide U.S. efforts to combat terrorism. Of these, five were newly published strategies that 
related to specific aspects of homeland security and combating terrorism, such as 
WMD.640  
Since nuclear proliferation was identified in 1992 by the United Nations Security 
Council as a threat to international peace and security, the most reliable and consistent 
policy for achieving nonproliferation has been to prevent actors from acquiring the means 
to build a bomb by erecting technical barriers to that process.641 Chemical, biological, 
and missile proliferation did not attain the priority of nuclear proliferation until the 
1980s.642 Chemical and biological threats have been dealt with mostly through 
international protocols and regulative measures. 
As times have changed, and programs continue to develop, that preventative 
posture may not be enough to make the United States safe from these threats. State 
actors, acting outside of the regime, such as Iran, Iraq,643 and North Korea, have all 
managed to develop programs of varying degree.  
In 1995, the first domestic policy announced links between nuclear, chemical, and 
biological weapons threats, and terrorists.644 Following 9/11, the 2002 National Strategy 
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to Combat Terrorism officially designated “non-state actors” as a security threat.645 The 
2002 National Security Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction contained 
similarly direct language:  
The gravest danger our Nation faces, lies at the crossroads of radicalism 
and technology. Our enemies have openly declared that they are seeking 
weapons of mass destruction, and evidence indicates that they are doing so 
with determination. The United States will not allow these efforts to 
succeed.646 
After 9/11, the United States set out its strategy to specifically combat WMD. The 
strategy is comprised of three pillars: nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and 
consequence management.647 (The 9/11 Commission offers one recommendation in this 
domain that essentially urges enhancing three existing programs—counterproliferation 
efforts, expanding PSI and CTR—with greater emphasis).648 The strategy defines 
counterproliferation activities as those that combat the use of WMD, such as interdiction, 
deterrence, defense, and mitigation. Non-proliferation efforts are those aimed at 
preventing the spread of those weapons to limit the production and transfer of materials 
used in the production of WMD.649 These non-proliferation efforts include such diverse 
approaches as diplomacy, arms control, multilateral regimes, threat reduction, 
cooperation, controls on nuclear materials, sanctions, and export controls as the first 
actions the United States can take to build international support for the elimination of the 
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threat.650 It is of interest to point out that the document narrows the WMD threat to being 
a component of a terrorist attack and not as a potential threat posed by a rogue nation.651 
Then, in December 2002, in the midst of post-9/11 bureaucratic realignment, 
President Bush announced a national strategic policy on WMD to complement the 2002 
National Strategy. In this document, the 2002 Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, the President went further in specific efforts to combat WMD including 
calling for the application of new technologies, increasing emphasis on intelligence 
collection and analysis, strengthening relationships with alliances, and the establishing 
new partnerships with former adversaries.652 The main pillars of the President’s program 
included interdiction efforts, nonproliferation programs, and consequence 
management.653  
We will not permit the world’s most dangerous regimes and terrorists to 
threaten us with the world’s most destructive weapons. We must accord 
the highest priority to the protection of the United States, our forces, and 
our friends and allies from the existing and growing WMD threat..654 
In particular, President Bush called for an emphasis on improving intelligence regarding 
WMD facilities and activities, expanding the interaction among U.S. intelligence, law 
enforcement, and military agencies, and enhancing intelligence cooperation with friends 
and allies.655 Also of note, was that the comprehensive approach relied heavily on both 
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diplomacy and military strength,656 which signaled one of the earliest recognitions that 
both these efforts were needed to support operational efforts.  
The National Strategy for Combating WMD Terrorism was intended to “bring 
together in a comprehensive way our traditional counter-proliferation, nonproliferation, 
and counterterrorism tools to confront and defeat this grave threat to international peace 
and security.”657 The strategy was an attempt to provide the President’s vision on how 
the entirety of the federal government should address this catastrophic threat to the 
nation. Under this strategy, the Departments of State, Defense, and Homeland Security 
have the primary roles in executing this strategy; it does not alleviate the other 
departments from also taking actions to combat this threat.658 However, clearly defined 
roles of each agency, or how the nonproliferation community and counterterrorism 
community would work together to coordinate have not been identified. These gaps raise 
the issues, of whether anyone is coordinating actions and efforts, or orchestrating a grand 
strategy to maximize effects.  
The second major component of nonproliferation, security cooperation, and 
building partner capacity, focuses on assisting U.S. allies and friends in being self-
sufficient in their own protection. By the simple nature of treaties and economic 
sanctions, these actions primarily focus on state entities and consequence management, 
which guide the planning and response to a WMD event,659 which also serves as a 
deterrent by demonstrating the U.S.’ capabilities to respond to the use of chemical, 
biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons. If the United States is successful in 
controlling access to critical technology and demonstrating an overwhelming ability to 
respond, most nations should be kept from even attempting to acquire or develop WMD 
capabilities. 
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While it may be easy to see the second pillar, counterproliferation, as the next 
logical step after nonproliferation fails, it is in fact a step that must happen in concurrence 
with nonproliferation. Unfortunately, chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 
(CBRN) weapons already exist around the world and require actions today through 
means other than treaties. The United States is capable of countering ongoing proliferation 
by maintaining the ability to interdict shipments of WMD-related material and by providing a 
credible deterrent.660 
By comparison to the 2002 Strategy, the 2007 National Strategy additionally 
specifies the importance of preventing and disrupting terrorist attacks using WMDs, 
protecting the American people, critical infrastructure, and key resources, and notably, 
includes response to and recovery from such incidents.661 The most significant policy 
shift in this document narrows the WMD threat to being a component of a terrorist attack 
and not as a potential threat posed by a rogue nation.662  
In February 2010, the Quadrennial Defense Review stressed how the proliferation 
of WMD “continues to undermine global security.”663 During talks related to these 
initiatives, President Barack Obama directly connected the threat of nuclear terrorism to 
the success of nuclear proliferation efforts.664  
From a U.S. perspective, proliferation has been seen from the beginning as a 
global problem. Responses to the threat in the nuclear realm have been primarily global 
in nature, including the Atoms for Peace initiative, a modest proposal that traded access 
to civil nuclear technology for restraints on military applications, the creation of the 
IAEA (as envisioned in the Atoms for Peace proposal) and the NPT.665 In the late 1990s, 
the United States embarked on the Nunn-Lugar project, a bilateral agreement on threat 
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reduction that worked to secure stockpiles of nuclear material in Russia. The project is 
credited with at least moderate success in reducing the about “loose nukes” and lose 
material in Russia under crumbling infrastructure. Biological and chemical weapons 
proliferation did not attain the priority of nuclear proliferation until the late 1980s 
following the first Gulf War and the Iraq chemical weapons use on Iran and its own 
Kurdish population.666 This situation was also dealt with by an international response 
focusing on international treaties, which led to the negotiation and conclusion of the 
Chemical Weapons Convention, (CWC) a growing attention on verification of the 
Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and the creation of supplier regimes, primarily 
the Australia Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).667 Until the 
9/11, virtually no mention of terrorism appeared in the projects, and had little direct 
connection to domestic projects and actions—the “homeland security aspect.” 
E. ANALYSIS OF CURRENT POLICIES/REVIEW OF NATIONAL 
EFFORTS 
1. WMD Report Card 
The Partnership for a Secure America (PSA) announced an initiative to monitor 
and evaluate the implementation of key unfulfilled recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission related to WMD.668 One of the top priorities of this effort was to follow up 
on the Commission’s recommendation that the U.S. government apply maximum effort 
to preventing a WMD terror attack on the United States by combating the proliferation of 
weapons and materials around the world.669 In December 2008, in accordance with the 
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (Public Law 110–
53), the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation 
and Terrorism submitted its report, “World at Risk.” In 2009, the Commission was 
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authorized to work for an additional year to assist Congress and the Administration to 
improve its understanding of its findings and turn its concrete recommendations into 
actions. In accordance with that authorization, the Commission submitted a report card 
assessing the U.S. government’s progress in protecting the United States from WMD 
proliferation and terrorism. Commonly known as the WMD Report Card, it assessed the 
progress that the U.S. government has made in implementing the recommendations of the 
9/11 Commission. In September 2008, the Partnership for a Secure America released its 
bipartisan report of the U.S.’ efforts to improve security from WMD attacks and gave the 
U.S. government an overall grade of “C.” In their report, they identify three major 
shortfalls the government must address in regards to WMD prevention and preparedness: 
(1) no one overall is in charge of converting “resolve into results,” (2) no strategic plan 
links disparate actions, and (3) a failure exists to build international support for these 
efforts.670 
Its first report issued in 2008, “World at Risk,” the Commission concluded in its 
final report that American national security faced ever growing threats from 
unconventional weapons, and from biological weapons in particular.671 The report 
assigns 17 grades that highlight the issues of greatest priority in protecting Americans 
from WMD. While in general, the government was given praise for its efforts to reduce 
nuclear threats, it had harsher findings regarding biological threats. Specifically, the 
commission concluded that the last four Presidential administrations have “failed to pay 
consistent and urgent attention to increasing the nation’s ability to respond quickly and 
effectively to a germ attack” that would inflict massive casualties on the nation.672 
Ultimately, the commission chairman and vice chairman stated, the “lack of 
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preparedness” and “consistent lack of action” reflect “a failure of the U.S. government to 
grasp the threat of biological weapons.”673 
In a stark and now infamous warning, the Commission found that “unless the 
world community acts decisively and with great urgency, it is more likely than not that a 
weapon of mass destruction will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by 
the end of 2013.”674 
2. Evaluation of Goals for President Obama’s Nuclear Strategy  
A decade after events that changed the way the nexus between proliferation and 
WMD terrorism is viewed, the current policy landscape requires an examination of the 
interpretation and implementation of the policies established in the early days following 
9/11, as well as how other nations are addressing this same global challenge. 
Unfortunately, it seems nonproliferation has seen only minor changes in the last decade.  
While President Bush was the first to include terrorism on the national strategic 
agenda, President Obama first put nuclear non-proliferation the “centerpiece” of his 
national security agenda.675 In 2009, President Obama laid out an aggressive vision of 
nuclear security. While the most noted goal was a world without nuclear weapons, he tied 
that goal to preventing nuclear terrorism by securing vulnerable nuclear materials and 
strengthening international cooperation on nuclear issues.676  
Most recently in June 2011, President Obama made a dramatic shift over the Bush 
Administration policies regarding terrorism strategy. In issuing the 2011 National 
Strategy on Counterterrorism, President Obama chose to use this document by focusing 
on one part of a larger national security strategy.  
This Strategy builds upon the progress we have made in the decade since 
9/11, in partnership with Congress, to build our counterterrorism and 
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homeland security capacity as a nation. It neither represents a wholesale 
overhaul—nor a wholesale retention—of previous policies and 
strategies.677 
However, for the first time in defining the threat, the 2011 Strategy specifically 
targets one group—Al Qaeda—rather than a larger subset of groups, targets, and 
methodologies. The principal focus of this counterterrorism strategy is the network that 
poses the most direct and significant threat to the United States—al-Qaeda. According to 
the 2011 Counterterrorism Strategy, “the preeminent security threat to the United States 
continues to be from al-Qa’ida and its affiliates and its adherents.”678 
The strategy does contain a brief mention in regards to the prevention and terrorist 
acquisition of WMD, which continues the justification, laid out by earlier strategies. In 
that brief statement, it lays out two significant facts: (1) that nuclear terrorism is the 
greatest threat to global security, and (2) that providing multilateral nonproliferation 
organizations with the resources, capabilities, and authorities they need to be effective. 
.Deepening international cooperation and strengthening institutions and partnerships is 
one way to achieve to prevent WMD and nuclear materials from falling into the hands of 
terrorists.679  
While the President has continued to highlight the dangers of nuclear terrorism in 
policy speeches, his efforts in nonproliferation are still largely tied to the START—a very 
“traditional concept” in nuclear missile defense. While the current administration is 
attempting to make diplomatic headway in the areas of chemical and nuclear 
proliferation, it took a very different approach with biological threats. 
3. The Obama Administration and Biological Threats 
Although new efforts to thwart chemical threats remain absent from the national 
agenda, President Obama released a National Strategy to Countering Biological Threats 
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whether they be “natural, accidental, and deliberate origin.680 The plan is intended to 
provide a comprehensive roadmap for addressing the full range of biosecurity and 
infectious-disease challenges facing the United States. In this way, for the first time, 
national biodefense strategy integrates public health and security concerns into a single 
paradigm. At the 7th Biological and Toxin Review Conference, then Secretary of State 
Hilary Clinton stated, “Shoring up our domestic and international defenses against 
intentional attacks will make it easier to detect and respond. We need public health 
systems that can quickly diagnose outbreaks, whatever their source, and mobilize the 
right medical resources and personnel. By making any one country more secure, we make 
the international community more secure at the same time.”681 
The National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats takes a holistic approach 
to infectious-disease threats by viewing them as a spectrum that encompasses: (1) natural 
emerging infections, (2) the accidental release of pathogens from a research laboratory, 
and (3) the deliberate use of disease as a weapon by states and non-state actors, such as 
criminals and terrorist organizations.682 Although the strategy document sets out policy 
guidelines, it states that their implementation, including specific actions to be taken by 
federal agencies, “will be directed separately.”683 Thus, the challenge facing the 
Administration is how to translate the broad guidelines in the National Strategy into a set 
of concrete policy initiatives, and to give them the political and budgetary support they 
will require for effective implementation. While it is true, certain attack scenarios 
involving exotic or bioengineered pathogens would be recognized almost immediately as 
bioterrorism, in other cases.  
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While the previous presidential administration focused much of its homeland 
security biodefense efforts on programs focused on preparedness and response to a 
biothreat after a potential dangerous pathogen is detected, the new strategy appears to 
also focus more on the nation’s biosecurity posture by placing a greater emphasis on 
preventive measures to reduce the risks of biological weapons proliferation and terrorism; 
thereby, recognizing the importance of stopping biological threats before they can fully 
materialize.684  
The end of 2011 saw the Seventh Annual Review Conference of the BWC (BWC 
RevCon). The Obama administration called the ambitious work program adopted by the 
Review Conference “an important step toward reinvigorating the BWC as a premier 
venue for multinational collaboration on concrete efforts to help counter biological 
proliferation and bioterrorism.”685 The agreed upon goals of the RevCon are as well-
intended and auspicious as any international debate to combat such a threat and include 
strengthening the national implementation of the BWC, an agreement on the need to 
build capacity to deal with disease outbreaks, including those potentially due to use of 
biological weapons, and a systematic assessment of developments in the field of science 
and technology related to the BWC, as well as a review of scientific and technological 
developments relevant to the Convention. However, the work of the committee may have 
been overshadowed by controversial research published, which was undertaken in the 
Netherlands and the United States that increased the virulence of the H5N1 influenza 
virus (known as the H5N1 research). This research stimulated fears about potential 
bioterrorism and public health concerns about such virulent strains escaping from 
laboratories with inadequate biosecurity and biosafety regimes into a world with 
insufficient public health surveillance and response capacities to deal with such a 
nightmare and highlighted the distance remaining in achieving an international policy. 
These concerns are not new, and have been on the BWC agenda for years. Despite public 
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outcry, nothing ended up in the final declaration of the Rev Con. It seems that despite 
years of warnings from experts about the need to address potential dangers in this realm, 
the BWC process before and after the Seventh RevCon has contributed little to an issue 
right in the BWC nexus between public health and bioterrorism.  
4. The Global Nuclear Detection Architecture 
The GNDA is described as a multi-layered system of detection technologies, 
programs, and guidelines designed to enhance the nation’s ability to detect and prevent a 
radiological or nuclear attack.686 It is one of the first national efforts to coordinate a 
defense system by bringing together both policy and operations with the intent to address 
the prevention of a nuclear threats on the U.S. homeland.687 Development of the GNDA 
was mandated in National NSPD-43/HSPD-14688 and in the SAFE Port Act of 2006.689  
The GNDA is described not as a program, but a “network of systems which in 
part or in entirety support a common objective.”690 More specifically, this system is 
described as “a worldwide network of sensors, telecommunications, and personnel, with 
the supporting information exchanges, programs and protocols, that serve to detect 
analyze, and report on nuclear and radiological materials that are out of regulatory 
control.”691  
The GNDA is based upon a “layered defense” model that works to keep nuclear 
threats out of U.S. borders but is also a detection system that would be located within the 
domestic territory. A layered defense provides multiple opportunities to detect and 
interdict threats. According to DNDO, “It is recognized that no single layer of protection 
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can ever be 100% successful” and a layered defense strategy acknowledges this 
difficulty.692 The plan includes stakeholders at the international, national, state and—
most notably for its uniqueness—the local level.693  
The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) is the government agency in 
charge of developing the GNDA. The office was initially established under the Bush 
Administration, under the Department of Homeland Security, to centralize the 
coordination of the federal response to an unconventional nuclear threat. DNDO is the 
accountable organization to develop this architecture and to support the deployment of 
domestic nuclear detection systems.694 However, DNDO has not been without criticism. 
Initially, President Bush appointed Secretary Vayl Oxford, but the position was vacant 
for an extended period of time and without a permanent leader until President Obama 
named his replacement in 2010. DNDO has also been publicly criticized for several 
reasons including a lack of vision, and that the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations on 
addressing the proliferation of WMD never called for such a detection array or even 
envisioned such a system.695  
DNDO was also criticized for being slow to build strategies to guide domestic 
development including estimating time frames and costs for addressing gaps as directed 
by Congress,696 and for failing to address elements of key gaps in defense systems and 
the slow development of the GNDA strategic plan, which was mandated in its original 
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mission but was not completed until 2010.697 One of the most controversial initiatives 
that has greatly impacted DNDO’s credibility was the much aligned development of a 
new technology called the Advanced Spectroscopic Program (ASP), which was intended 
to be the “next generation” of radiological/nuclear detection monitoring at seaports and 
borders. However, the technology failed to deliver the level of technological 
advancement after billions had been invested.698 The theme of implementing new 
technologies that did not meet intended requirements or were not appropriately tested 
and evaluated, and cost benefit analysis that was not completed before deployed in 
an operational environment has been a challenge to the DNDO mission.  
Many factors ultimately will impact the success, or failure of a GNDA. Certainly, 
a sustainable and robust GNDA will require a constant need to identify and fill critical 
gaps. Technological limitations,699 adaptability of the adversary, and implementation by 
all stakeholders at all levels of government,700 are identified as some of the biggest 
hurdles in this mission. In addition, perhaps the biggest challenge as with any initiative or 
program with multiple stakeholder is interagency coordination.701 Since multiple 
departments are involved in the implementation, the GNDA does not have one single 
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budget, which makes it difficult to provide Congress with a more transparent correlation 
between agency funding and the GNDA.702 
Certainly for the architecture to be successful, substantial interagency 
coordination must occur on the operational and policy levels. Measuring the success of 
the larger system relative to its individual components and the effectiveness of additional 
system development is a challenge.703 
5. Nuclear Posture Review and April 2010 Summit 
The Nuclear Posture Review is the official U.S. government statement on the role 
of nuclear weapons in its deterrence and defense policy. This policy document is 
legislatively mandated and drives nuclear investments and war-planning for a five- to 10-
year period.704 The NPR provides a roadmap for implementing the agenda for global 
security of nuclear threats. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) is the third formal 
review of U.S. nuclear strategy conducted since the end of the Cold War.705 The 
preceding reviews were conducted early in each of the Clinton and Bush administrations’ 
first terms both of which were conducted in 1994 and 2001, respectively and occurred 
under vastly different political circumstances.  
The 2010 NPR produced under President Obama does break with some policies of 
the Bush Administration—most notably by putting unprecedented emphasis on the 
nuclear threat from terrorists and rogue states, as opposed to nuclear powers, such as 
Russia and China, and instead places nuclear terrorism and proliferation at the “top of the 
national agenda,”706 and as noted by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, is intended to 
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lead expanded international efforts to rebuild and strengthen the global nuclear non-
proliferation regime.707 
In his April 2009 speech in Prague, President Obama highlighted 21st century 
nuclear dangers and laid out his philosophical ideas that would become the NPR the 
following year. In the same speech, he laid out a plan to improve nuclear security, which 
included convening a nuclear security summit in Washington, DC, in April 2010.708 In an 
auspicious move, the President declared that to overcome these grave and growing 
threats, the United States will “seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear 
weapons.”709 The President pledged to take concrete steps toward that goal by reducing 
the number of nuclear weapons and their role in U.S. national security strategy while at 
the same time promising that as long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States will 
maintain a safe, secure, and effective arsenal, both to deter potential adversaries and to 
assure its U.S. allies and other security partners that America’s security commitments are 
reliable.  
These classic nuclear security assurances and postures raise a new policy 
conundrum of sorts for the future of nonproliferation. If the threat premise is that nuclear 
states are not the main adversary and if terrorists are not going to use missile systems, 
how then can the NPR support counterterrorism efforts? According to the NPR, missile 
defense may play an indirect role in deterring nuclear terrorism as a means of 
strengthening this nation’s ability to mobilize broad international support for the 
measures needed to reinforce the non-proliferation regime and secure nuclear materials 
worldwide.710 The second proposition underlying the bipartisan consensus is that many 
countries consider U.S. compliance with its nuclear disarmament obligations under 
Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT, a precondition before supporting 
additional U.S. nonproliferation initiatives vital to countering 21st century nuclear 
threats. These threats are characterized by the diffusion of nuclear materials, expertise, 
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and technology—much of it with a civilian dimension—to state and non-state actors 
enabled by globalization and economic development. In the words of Secretaries Shultz, 
Kissinger, Perry, and Senator Nunn, “Without the vision of moving toward zero [nuclear 
weapons], we will not find the essential cooperation required to stop our downward 
spiral.”711 
6. Coordination and Implementation 
In practice, U.S. nonproliferation/counter-proliferation policy covers an enormous 
spectrum of activities. The scope of activities encompasses the maintenance of 
multilateral non-proliferation regimes for chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, and 
missile delivery systems, as well as substantial programs to secure nuclear weapon 
materials and dangerous pathogens in the United States and abroad. Also included in this 
scope are the gathering of intelligence on a worldwide basis and its effective use, 
domestic and global coordination of technology controls, a multi-billion dollar, multi-
agency research budget, the management of public health preparedness, including the 
development and manufacture of vaccines against bioweapon agents, and major elements 
of U.S. defense policy, including the U.S. deterrence posture (important to reassure allies 
they do not need nuclear weapons of their own), and the development of missile 
defenses.712 In other words, many programs and government entities are charged with 
implementing and overseeing initiatives.  
In addition to those traditional multilateral proliferation regimes, a December 
2011 GAO report identified and reviewed 21 U.S. government programs and offices 
under five federal agencies—NNSA, the DoD, Department of State, DHS, and the 
Department of Justice—that play a role in preventing and detecting the smuggling of 
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nuclear materials and illicit trafficking of related technologies overseas.713 These 
programs include conducting research and development on radiation detection 
technologies, deploying radiation detection equipment along foreign borders and points 
of transit, training and equipping foreign customs and border security officials to identify 
and interdict illicit nuclear materials or technology transfers, assisting foreign 
governments in the development of export control systems, enhancing and coordinating 
with foreign anti-smuggling law enforcement and prosecutorial capabilities, and 
analyzing potential foreign nuclear smuggling cases and incidents.714  
The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction has provided the 
President’s vision on how the entire interagency should address this catastrophic threat to 
the nation. While the Departments of State, Defense, and Homeland Security have the 
primary roles in executing this strategy, it does not alleviate the other departments from 
also taking actions to combat this threat. In identifying each agency’s focus, it raises the 
question, “is anyone directing or synchronizing actions in order to achieve effects?” 
While the Department of State has not prepared a specific strategy, its actions appear that 
it is executing the nonproliferation intent presented in the national strategy—its primary 
treaty emphasis has been on strengthening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. 
Several key reports on terrorism and WMD have all highlighted common 
problems with coordination in relation to WMD. The 2005 report of the Commission on 
the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (known as the Robb-Silberman Commission) noted the need to create 
“government-wide ‘strategic operational planning’” on WMD issues outside the National 
Counterproliferation Center.715 Difficulties in coordinating WMD efforts to combat 
nuclear proliferation were also noted as recently as December 2008, in “World at Risk,” 
the report of the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Proliferation and Terrorism in December 2008. 
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According to the GAO, “DNDO has taken steps to develop a global nuclear 
detection architecture but lacks an overarching strategic plan to help guide how it will 
achieve a more comprehensive architecture.” Development of the GNDA is one attempt 
to coordinate all the programs related to this issue; however, despite creating a 
comprehensive strategy, the implementation of the architecture is complicated. Full 
implementation of the GNDA is the responsibility of several different departments and 
agencies, including the Departments of State, Defense, Energy, and Justice that maintain 
their respective responsibilities for policy guidance and implementation portion of the 
GNDA.716 Specifically, DNDO has developed an initial architecture after coordinating 
with the DoD, DOE, and State to identify 74 federal programs that combat the smuggling 
of nuclear or radiological material.717 However, it is unclear whether these more defined 
roles give authority to these lead agencies to provide direction and guidance across 
multiple agencies and programs.718 
Also needing clarification is the lead agencies responsible for different elements 
of the global architecture, including efforts overseas. Specifically, for the exterior layer of 
the global architecture—the portion focused on enhancing international capabilities for 
detecting nuclear and radiological materials abroad.719 For instance, State and DoD 
officials told GAO that neither State nor any other federal agency has the authority to 
direct the activities or coordinate implementation of programs administered by other 
agencies involved in preventing or detecting nuclear smuggling overseas.720 
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Another criticism of DNDO is that it has too narrowly focused it efforts on 
radiation detection and should instead have a role to “….be one (major) piece within a 
broader effort to defeat nuclear terrorism.”721 
As noted earlier, the “World at Risk Report” makes recommendations for 
improved coordination of activities relative to nuclear proliferation.722 Specifically, this 
report recommended the creation of a WMD terrorism prevention coordinator in the 
White House.723 “No single person is in charge of and accountable for preventing WMD 
proliferation and terrorism, with insight into all of [the] committees and interagency 
working groups focused on these issues.”724 This situation is a similar to the requirement 
defined in the 2007 Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act.725 
That commission proposed that the President designate “a White House principal advisor 
for WMD proliferation and terrorism” that would not require Senate confirmation. Such a 
role was to oversee the efforts in the areas of proliferation and terrorism, but would also 
lead the formulation, advocacy, and oversight of a comprehensive U.S. counter-WMD 
policy and strategy. The head of this office is to advise the President, “formulate national 
strategy and policy, lead interagency coordination and implementation, and oversee the 
development of a comprehensive coordinated budget for these issues.”726  
Despite these recommendations, neither the Bush nor Obama Administrations 
made appointments until 2009 when President Obama named a Coordinator for the 
Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism under the 
National Security Council.727 This new position is under the National Security Council 
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and serves as the central organizer for U.S. efforts to improve nuclear security and 
prevent nuclear terrorism worldwide.728 However, more direct involvement from the 
NSC is also requested. Despite this new position, some have advocated for the NSC to 
play a stronger role in nonproliferation issues. DOE and NNSA agreed with the GAO’s 
recommendation that the NSC lead the interagency development of a more detailed 
implementation plan.729  
To provide a clear sense of the overall scope of work anticipated under the 
President’s initiative to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide 
within 4 years, we recommend that NSC lead and coordinate through 
NNSA, DoD, State, and other relevant agencies, including members of the 
intelligence community, the development of a comprehensive plan for 
implementing the initiative.730 
Subsequent reports continued to state, “we recommended that the Secretaries of 
Defense and Energy develop an integrated plan for improved coordination of all U.S. 
threat reduction and nonproliferation programs.”731  
7. The International Community’s Response—New Approaches 
A major weakness of existing multilateral regimes that the next generation of 
nonproliferation instruments is attempting to address is trading, smuggling, and 
trafficking of WMD-related materials. No multilateral regime before the PSI and 
Resolution 1540 directly addressed these crucial avenues by which WMD materials are 
traded. The matter was largely left to the law enforcement and border patrol in individual 
nation-states.732 
In 2003 and 2004, the United States created two significant international 
mechanisms to attempt to stem the tide of illegal proliferation: the Proliferation Security 
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Initiative (PSI), and the passing of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 
1540. These new mechanisms were instituted to fill gaps in the existing non-proliferation 
regime, although they approach nonproliferation by different methods. One utilizes a 
small voluntary coalition, while the other imposes mandatory obligations of a universal 
nature. Both were created through international legal methods, but arguably exist due to 
novel legal authorities.733 Both the Proliferation Security Initiative and Resolution 1540 
represent a departure from multilateral treaty regimes that the international community 
has utilized for over 100 years in attempts to curb the proliferation of WMDs or chemical 
and biological weapons.734 These new mechanisms were developed as evolving global 
security threats have highlighted the consent-based treaties’ “futility and 
ineffectiveness,”735 and represent a new generation of multilateral approaches to 
combating weapons of mass destruction.736 These new mechanisms add another layer to 
the non-proliferation regime that may clarify and focus efforts where greater effort is 
needed, or create more political divisiveness, and ultimately, undermine existing non-
proliferation regimes. When passed, these initiatives initially carried a strong strategic 
message by demonstrating the resolve of governments to halt the WMD threat and 
represented the first significant efforts to link the issues of proliferation and the nexus of 
terrorism.  
8. The Proliferation Security Initiative 
The Bush Administration announced the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), as 
a proactive international (voluntary) partnership to fill gaps in the multilateral WMD 
regime by leveraging military, economic and diplomatic tools to prevent the illicit 
trafficking of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and missile technology by 
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interdicting threatening shipments of WMD and missile-related technologies.737 The 
focus of the PSI is not on preventing WMD terrorism but rather on promoting 
counterproliferation cooperation among like-minded states, and especially, on curtailing 
North Korea’s nuclear-related trade.738 
On May 31, 2003, U.S. President George W. Bush introduced the PSI during a 
speech at the G8 Summit in Krakow, Poland. 
When WMD or their components are in transit, we must have the means 
and authority to seize them. So today I announce a new effort to fight 
proliferation called the Proliferation Security Initiative. The United States 
and a number of our close allies, including Poland, have begun working on 
new agreements to search planes and ships carrying suspect cargo and to 
seize illegal weapons or missile technologies. Over time, we will extend 
this partnership as broadly as possible to keep the world’s most destructive 
weapons away from our shores and out of the hands of our common 
enemies.739 
The premise of the PSI lies in the assumption that proliferation is a universal 
threat and pro-active, collective action must be taken to ensure that deadly weapons do 
not fall into the possession of terrorists or rogue states.740 According to the members of 
PSI, the initiative is a necessary approach to fill gaps in the existing non-proliferation 
regimes, particularly the problems of non-state actors seeking to acquire WMD and of 
countries that do not fulfill their international obligations, do not join existing regimes, or 
do not follow international legal norms.741 
The PSI has a primary aim to restrict trafficking of WMD in the air, on land, or at 
sea by raising the stakes, both politically and economically, of weapons trafficking; thus, 
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becoming a major deterrent to would-be proliferators.742 The U.S. Department of State 
characterizes PSI as an effort to seek “cooperation from any state whose vessels, flags, 
ports, territorial waters, airspace, or land might be used for proliferation purposes by 
states and non-state actors of proliferation concern.”743  
The PSI is unique in specifically stopping materials in transit through an 
integration of diplomacy, information sharing, law enforcement, and if necessary, 
military action. The new initiative was led by the United States, and consisted of 10 other 
states that sought to stem the proliferation of WMD and their components.744 Over the 
next few years, additional countries also joined.745 Today, the PSI counts several nations 
as participants in an ad hoc basis, in addition to the core membership and has the support 
of more than 90 nations.746 With the establishment of a series of new agreements and 
partnerships, the PSI attempts to create a legal framework for intercept operations as a 
counterproliferation strategy. Interdiction principles were released, becoming the PSI’s 
core document.747 It formally stated the commitment of the PSI core members and 
outlined a framework for action against proliferation. According John Bolton, the then 
Under Secretary of State, “the PSI reflects a need for a more dynamic, proactive approach 
to the global proliferation problem” to collectively work to develop a broad range of 
diplomatic, economic, and military options to interdict threatening shipments of WMD 
and missile-related equipment and technologies.748 
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The U.S. claims that the PSI has proven to be a success for the United States in 
not only increasing partner capabilities but also in building diplomatic credibility for 
future endeavors.749 However, current international law does not explicitly permit the use 
of interdiction as a tool of counterproliferation. Therefore, the legal ramifications and 
considerations of the PSI must be examined and an analysis of the possible alternatives 
and policy options must be made so that U.S. security planners can best address current 
proliferation threats, while maintaining their international commitments.750  
While PSI is considered one of the first—and only—initiatives to take a flexible 
international approach to countering issues affecting both proliferation and terrorism 
prevention, the success of PSI remains difficult to quantify. Seven incidents of ship 
interdiction and boarding are commonly cited as PSI successes.751 Criticisms of the 
initiative and its implementation are also plentiful. For instance, one common 
shortcoming of PSI is that it does not grant any legal authority for ship boarding or 
interdiction beyond the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea and other various bilateral 
agreements.752 Other nations in opposition cite a concern that PSI could violate their 
sovereignty and have questioned the legality of its interdictions. Still others have pointed 
out that PSI is limited by “having neither an independent budget nor coordinating 
mechanisms, a legal framework in which to lock in long-term, verifiable, and irreversible 
member state commitments.”753  
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9. UN Resolution 1540 and Its Extension 
In 2004, the international community came together with UN resolution 1540, and 
again with its extension UNSCR 1877 in 2010. UNSCR 1540 established for the first 
time legally binding obligations on all UN member states to take and enforce effective 
measures against the proliferation of, or acquisition by non-state actors, of chemical, 
nuclear or biological weapons, their means of delivery or related materials.754 These 
treaty-based international institutions are being used to analyze export control capacities 
in the context of UNSCR1540’s overarching counter-proliferation mandate. Unlike the 
three guiding documents of nonproliferation that apply to states, Resolution 1540 tries to 
fill in the gaps by addressing non-state actors. Since individuals are not subject to 
international law, under the resolution, states are required to ensure a national legal 
framework of laws, regulations and controls exist. 
For the first time, the Security Council created a resolution focused on security 
that dealt with a function rather than a state. A mere seven months after President Bush’s 
speech, the resolution passed outlining that states, .” . . refrain from providing any form 
of support for non-State actors. . .adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws . . . and 
enforce effective measures to establish domestic controls . . .” This single resolution 
placed the onus on all nations to take active steps to confront this new threat. What it was 
unable to accomplish was establish consistency between countries or an enforcement 
mechanism to ensure countries met their obligations. This resolution opened the door for 
much follow on discourse about ways to halt terrorist financing with respect to WMD 
acquisition, as well as reinforce “rule of law” as a means of both combating WMD but 
also combating terrorism in general. In all three cases, PSI, the Global Partnership, and 
UNSCR 1540, great levels of initial enthusiasm and action have been demonstrated. 
However, while the Bush Administration’s support around the world waned, so did its 
ability to carry forth with additional diplomatic efforts.755  
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Resolution 1540 requires states to “promote the universal adoption and full 
implementation, and, where necessary, strengthening of multilateral treaties to which 
they are parties, whose aim is to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, biological or 
chemical weapons”756 and to “fulfill their commitment to mutilateral cooperation, in 
particular within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the 
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and the Biological and Toxin 
Weapons Convention.”757 The focus of Resolution 1540 is not the treaties per se but the 
resulting national legislation and regulations that allow it to take action against non-state 
actors.758 
A committee was established under the Security Council to monitor and promote 
implementation of these national legal measures, and states have been required to submit 
a report on their implementation efforts to this committee. The UN Security Council will 
then meet to review and likely extend the mandate of the 1540 Committee, which was 
extended in April 2011.  
The adoption of Resolution 1540 raises several issues and poses ongoing 
challenges for the international community. The first and foremost question involves the 
Security Council’s authority. The Council, in unanimously adopting the resolution, has 
imposed obligations on states that neither negotiated nor ratified the process and now 
have no choice but to comply. Also raised was the question of whether a UN resolution 
should address an issue traditionally covered by the three main treaties of the non-
proliferation regime. However, these treaties do not directly regulate non-state actor 
behavior and the requirements outlined in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 
the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the Biological and Toxins Weapons 
Convention (BTWC) leave substantial gaps, especially given the less than universal 
adherence to these WMD weapons-related treaties. The resolution is universal unlike the 
three main WMD treaties. Whereas the three main WMD treaties, the Non-Proliferation 
                                                 
756 S/RES/1540(2004) article 8a. 
757 Ibid., article 8c. 
758 Peter Van Ham, and Olivia Bosch, “Global Non-Proliferation and Counter-Terrorism: The Role of 
Resolution 1540 and Its Implications,” Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2007, 15. 
 185 
Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention, are first and foremost applicable to states, the resolution focuses on non-state 
actors. The resolution, adopted under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, requires 
enforcement, which emphasizes the role states are expected to play to pre-empt 
proliferation759 because it hints at the possibility of sanctions in the case of non-
compliance. It also tries to address the enforcement weakness in the treaties and export 
control regimes.  
Proponents of the resolution advocate that it will complement, rather than 
conflict, with the existing treaties. For example, the Director-General of the Organization 
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), Ambassador Rogelio Pfirter, 
provided a briefing to the 1540 Committee in which he emphasized that improvements in 
measures to implement the CWC are occurring in parallel with the complementary 
requirements laid down in Resolution 1540, which are binding on all UN member states, 
including non-member states of the OPCW.760 
Another issue that has been raised is whether the Security Council will back up 
the resolution with enforcement measures to hold states accountable for their compliance, 
and whether states fully appreciate the implications of the obligations that have been 
placed upon them. Furthermore, states must meet the resolution’s legally binding 
requirement to institute “appropriate” and “effective” measures to deny non-state actors 
NBC weapons. However, the resolution does not define what is “appropriate” or 
“effective,” which leaves this task to the Committee and the states themselves to interpret 
these standards. This situation brings to light concerns about the lack of enforcement and 
what becomes of non-compliant states when “non-compliance” has not been clearly 
defined. A final issue is the effective implementation of Resolution 1540 and the 
responsibility of international organizations and states with the capacity to satisfy the 
terms of the resolution to help those 150 nations without the adequate legal infrastructure 
to do the same successfully.  
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Critics of the measure argue that many countries, particularly developing ones, 
may be hesitant to implement 1540 because it will require potentially significant 
investments in a range of specialized regulatory capacity—resources that they might 
expend elsewhere.761 However, UNSC-1540 does not define what “appropriate effective” 
means, leaving the interpretation to individual countries’ discretion, nor does it provide 
funding to support implementation.762 As a result of these factors, implementation among 
developing countries is weak.  
Resolution 1540 obligates all nations to implement laws to prevent the 
proliferation of WMD, especially to non-state actors. The vast, comprehensive approach 
leads to difficulties in the legal context, including interpretations and obligations, but 
more significantly, it raises questions of what constitutes full implementation, and 
eventually, future enforcement. Enforcement has long been a challenge within the non-
proliferation regime. While Resolution 1540 shows the resolve of some states to stop the 
proliferation of WMD weapons to non-state actors, its provisions will require much 
cooperation by states to be effective. 
One assessment of this security measures asserts, “Resolution 1540 is the most 
important pillar of the evolving nuclear security regime, but its implementation has been 
slow and patchy.”763 
10. 1977 Extension 
An April 20 White House statement called the continuation of the committee’s 
work “an important element of the United States’ nonproliferation objectives” and 
highlighted a March 31 White House announcement that Washington intended to 
contribute $3 million to a UN-administered fund to support the committee’s efforts to 
assist states in implementing Resolution 1540’s requirements. 
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On April 20, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted 
Resolution 1977. The measure extends the mandate of the 1540 Committee, which is 
charged with executing the 2004 resolution, assessing progress toward its 
implementation, and aiding governments in fulfilling their obligations to prevent non-
state entities from obtaining WMD or the means to deliver them.764  
F. SUMMARY 
Efforts to address WMD threats and proliferation comprehensively are well 
documented in government reports and programs. The question is whether these 
programs are effective and innovative enough to deal with the recent developments 
overlapping nonproliferation and counterterrorism efforts. Coordination of multiple 
agencies and entities continues to be a challenge as does implementation of several 
domestic and international initiatives.  
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. A NEW ERA OF PROLIFERATION CHALLENGES 
1. Conclusion 
Since the beginning of the new century, a confluence of events has increased the 
threat that non-state actors may acquire nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. These 
threats look drastically different from the national-state combatant paradigm when old 
beliefs about nuclear threats were first introduced. The terrorist attacks of 9/11, 
information about the ambitions of certain terrorist organizations to acquire and use 
WMD weapons, and revelations about a global proliferation network, should galvanize 
the international community to rethink its approach to the non-proliferation regime.  
While neither the non-proliferation regime, nor its core agreements, should be 
abandoned, they do need to be reinvented to reflect changes in the new world following 
the end of the Cold War, the expansion of nuclear technologies, and the emergence of 
transnational terrorism. Governments must seek to include measures to supplement 
existing nonproliferation treaties to make those treaties relevant to the threats faced 
today.  
The 9/11 attacks resulted in an unprecedented U.S.-led effort to implement, 
enforce and expand existing regime norms. However, new and innovative measures, such 
as Pacific Security Initiative (PSI), and other interdiction and enforcement initiatives, 
operate in the absence of an overarching international framework, which results in the 
failure to capture fully the integration of the enforcement mission into the non-
proliferation regime. Revelations about the Khan network catalyzed international 
consensus behind a universal mechanism that could capture and integrate “traditional” 
regime-based and newer anti-proliferation–based approaches to combat illicit WMD 
trafficking and terrorism.  
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The central argument of this paper is that effective strategies on the state765 level 
are the requirement for meeting threats from non-state actors. The international 
community must tie the non-proliferation regime into (domestic) law enforcement, 
intelligence, and interdiction efforts to stop WMD threats. Solutions to this new WMD 
threat may look unconventional to the non-proliferation regime but these additions will 
make all elements across the spectrum of approaches more effective.  
One reason problems still exist is that the regime is still largely stuck in an archaic 
Cold War paradigm that has not yet kept pace with new threats. One complicating factor 
of proliferation is the “Rational Actor Theory,”766 which has guided international theory 
and norms but does not necessarily apply to non-state actors. The rational actor model is 
based on rational choice theory, adopts the state as the primary unit of analysis, and inter-
state relations (or international relations) as the context for analysis.767 According to the 
rational actor model, a rational decision-making process is used by a nation-state.768 The 
state is seen as a monolithic unitary actor, capable of making rational decisions based on 
preference ranking and value maximization.769 The rational actor model has been subject 
to criticism. The model tends to neglect a range of political variables, of which Michael 
Clarke includes, “political decisions, non-political decisions, bureaucratic procedures, 
continuations of previous policy, and sheer accident.”770 Issues of how do deter and  
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dissuade WMD terrorism must take this new paradigm into consideration; terrorists (or 
even rogue nations who may help them) may not react or respond the way a nation-state 
would.  
However, some researchers who have studied WMD terrorism sometimes 
disagree with the notion that terrorists are non-rational actors. In research conducted by 
the Belfar Institute, the researchers looked at the decision-making militant Islamists 
choosing to use WMD weapons. It found that the group would employ a rationalized 
risk-gain assessment in gauging its level of interest, motivation. and justification. This 
expert concludes that the:  
Ideology of militant Islamists is extreme, but it is not irrational, “it is a 
well-reasoned, well-developed weltanschauung, or world view. Thus, the 
rational actor model can be applied to militant Islamists, who possess an 
internally consistent belief system. The motivation to possess and use 
WMD flows logically from an extreme, but very rational set of concrete 
goals that are based on a certain interpretation of history and religion.771 
The question becomes whether it is appropriate to apply international relations 
models to the evolving problems of terrorism. 
Moreover, the Cold War concept of deterrence is not the only thing that has 
changed in this new security environment. Transnational terrorism, globalization, the 
easy sharing of information, technology diffusion, and a criticality of intelligence and 
government systems all enhance—and complicate—the system in which this nation 
operates. Smugglers and would-be nuclear terrorists, regardless of motivation (financial, 
ideological, etc.) are able to work through the cracks, of the international system. It is, 
therefore, imperative to shore up the gaps they may be able to exploit. More extensive 
improvements are needed to the international non-proliferation regime to block the 
emergence of new networks and to detect them promptly if they do arise,772 which 
includes leveraging the non-proliferation framework already in existence by 
supplementing with efforts to combat international criminal networks and overarching 
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counter-terrorism objectives. In short, it is necessary to rethink how WMD terrorism’s 
interconnectedness to the larger global agenda on security and threats and 
nonproliferation are viewed.  
Departures from the current policy approach should be taken when they are 
essential to bolstering an effective deterrent. Currently, nonproliferation and WMD 
counterterrorism move in two distinct but parallel paths—one path that reduces WMD 
dangers by maintaining classical forms of deterrence and security (such as material 
controls and international treaties), and the other that seeks to stop terrorists through 
intelligence sharing and traditional legal means. However, to address new and 
complicated threats adequately, it essential to adjust the parallel paths to intersect at the 
critical nexus to between the two. Nonproliferation and counterterrorism are no longer 
mutually exclusive imperatives. 
However, the caution is that the “nexus” should not create an imbalance in 
resources (time, money, political will) on a lower-probability contingency (actual WMD 
attack by a terrorist group through illegal acquisition) at the expense of the higher 
probability threat (conventional mass casualty attacks).773 This problematic planning 
assumption has troubled national and homeland security advisors since 9/11. Hedging 
against the worst-case scenario is critically necessary but should not be done at the 
expense of more common scenarios.774 The Bush Administration may have made this 
critical mistake in translating the nexus concept into practice with its extensive focus and 
subsequent action on Iraq’s WMD program rather than other defensive and intervention 
methods.  
Nonproliferation and counterterrorism are no longer mutually exclusive issues. 
Modernizing the current regime could place this nation in a better position to deal with 
these new challenges. Conversely, by considering WMD use as a possible operational 
contingency, the chances are increased of detecting potential plots and proliferation 
networks through normal intelligence practices. A complex approach must be 
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implemented that bridges the divide between anti-proliferation and counterterrorism. In 
addition, it must include not just diplomatic solutions, but legal ones, as well to account 
for non-state actors. International frameworks need to be expanded and have more teeth. 
Traditional non-proliferation vehicles have tried to shore up the gap, but they are working 
with policies originally designed for a different purpose, for instance, the NPT.  
Rolf Moffat-Larssen summarizes the current challenges in regards to nuclear 
materials throughout the modern world:  
Ensuring complete control over nuclear equipment, material, and 
technology is more difficult now than at any time in the past. There is a 
burgeoning global interest in all things nuclear. More states are seeking 
nuclear technologies, power, and weapons. Production, transportation, and 
storage of nuclear materials will expand throughout the 21st century. The 
presence of more material in more places increases the odds of a security 
breach leading to the loss of a bomb or the theft of materials to make a 
bomb. The anticipated global renaissance in nuclear energy will pose new 
challenges in this regard unless the associated proliferation risks are fully 
taken into account in decisions on materials processing, transportation, 
and storage. In this light, it is essential to secure not only weapons-grade 
plutonium and uranium from military programs, but also plutonium, 
highly enriched uranium, and other materials from civilian programs. 
Materials that would not meet the standards required for a nuclear weapon 
developed by a state might be usable in a terrorist’s yield-producing 
bomb.775 
While the elements of the debates about proliferation remain largely the same 
(who will proliferate, why they may proliferate, what are the consequences, etc.), it is the 
phenomenon of transnational terrorism that has changed the likely sources of 
proliferation, as well of the methods applied to combat it. Where once the fear of 
proliferation was about preventing nation-states from using nuclear power in a state-to-
state conflict, now the additional fear is that individual actors may influence proliferation 
to make their own weapons or to help rogue nations. Therefore, the debates and 
instruments in the non-proliferation regime must change to address these evolving issues; 
the cause (terrorist) must be attacked and not just the symptom (the attempt to acquire 
WMD). The application of that result has changed greatly. 
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2. International Norms 
Normative behavior may also be a factor. All these international norms have, of 
course, been violated at times by certain states that had pledged to uphold them. Norms 
do not shape the behavior of all states or individuals, but they do shape that of some. 
They also provide a basis for which to disallow persons or groups not a nation-state from 
ever legally pursuing the development for capabilities. Preventing acquisition, 
production, stockpiling, or use of chemical and biological weapons helps stigmatize them 
for states, as well as individuals and rogue groups. Norms do not determine outcomes; 
they shape the realms of possibility. They influence (increase or decrease) the probability 
of occurrence of certain courses of action. For example, the nuclear taboo, by 
delegitimizing a particular occurrence of certain course, decreased the likelihood that 
nuclear weapons will be used.776 A nation that evades global norms creates a precedent 
that others might follow. However, if the non-proliferation regime is based on these 
paradigms, they are inefficient to cover the new threats emerging in the proliferation 
rules.  
Constructivists argue that states embrace international institution out of a “desire 
to conform to shared ideas and norms of behavior.”777 An individual international 
institution is an array of interrelated norms that embody behavior for actors with a given 
identity. In this case, the norm of non-proliferation is an extension of the “nuclear taboo, 
“a norm against the use of nuclear weapons which has stigmatized nuclear weapons as 
acceptable weapons.”778 
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3. Unfortunate Stovepipes in Nonproliferation and Counterterrorism  
Since nonproliferation can, and will, have an impact on domestic homeland 
security measures, nonproliferation targeted toward terrorism must be part of a 
comprehensive foreign policy. Doing so will protect both homeland security and national 
security efforts. Plenty of documents detail both the threats of nuclear terrorism, as well 
as how to stop the dangerous proliferation of nuclear weapons and other WMD. The 
problem is that both camps are stovepiped. On one side of the debate is the non-
proliferation regime, which was developed to monitor nuclear programs in nation-states. 
Under this paradigm, terrorism and nuclear threats from non-state actors almost appears 
to be an afterthought. Even after the international community officially recognized non-
state actors as a threat, the core documents have not changed. It still assumes that if 
nations are prevented from building illicit programs, the results will also stop 
proliferators. That is an oversimplification of the problem and certainly its solution.  
On the other side, terrorism is rarely considered in the context of other foreign 
policy issues. Counterterrorism recognizes the threat of transnational terrorism but WMD 
terrorism, and in particular, nuclear terrorism is often discounted as being too low 
probability because of the technical hurdles and steps to be able overcome by a terrorist 
to be a “real” concern. The danger is that proliferation via terrorist is left to an amorphous 
global authority, with few teeth, many holes, and an assumption that the concern can be 
effectively dealt with via with state norms.  
The solutions seem to examine the issue from one side to the exclusion of the 
other, rather than as part of a comprehensive strategy. WMD terrorism in not wholly 
different but because of the materials needed to achieve it, it does have a uniqueness it 
controls, in the sharing of intelligence and in the international protocols. Until now, 
WMD terrorism has been dealt with not as a new threat with unique dynamics but as part 
of an old dynamic. The policy discussions that have occurred have thus failed to be 
translated into achievable policy reform.  
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Terrorist scholars and nonproliferation experts come at the same problem from 
different directions but neither follow the continuum far enough to hit the critical nexus. 
As one leading nuclear scholar summarized,  
One of the fundamental deficiencies in most governmental and non-
governmental analysis display familiarity with both domains, and much of 
what passes for analysis is particularly shallow in treating the diversity of 
terrorist types, their motivations and the means available for affecting the 
tactical and strategic calculations of terrorists.779 
Nonproliferation targeted toward terrorists must be part of foreign policy. Doing 
so will protect not only foreign policy objectives but also homeland security objectives 
by making it possible to leverage critical opportunities to enhance both diplomatic and 
security efforts—at home AND abroad. Neither should be abandoned but should be 
expanded.  
The need for policy integration in the national security is echoed at the highest 
levels of government and academia. One leading expert, Paul Stockton, asserts that the 
integration of domestic and international components of security policy is necessary, 
albeit complicated.780 He highlights this theory in examining the challenges to 
institutionalize the role the HSC (created to develop policies and integrate U.S. homeland 
security institutions) with the work of the NSC since the roles are distinct and yet aligned. 
He also argues that homeland security fundamentally differs from national security in that 
states and localities play the leading role in many homeland security missions, as opposed 
to federal agencies that make “vertical” integration,781 as well as “horizontal” 
integration”782—difficult.783  
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Defending the nation against terrorism can and should relate to other foreign 
policy objectives, such as controlling WMD. This new framework will support 
nonproliferation by including tools from the counterterrorism world and vice versa. This 
challenge is apparent, in not just overall security policies, but can be applied in the case 
of non-proliferation policies, specifically, especially when looking at the implementation.  
National security policies rarely depend on state and local implementation; 
DoD and other federal departments carry them out. In contrast, state and 
local governments (and police, firefighters, public health workers, and 
other professionals they employ) are absolutely vital to homeland security, 
making vertical coordination more important as a consequence.784 
John Brennan, President Obama’s key advisor for on homeland security issues has 
echoed concerns in the need to be able to use “the full range of our foreign policy tools” 
in dealing with threats to U.S. national security and the terrorism.785  
He explains the strategy by saying that the approach recognizes “that our 
counterterrorism efforts clearly benefit from—and at times depend on—broader foreign 
policy efforts, even as our Counter-Terrorism strategy focuses more narrowly on 
preventing terrorist attacks against our interests, at home and abroad.”786 In explaining 
the 2011 counterterrorism strategy, John Brenan emphasized the important connection 
between counterterrorism strategies.  
Our strategy recognizes that our counterterrorism efforts clearly benefit 
from—and at times depend on—broader foreign policy efforts, even as 
our CT strategy focuses more narrowly on preventing terrorist attacks 
against our interests, at home and abroad.”787 
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4. Bridging the Gap 
It will take cooperation, collaboration, and approaches across multiple 
disciplines—and between countries—to develop a “web of preparedness” to protect 
dangerous proliferation that may lead to terrorism. The current challenges require a 
rethinking of terrorism and efforts to prevent it. The task will require the combined 
efforts of the foreign policy, nonproliferation, and terrorism specialists in government 
and academia. Strengthening the linkages will help to close gaps and to leverage fully all 
the resources possible. Strategic thinking in the post-Cold War era must account for the 
unconventional power of non-state actors willing to violate norms and who may be 
immune to traditional tools of diplomacy and enforcement.788 Efforts, such as UN 
Resolution 1540 and the PSI, are a significant start. However, these and subsequent 
efforts should examine the relations of these activities, not only within an international 
framework, but also within the activities of national efforts of DHS and DNDO in a way 
that drive the U.S. government closer to a global strategy for counterproliferation, instead 
of stovepiped domestic and international strategies.  
A true overhaul of counterproliferation policy would aim to eradicate the threat of 
nuclear terrorism, but would also include heavier emphasis on chemical and biological 
threats and would aim to contain the scale of the most likely forms of bioterrorism and 
heavily monitored chemical supplies. It would revamp outdated arms control agreements, 
expand counterproliferation programs in the Pentagon and DHS, and improve the way 
intelligence on WMD is collected and analyzed. Finally, it would develop coherent 
strategies for heading off the most pressing nuclear proliferation threats: Iran, North 
Korea, and Pakistan (and the quickly escalating Syrian threat) where the transfer of 
materials expertise, or lack of control, may occur. Solutions must be multi-layered and 
account for multiple contingencies or scenarios not yet fully plan for or recognized. 
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The benefits to linking the areas of non-proliferation and counterterrorism are 
varied and include the following.  
• Leveraging all tools of international power—legal, economic, diplomatic, 
and security against a common threat  
• Strengthening norms by galvanizing the international community against a 
common goal with consistent policies 
• Shoring up gaps that can be exploited by terrorists; thereby, preventing 
potential terrorist (and or rogue nations) from slipping through the cracks 
of international law or export controls 
• Securing source materials and weaponry across the globe making it highly 
difficult for terrorists to be successful and may even dissuade terrorists 
from pursuing WMD materials 
• Providing better information sharing protocols to better prevent or 
interdict WMD threats 
• Enhancing this nation’s overall ability to detect and disrupt and terrorist 
and proliferation networks involved in illicit activity 
• Augment this country’s overall ability disrupt terrorists attacks of all types 
in the planning stage 
B. PROLIFERATION THROUGH THE TERRORIST’S EYES: 
LEVERAGING OPPORTUNITIES TO DEFEAT THE ENEMY  
1. The New “Red Line” 
The use of the term “red line” is not new in WMD circles, especially in the field 
of nonproliferation. The red line represents key milestones in the development of a 
weapons program. Proliferation is a process by which countries move closer to, or away 
from, different thresholds toward developing the bomb. Recent years have witnessed the 
steady erosion of nonproliferation “red lines” as the United States has been unable to 
prevent hostile proliferators from crossing key technological thresholds in the nuclear 
area. North Korea’s nuclear test and Iran’s uranium enrichment are prominent cases in 
point. Countries will not necessarily stay solidly in one state of “nuclear latency” or 
another, as internal and external conditions that fuel or suppress proliferation may change 
over time.789 As “lines are drawn,” countries may progress from exploring a program, to 
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building a technical capability, to the enrichment of fuel, to weaponsization, and finally, 
to the testing of a weapon.  
Recently, President Obama has used the term in regards to Syria. In the summer 
of 2012, Barack Obama talked about “red lines” for Syria’s chemical weapons.790 In a 
press conference, the President warned Syria’s leader, Bashar Assad, that the United 
States was prepared to act if Assad began to move his chemical weapons as a precursor to 
their use. “We cannot have a situation where chemical or biological weapons are falling 
into the hands of the wrong people.”791 He added, “A red line for us is we start seeing a 
whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being utilized.”792 
Perhaps, red lines are not useful as the public prophetic pronouncements of action 
as of late. The concept of red lines may be most useful in helping to determine the real 
capability of a terrorist group’s program and its ability to pose a threat. Being able to 
decipher intent (i.e., desire) from an actual capability by understanding its ability 
technological and logistical ability to develop program may be useful in intelligence 
circles. The understanding of a group in the process is key to being able to focus the 
intelligence community’s attention to the clear and present threat by focusing on those 
truly pursing WMD capabilities. 
2. Interrupting the Chain of Causation 
Grahm Allison’s famous quote stated, “It is a basic matter of physics: without 
fissile material, you can’t have a nuclear bomb. No nuclear bomb, no nuclear 
terrorism.”793 While technically accurate, and highlighting the single biggest effort to 
stop the threat, it fails to examine other opportunities to stop attack and relies solely on a 
single step in the process. It also leaves out the chemical materials that have different 
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control systems and very legitimate uses on the marketplace. By adopting a single point-
of-failure (or success) strategy, the chances for intervention are limited.794 The 
motivations of terrorist and the opportunities created by globalization are too great to put 
all WMD efforts in a single strategy. 
In his book, On Nuclear Terrorism, Michael Levi discusses his theory that 
underlying his concept of defense as a system is the premise that for a defense against 
nuclear terrorism to be effective, it only needs to succeed at one stage in the terrorist 
chain of events.795 In contrast, the terrorist must successfully complete each step in the 
plot to acquire fissile material or an intact nuclear explosive, fabricate a nuclear weapon, 
deliver the weapon to the target, and detonate the explosive.796 Although any element or 
layer of defense may be relatively ineffectual, Levi argues that a carefully conceived and 
integrated, multilayered defense stands a much better chance of obstructing a nuclear 
attack than may at first appear to be the case.797 
This approach leads Levi to what he calls “Murphy’s Law of Nuclear Terrorism,” 
what can go wrong (from a terrorist’s perspective) might well go wrong.798 In other 
words, understanding the various ways in which terrorists might fail provides insights 
and potential tools for increasing the odds of terrorist failure. This perspective, in turn, 
suggests the importance of understanding both terrorist capabilities and their attitudes 
toward risk and failure. Although any element or layer of defense may be relatively 
ineffectual, Levi argues that a carefully conceived and integrated, multilayered defense 
stands a much better chance of obstructing a nuclear attack than may at first appear to be 
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the case.799 “Levi’s study adopts a systems analysis perspective to demonstrate the power 
of an integrated, multilayered defense.”800  
Identifying these vulnerabilities and potential for failure provides an easier path to 
identify prevention tools to increase the odds of terrorist failure. A disruption to any one 
of the steps in the chain could make a terrorist WMD plot susceptible to detection; thus, 
giving multiple opportunities to stop a potential plot. These defensive steps should be 
thought about in the context of the nonproliferation framework to identify innovative 
comprehensive measures. This perspective, in turn, suggests the importance of 
understanding both terrorist capabilities and their attitudes toward risk and failure. Doing 
so may help develop more effective deterrents in the non-proliferation and 
counterterrorism regimes.  
Chapter IV of this thesis includes an examination of the seven steps necessary for 
a terrorist group to undertake successfully to execute a nuclear attack including possible 
opportunities created by globalization for terrorists to exploit should they choose to 
pursue WMD terrorism. However, those same seven steps allow opportunities to defeat 
terrorism in each individual step of the process to maximize impact on prevention.801 By 
looking closely at the nuclear “chain of terror,” it is possible to determine at what point to 
apply risk reduction measures and defensive strategies most effectively;802 essentially, 
completing the cycle of motive, mean, and opportunity. By interrupting that cycle, an 
attack is either defeated by interdiction and enforcement or by dissuading them from 
attempting to cross the “red line.”  
This section revisits the seven steps to a terrorist attack and looks at how to apply 
measures that may mitigate and stop an attack.  
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• Steps 1 and 2 
• The terrorist group must decide to embrace violence to achieve its 
goals  
• The group must then choose to acquire CBRN weapons to advance 
its objectives 
While certainly not limited to WMD terrorism, it is crucial to continue to bolster 
knowledge of how jihadits use the Internet to recruit and radicalize. Analysts must build a 
better understanding of why groups would choose WMD over more conventional 
weapons for attack. When conventional weapons are available, the analyst must ask why 
might terrorists choose this more technically complicated approach. Intelligence 
collection is extremely important at this stage. The distribution (intelligence sharing) of 
that information through the international network is also critical. One RAND report 
surmised, “These weapons may be desirable for certain groups, such as Aum Shinrikyo, 
that have “latched on to CBRN materials,” or are advantageous for groups that already 
have a reliable source of conventional weapons. Alternatively, some groups, such as al 
Qaeda, may believe that CBRN weapons also have an intrinsic value and therefore may 
be more inclined to acquire.”803 
A more accurate understanding of a group’s intent and capabilities will make it 
possible to allocate resources appropriately. Without discounting the WMD threat, one 
expert cautions the importance of recognizing the “nuances, distinctions and 
developments between and within groups that precipitate the use” of WMD, which is 
sometimes left out of the analysis of determining the threat.804 A better understanding of 
groups’ dynamics and decision making will help analysts to better understand where to 
focus concern and direct subsequent efforts.  
Terrorists’ innovation processes should be disrupted.805 Being able to understand 
the motivation of al Qaeda and other groups can help nations better disrupt, defend 
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against, and prepare for and anticipate terrorist attacks. Greater familiarity with the range 
of terrorist behavioral patterns, preferred types of weapons, and delivery methods will 
aide in the development of the most effective countermeasures and consequence 
management. By disrupting this transfer of technological information process, it is then 
possible to stop the escalation of technological thresholds needed to gain WMD 
capability.  
RAND studies the group dynamics to understand better what made for successful 
knowledge and technology exchanges as a way of determining vulnerabilities in these 
exchanges by focusing on how terrorists try to get around defensive technologies, share 
technologies among themselves, and prioritize their targets, gains or costs in operational 
capabilities.806 By preventing technology exchanges, and thereby, disrupting the 
technological innovation, terrorists are left with only desire to use WMD, but no 
capability.  
For example, governments have provided safe havens as incentives to get 
terrorists to participate in peace negotiations, but such safe havens facilitate technology 
transfers. Tightening porous borders can also help disrupt technology exchanges. 
Policies Should Disrupt Trust Among Terrorist Groups.  
• Step 3 
• The group must obtain the materials, such as chemicals, biological 
agents radioactive sources, or weapons-usable nuclear materials, to 
make CBRN weapons 
In recent years, notable progress in ensuring that stockpiles of the essential 
ingredients of nuclear weapons around the world are secured from theft and transfer to 
terrorists have ensued. In the chain of causation, the most difficult challenge for a 
terrorist organization would most likely be obtaining the fissile material necessary to 
construct an improvised explosive device (IND). Terrorists could attempt to exploit many 
acquisition routes most likely through an illegal purchase, theft, diversion. Or force. Or 
perhaps even by chance during a time of political turmoil, including one brought on by a 
coup or revolution. In 1989, South African dismantlement program (under the auspices of 
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IAEA) eliminated the weapons in the county and led to the subsequent treaty of 
Pelendaba and the government’s ascension into the NPT. Historically, the greatest 
emphasis has been on developing programs to secure the material through Cooperative 
Threat Reduction (CTR) programs, such as those in Russia that lessen opportunities and 
stop the threat at the source. The Nunn-Lugar program has successfully reduced the 
number of stockpiles and “loose nukes” in the former Soviet Union. As many experts 
have said, securing the materials offers the single strongest factor in preventing nuclear 
terrorism.807 These programs with demonstrated effectiveness must continue. Yet, 
despite these proven successes, these collaborative efforts have not been afforded the 
financial resources or political support they warrant.808 At funding levels of just over $1 
billion annually,809 the return on investment on the cooperative nonproliferation 
programs has been incalculable—not only in terms of weapons destroyed, but in potential 
terrorist incidents averted. 
A number of other promising approaches have reduced the risk of fissile material 
leakage, including the minimization or elimination of HEU use in the civilian nuclear 
sector. With the growth for energy, more so in the civilian sector, and may include a 
number of countries. Stricter controls are needed.  
Additionally, to deal with the problems of smuggling and terrorism, focus on 
programs directed at smaller quantities and facilities outside of weapons and energy 
plants is also needed.810 The Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security 
Administration (NNSA) plays a key role in the U.S. government’s comprehensive effort 
to combat terrorism. Since 2001, NNSA has doubled spending on nuclear 
nonproliferation programs and has received nearly $45 million in contributions from 
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seven countries.811 Among its successes, NNSA claims to have recovered 22,674 
unwanted or excess high-priority radioactive sources in the United States and upgraded 
the physical security at 598 vulnerable buildings around the world that contained high-
priority nuclear and radioactive material.812 However, while it is known that the United 
States is looking closely at security material within its own country, records of other 
nations internal efforts are inconsistent and varied.  
Were we able to secure all nuclear weapons and materials, there would be 
no need for a broader effort to prevent nuclear smuggling. Security at the 
source, including, most prominently, cooperative threat reduction, is the 
most powerful tool available, and would benefit from increased 
investment and attention. But it will never be sufficient alone.813  
Despite numerous programs to secure materials at the source, it is necessary to 
concentrate on the other points of vulnerability, as well to identify other opportunities to 
lessen the other factors. 
• Steps 4 and 5 
• Next the terrorist must acquire the requested technical skills and 
knowledge either through learning or buying the services of 
technical experts 
• Then the terrorist group must combine the knowledge and skills 
with the CBRN materials to build effective weapons 
As has been stated throughout this thesis, technical expertise is one of the greatest 
inhibitors to a terrorist group to obtain and launch a WMD. The technological threshold 
required for a successful attack is very high. Obtaining the necessary material and 
expertise and fashioning the two into a weapon is not a simple operation, even with the 
right material and equipment.  
Most analysts have assumed that to accomplish this task, the terrorist group in 
question would have to assemble a small team of specialists with expertise in such varied 
areas as nuclear physics or engineering, metallurgy, machining, and conventional 
                                                 
811 NNSA, “Fact Sheet: Working to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism,” September 9, 2009, http://nnsa. 
energy.gov/mediaroom/factsheets/preventingnuclearterrorism. 
812 Ibid. 
813 Levi, “U.S. Efforts to Detect Smuggled Nuclear Weapons.”  
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explosives. However, as discussed in detail in a later section, building the simplest type 
of IND, a gun-type device, might not require a large technical team.814  
Globalization is helping make the trade in materials, and know how possible. 
If the subject matter expertise can be prevented and protected, terrorist groups can 
be prevented from being able to execute an attack. The very trends driving 
globalization—improved communications and transportation links—can enable the 
development of extended proliferation networks that may facilitate the terrorist 
acquisition of WMD. Globalization requires that partner nations work together closely to 
prevent, detect, and disrupt linkages that may develop between terrorists and facilitators, 
such as A.Q. Kahn. 
The United States has made an effort to engage more than 16,000 personnel at 
over 180 facilities in the former Soviet Union, Libya, and Iraq to help redirect their 
talents to civilian pursuits while preventing the flow of WMD expertise to countries of 
proliferation concern and terrorist groups.815 Efforts to stabilize employment for nuclear 
personnel helps make them less vulnerable to financial incentives from terrorist groups 
and rogue nations looking to build illicit weapons. However, these experts travel and 
transfer data, another opportunity. 
In the planning stages of an attack, its members appear to travel frequently for 
training, planning meetings, or to conduct specific attacks. Thus, the cases816 
demonstrate that as a terrorist group expands the sophistication of its attacks, as well as 
its reach, it requires a parallel expansion of funds. Furthermore, these funds can be used 
to both sustain the terrorist group’s operational capabilities and help fulfill its 
organizational requirements.817  
                                                 
814 Charles D. Ferguson and William C. Potter, Improvised Nuclear Devices and Nuclear Terrorism, 
The Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, 2005, 7. 
815 NNSA, “Fact Sheet: Working To Prevent Nuclear Terrorism.” 
816 This case study “Dynamics of Terrorist Threat” specifically references Al Qaeda and FARC. 
817 Cragin and Daly, The Dynamic Terrorist Threat: An Assessment of Group Motivations and 
Capabilities in a Changing World, 56. 
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Finally, WMD operations demonstrate the group’s significant need for financial 
resources. Among other requirements, millions of dollars would likely be needed if the 
group sought to purchase fissile material, bribe, or threaten members of security forces 
guarding them, or attack a fissile material storage or processing site.818 The money it 
would take to obtain the expertise and materials is substantial, which gives intelligence 
and law enforcement communities a huge opportunity to identify activity since building a 
WMD capability—especially a nuclear capability—will take a substantial about in 
financial support. Also, policies, such as blocking payment transfers, can affect a terrorist 
group’s cost-benefit analysis of getting involved in technology exchanges.819 Finding 
ways to restrict funding to terrorist groups and to be able to identify activities based upon 
large expenditures will restrict terrorist groups. Large amounts of money provided in a 
lump sum do not appear to be a requirement, but rather, a steady stream of income.820 
Another key reality is that large sums of money will be involved if a substate group tries 
to smuggle, buy, and weaponize vulnerable nuclear materials or tries to weaponize 
biological and/or chemical agents.821 The capabilities, global reach, and financial 
resources of terrorist groups need to be controlled.  
While it is true that the steps 3–5 could also be helped by a state sponsor, for 
which the non-proliferation regime is designed. Bringing some of the tools used in 
nonproliferation to the counterterrorism mission is the critical gap in non-state actors 
operating outside the regime and with no diplomatic enforcement capability.  
• Step 6 
• The group must next deliver the weapon or weapons to a target, 
such as a populated city or a place associated with political, 
military, or economic value 
As with all terrorist attacks, this step perhaps creates the greatest vulnerability for 
terrorist and the greatest opportunity for law enforcement and intelligence officials.  
                                                 
818 Ferguson and Potter, Improvised Nuclear Devices and Nuclear Terrorism, 6–7. 
819 Ibid., “Getting Inside the Terrorist Mind,” 2007. 
820 Ibid. 
821 Michael Ryan Kraig, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 at the Crossroads: The 
Challenges of Implementation, The Stanley Foundation, October 1, 2009, 6. 
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This step involves transporting materials, or possibly a weapon, and involves the 
movement of terrorists. Monitoring known terrorist travel, export controls, and 
interdiction efforts, such as PSI or domestic detection, all offer a chance to intervene. 
Mistakes at this stage are easy and expose the terrorist to the outside world.  
Assuming that nuclear terrorists were able to acquire the necessary fissile material 
and manufacture an IND, they would then have to cross the next barrier to IND use. That 
is, they would have to find a way to deliver an IND to a target without being caught and 
stopped. The distance between the point of acquisition and the target could be quite 
substantial. If the loss of fissile material were detected, a massive hunt for the material 
would be launched, involving law enforcement and military personnel from many 
nations, assisted by nuclear specialists that would be accompanied by greatly intensified 
security over transportation links and points of entry. Every means of delivery, however, 
exposes terrorists to some risk of discovery. 
• Step 7 
• The CBRN weapon must then cause sufficient damage to achieve 
the terrorist group’s political, religious, or other motivational goals 
Steps 1–6 all involved steps “left of boom”—in other words, before an actual 
attack. However, the last step involves issues “right of boom,” or in other words, 
mitigating the consequences. Although consequence management of a WMD attack is 
outside the scope of this thesis, it is important to note that such an attack would not be a 
clear win for terrorists. If successful, for this low-probability event, such an attack would 
have far-reaching and devastating consequences. Although arguably a detonation would 
mean failure, a chance for success still exists by mitigating the consequences. Unlike the 
scenarios in a nation-state conflict in which a nuclear weapons could devastate and entire 
region, it is a commonly held belief among experts that an IND or other weapons 
(radiological, biological, chemical) could be contained enough. A well-planned response 
would help greatly in saving lives but would also lessen the impact of psychological 
damage of an attack that must include education to the public about the real threat and 
protective measures.  
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Any attack may also work against collective conscious that the use of WMD is 
not acceptable. Such as the response after 9/11, the consequences to Al Qaeda were harsh 
and severely limited its operational capability. Having a international coalition willing to 
take action may act to dissuade a group from pursuing this route. Having all the elements 
of international legal and diplomatic power in place to take swift action becomes critical.  
In conclusion, the assumption from the research is that a WMD attack is low-
probability, high consequence, and for terrorists, it is not necessarily a first choice and 
would likely face significant hurdles although the possibility cannot be discounted. In 
terms of potential proliferators, “there is little confidence that the other networks do not 
or will not exist or that elements of the Khan network will not reconstitute themselves in 
the future.”822 Instead, it is necessary to look at the opportunities for multiple points of 
failure, and enhance defensive measures both in nonproliferation and counterterrorism.  
The steps necessary to execute an attack are to create multiple (potential) points 
of failure for the terrorist. By reexamining the seven steps, it is possible to increase the 
opportunities to exploit potential failure by leveraging the totality of both 
nonproliferation and counterterrorism tools. “…..every step and every defensive layer 
that we put in complicates and adversary’s plan to be able to do this, and gives us other 
opportunities, to use other means…to try and identify that something may be 
planned.”823  
C. RECOMMENDATIONS: WHAT WILL CLOSE THE GAP? 
The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present. The 
occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise with the occasion. 
As our case is new, so we must think anew and act anew.824 
        Abraham Lincoln 
                                                 
822 Albright and Hinderstein, “Unraveling the A.Q. Khan and Future Proliferation Networks,” 2005, 
112.  
823 Quote by Vayl Oxford, in Steve Coll, “The Unthinkable,” The New Yorker, March 12, 2007.  
824 Abraham Lincoln, The President’s Annual Message to Congress (Concluding remarks), 
Washington, DC, December 1, 1862. 
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Many adopted security procedures form the baseline for protection against the 
new centuries’ threats, but are those that cannot require a paradigm shift in this nation’s 
approach to homeland security and national security. The recommendations put forth in 
this thesis are intended to address closing the gap between historical efforts in the non-
proliferation regime and emerging field of counterterrorism. Several potential solutions 
are presented to bridge the gap. 
1.  International Protocols Expanded beyond the Nation State Paradigm 
“Weaknesses, gaps, loopholes, failures, inadequacies, and ineffectiveness” have 
all been terms used to describe aspects of the multilateral treaty regimes’ attempts at 
nonproliferation.825 These shortcomings become increasingly more obvious with regard 
to non-state actors interested obtaining and using WMDs. New threats require 
international protocols to be tied to counterterrorism efforts and include the possibility of 
use by non-state actors. For instance, the NPT, the cornerstone of the non-proliferation 
regime has limitations as it is based upon the NPT three-legged approach of state-based 
nonproliferation, technology development, and nuclear disarmament. Likewise, the BWC 
and CWC make no mention of non-state actors. If these regimes are still the cornerstones, 
new vehicles to close the gaps must be either modified or found.  
These improved protocols must include specific and enforceable stopgap 
measures not included in traditional vehicles. If the international community’s primary 
response is to secure materials at the source, thereby shoring up supply side export 
control regime, then it must to be done in a framework that not only honors international 
norms, but also integrates the counterterrorism mission with the larger foreign policy 
mission. For instance, the Khan network was able to manufacture centrifuge components, 
which were eventually exported to Libya. The lack of export control laws in Malaysia 
meant the transfer went undetected. Proliferators are able to exploit a situation outside the 
                                                 
825 Shefloe, The Proliferation Security Initiative and United Nations Security Council Resolution 
1540: International Law and the World’s Recent Efforts to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, 33. 
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control of state-based authorities.826 Building a system that recognizes these non-state 
actors will allow for better mechanisms and diplomatic protocols to stop proliferation 
networks through intelligence, detection, and interdiction capabilities in the material 
control chain.  
The areas in which the current non-proliferation regime fails to remedy current 
threats is extensive. Terrorist obtaining materials for a WMD, porous borders, poor 
export controls, corruption in states in which WMDs may be trafficked, sold or traded, 
and proliferation from non-traditional supplier states, are all critical issues that fall 
outside existing regime structures. Leakages and transfers of knowledge and materials are 
still poorly remedied by the current regime and the obvious lack of compliance is also 
problematic, as is the treaties’ failures to prevent the trading, smuggling and trafficking 
of WMDs and WMD-related materials. As Iran and Korea continue to undermine 
proliferation, the focus keeps reverting to stopping proliferation among nation-states and 
less attention is paid to the new threats of sub-state actors. The gaps created by new 
threats will be better addressed by expanding the non-proliferation regime outside of the 
antiquated nation-state paradigm.  
2.  Fully Align Nonproliferation and Counter Terrorism Measures  
At the international level, flaws in the instruments developed to address WMD 
terrorism threats exist; at the national and regional levels, implementation of WMD 
security measures is inconsistent. Despite well-intentioned discussion to align efforts, too 
often that talk does not translate into concrete measures. Proliferation networks, ones that 
capitalize on globalization and criminal enterprises, fall outside the realm of traditional 
nonproliferation approaches but whose solutions should be considered as part of the 
overall non-proliferation regime. Since this situation may be the greatest existing gap, it 
is essential to determine how to best align both the nonproliferation and counterterrorism 
agendas. Are these two agendas being approached as separate parts under a single 
umbrella or parts of the whole?  
                                                 
826 Todd E. Perry, “The Growing Role of Customs Organizations in International Strategic Trade 
Controls,” in Nuclear Safeguards, Security and Nonproliferation, ed. James E. Doyle (Burlington, MA: 
Butterworth-Heinemann Publishing, 2008), 550. 
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This is not to say that a strategic national missile defense programs’ capabilities 
should be subordinate to countering a WMD policy. The overall national strategy has to 
articulate and link all aspects of government interest and policy relevant to the two 
distinct goals of countering nation-state WMD programs and countering terrorist use of 
CBRN hazards. 
Since 9/11 forced this nation to determine how to deal with these new threats, two 
distinct approaches are currently available, war and law enforcement. From a legal 
perspective, war and law enforcement are completely separate entities, governed by a 
completely different set of rules, neither of which is best suited for the current challenge 
of terrorism. Illicit WMD proliferation can no longer be separated from transnational 
crime, illicit trafficking, and the criminal consequences of the networked proliferation 
networks. 
The problem is a distinct lack of goal setting. Same fight, different tools, but the 
common goals must be defined. Fundamentally, it is necessary to define the strategy to 
counter nation-state WMD programs as distinct from the strategy to counter the terrorist 
pursuit of WMD,827 which is distinct but interconnected to common goals, and be able to 
leverage resources on both sides. Nonproliferation is really a continuous line along a 
single spectrum: failure at either end leads to gaps. 
3.  Fully Support New and Innovative Approaches Through Aggressive 
Implementation 
At funding levels of just over $1 billion annually,828 the return on investment on 
the cooperative nonproliferation programs has been incalculable. As many experts cite, 
cooperative threat reduction programs may be the single most valuable tool with the 
greatest tool available to stop weapons and illicit materials from falling into the wrong 
hands;829 however, with the current climate, it is negligent not to supplement the success 
of these programs with new and innovative measures and approaches.  
                                                 
827 Mauroni, “A Counter WMD Strategy for the Future.” 
828 Finlay and Turpen, 25 Steps to Prevent Nuclear Terror: A Guide for Policy Makers, 8.  
829 General research conclusion from Levi, Potter and Finlay and Turpen report. 
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Two innovative initiatives—The Proliferation Security Initiative and UN Security 
Council Resolution 1540—were developed post 9/11. These initiatives are certainly the 
most innovative to try and close the gaps. These measures were the first to recognize and 
codify the key link between WMD terrorism and nonproliferation but neither is without 
problems and cannot solve the critical gaps alone.  
Resolution 1540 tries to fill gaps in the varying approaches of existing 
instruments.830 Resolution 1540 requires states to “promote the universal adoption and 
full implementation, and, where necessary, strengthening of multilateral treaties to which 
they are parties, whose aim is to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, biological or 
chemical weapons,831“ and to “fulfill their commitment to multilateral cooperation, in 
particular within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the 
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and the Biological and Toxin 
Weapons Convention.”832 Although the resolution encourages and promotes universal 
WMD treaty implementation, states not yet a party retain their prerogative not to sign 
these treaties. The focus of Resolution 1540 is not the treaties per se but the resulting 
national legislation and regulations that allow taking action against non-state actors.833  
UNSCR 1540 provides a legal, normative, and action-based framework for 
moving toward technology governance rather than technology denial approaches in 
nonproliferation.834 Resolution 1540 calls upon all states to “adopt and enforce 
appropriate effective laws which prohibit any non-state actors to manufacture, acquire, 
possess, develop, transport, transfer, or use nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and 
their means of delivery.”835 However, effective legislation is core in controlling the threat 
of CBRN, and while Resolution 1540 is an important step toward this goal, legislation 
                                                 
830 Van Ham, and Bosch, “Global Non-Proliferation and Counter-Terrorism: The Role of Resolution 
1540 and Its Implications,” 9–20. 
831 Resolution 1540, Article 8a. 
832 Ibid., Article 8c. 
833 Van Ham, and Bosch, “Global Non-Proliferation and Counter-Terrorism: The Role of Resolution 
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834 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, UN SCOR 59th Sess., 4956th Mtg., UN Doc. 
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835 Resolution 1540. 
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still needs to be implemented since it seeks to strengthen national criminal law rather than 
to create international criminal law. By establishing these actions as international crimes 
and providing a framework within which state parties can exercise jurisdiction over such 
crimes, changes would be comprehensive, and unified system created for monitoring and 
eradicating the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, transfer, and 
use of WMD.  
As with many UN resolutions, enforcement can also be a problem. Compliance is 
an issue. Enforcement and implementation is still a challenge within the international 
body.  
The PSI is also a groundbreaking innovation in the fight against illicit 
proliferation but also requires more support from the international community to remain a 
sustained and viable international approach. The PSI is not without its critics who cite 
problems of non-transparency, frequency, and a lack of formal structure, as well as a 
U.S.-dominated venture with a concrete structure under the auspices of the U.N. These 
types of initiatives mark a significant departure away from old thinking but they will still 
need collective international political will and additional implementation to be sustained 
to be a successful part of the culture. As one legal scholar summarizes in his conclusion 
regarding the PSI approach of international cooperation:  
PSI promotes cooperation and intelligence sharing between participating 
members. The PSI should serve as a model for future cooperation in 
international affairs. It offers a way to avoid many of the weaknesses 
inherent in the structure of the Security Council. It promotes global 
security, cooperation and enhanced intelligence sharing by nation-states. It 
also strikes an appropriate balance between nation-state sovereignty and 
international law by preventing the spread of WMD by those who operate 
outside the community of nations.836 As threats from nations such as 
North Korea and Iran continue to undermine peace and security in the 
twenty-first century, the PSI’s lack of structure is its greatest asset. As the 
United Nations struggles to enhance its effectiveness, the PSI offers an 
                                                 
836 Emphasis added. 
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example of international cooperation by nation-states without the 
politicization and bureaucracy so prevalent in the global body today.837 
Even though today these two international collective agreements are innovative in 
dealing with the proliferation threat relative to non-state actors, they require continued 
international focus, and cooperation. Sustainability is also important. More measures 
need to be introduced to close gaps.  
4.  Enhanced Detection and Interdiction to Support Source Security 
Efforts 
Securing materials at the source may be the most effective tool in preventing the 
transfer of illicit materials but nothing is foolproof. Interdiction is a response to the threat, 
but a line of front-line enforcement must be developed. A new era is emerging, one in 
which customs and other frontline enforcement organizations are making significant 
contributions to slow the spread of materials, equipment, and technology required to 
manufacture WMD.838 Within a growing number of states, the knowledge of complex 
technology control lists developed by multi lateral nonproliferation export regimes is 
being distilled into information that customs and other enforcement officers need to 
identify controlled communities during their inspections. Domestic detection efforts must 
also be included in these efforts and tied to the global nuclear detection architecture. 
However, detectors, regardless of how plentiful, have limitations as well. The elements of 
greatest concern—HEU and plutonium—have a low remittance of radiation and are 
difficult to detect.839 The next generation needs to be able to decipher. Successful efforts 
will also require solid, actionable intelligence since searching for these materials can be 
like searching for a needle in a haystack. Law Enforcement may, by chance, stumble 
upon a nuclear threat but the odds of a chance detection can be multiplied if it is 
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 217 
determined what/where/who to be looking for. In short, intelligence multiplies the 
detection effort.840  
Detection of not just nuclear material or WMD substances, but also other tools, 
such as delivery systems and other related material, is also important. PSI exercises have 
increased national capacities for coordinated detection and interdiction of suspect 
shipments. In addition, with the United States having successfully negotiated ship-
boarding agreements with the countries whose flags fly on the bulk of the world’s ships, 
flag state consent for boarding to search for WMD has become an expectation for and of 
many states.841 Most importantly, the PSI has evolved and metamorphosed from a focus 
on interdiction of ships at sea, to inspection in ports, to carriage of WMD by aircraft, to 
disruption of financial networks involved or supporting such trafficking.842 PSI exercises 
have increased national capacities for coordinated detection and interdiction of suspect 
shipments—a novel approach to proliferation, and may for the first time, look into how to 
change the tactics of proliferators in an attempt to disrupt terrorists. Detection and 
interdiction opportunities must be created at all points in the terrorist/sub-state actor 
process to develop WMD capabilities.  
5.  Improved WMD Intelligence Analysis 
Intelligence analysis for WMD threats must be improved. Iraq demonstrated that 
sufficient intelligence was not available to determine imminent threats accurately. the 
U.S. government must declassify and demystify the information surrounding WMD 
issues. It is critical that expertise be improved so that analysts are better able to 
understand the indicators of illicit activity to include building bridges with the scientific 
community. Finally, intelligence analysis must focus on whether terrorist groups have the 
capability to develop and launch a WMD attack, not just intent. To do so, analysts must 
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fully understand the indicators and thresholds of WMD. Proliferation networks operate 
like companies.843 They must be capable of coordinating a series of logistic, financial 
and technical functions.844 Analysts must understand these networks.  
The intelligence community will be most effective at combating chemical, 
biological, and nuclear threats if it works in concert with non-traditional government 
partners. Legal and regulatory regimes can help enable better intelligence gathering and 
disrupt proliferation-related activity.845 Better global intelligence on international exports 
are needed to ensure that contraband items are not being smuggled. 
The Robb-Silberman Commission demonstrated substantial evidence that 
information flows between the federal level and the state, local, and tribal levels—both 
upward and downward—are not yet well coordinated.”846 The finding included problems 
not just between nations but also within U.S. borders. As more domestic federal, state and 
local agencies are brought on board with the detection mission, more has to be done.  
As the Khan network expanded over many different countries, an effective 
intelligence sharing system should have been implemented. Improving global 
proliferation intelligence should be a basic requirement if the intelligence community 
seeks to stop proliferators like Khan’s network. Due to concerns generated after 9/11, the 
exchange of intelligence data is improving. However, more formalization is needed 
among cooperating states. Without good intelligence, initiatives, such as the PSI aimed at 
combating proliferation, cannot be successful. Nor can issues aimed at detection since 
trying to find a single source without having some indication as to where to look will 
most likely be fruitless.  
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Intelligence is important not just in terms of terrorists but also in terms of threats 
and vulnerabilities, such as which countries may have the largest or most unsecured 
stockpiles, which nations may be most susceptible to political instability; these nations 
may be more likely to cooperate or support terrorist seeking capabilities.  
In a survey on non-proliferation efforts, intelligence sharing was seen as a key 
nonproliferation tool by almost all the states surveyed.847 (In fact, every state but Iran 
recognized it as a high or moderate priority848) The problem, however, lies in the 
modalities of cooperation, the number of parties involved, and the manner in and extent 
to which multinational institutions participate in the process.849 Thus, although many 
countries traditionally have voiced support for the principle of intelligence sharing on 
nonproliferation matters, it has proved difficult to implement in practice.  
Intelligence regarding WMD trafficking has not kept precedent with that of 
intelligence sharing to combat other conventional forms of terrorism.850 The record to 
date, however, is inconsistent at best, and intelligence sharing among international 
organizations with responsibility for nonproliferation does not appear to be much better. 
Although the growing recognition of the threat posed by non-state actors may “remove 
some barriers to effective intelligence sharing, it remains to be seen how broad-based or 
enduring such collaboration will be.851  
6.  Efforts to Mitigate the Possibility of WMD Terrorism Should Look at 
the “Chain of Terror” to Determine Where to Most Effectively Apply 
Risk Reduction Measures 
Opportunities can be maximized by looking at them across the spectrum to 
prevent, interdict, and secure sources. This risk increases the demands that must be 
placed on security measures for materials at all stages of their use, i.e., production, 
                                                 
847 Scott Parrish and William C. Potter, “Nuclear Threat Perceptions and Nonproliferation Responses: 
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848 Ibid. 
849 Ibid. 
850 Ibid., 25. 
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processing, transportation, and storage, in research reactors, as well as weapons facilities. 
More must be done preclude terrorists from obtaining materials and components to build 
WMD. States must eliminate any possibility that terrorists will acquire sufficient 
materials to build a bomb or successfully attack or take over a facility containing 
weapons or materials. By determining the steps a terrorist must take to pull off an attack 
successfully, nonproliferation can be better applied across the entire non-
proliferation/counterterrorism spectrum. Building even a crude bomb or delivery system 
of a WMD is complicated and takes many steps and technological capabilities. It is 
necessary to see these as opportunities. Nations have been prevented from actually 
becoming weapons states by stopping them at the critical red line of proliferation. How 
terrorists view this situation needs to be determined to stop them by preventing hostile 
proliferators from crossing key technological thresholds in the nuclear area. Efforts must 
be focused not just on the components of weaponry but also on expertise by securing 
human capital and expertise, and not just the weapons themselves. 
Also critical is deciphering non-state threats, state strategies, and state-focused 
strategies to counter non-state threats. It is also essential to distinguish between three 
categories of countries: active sponsors, passive sponsors, and weak or failing states 
lacking the governmental capacity to control either their territories or sensitive WMD-
related technologies and materials.  
7.  Biological and Chemical Threats Need to Reach Parity with the 
Emphasis Placed on Nuclear Threats 
Despite many recent reports, which cite chemical or biological terrorism as the 
greatest concern,852 much greater emphasis is placed upon nuclear threats. In fact, in 
reviewing the threats and programs across the spectrum of WMD threats, the 
predominance of literature and program implementation focuses on nuclear threats rather 
than chemical or biological.853 The majority of attention is on the nuclear threat and 
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destabilizing effect of nuclear proliferation but “the threat from the proliferation of 
materials and technologies that could contribute both existing and prospective biological 
and chemical weapons programs is real.”854  
Beyond HEU or plutonium, the dual-use materials, technologies, expertise, and 
equipment required to make dangerous biological and chemical agents, are largely 
indistinguishable from those needed for “normal” scientific advancement, research, and 
commercial activities.855 Thus, export and border (customs) controls will have limitations 
in detecting truly non-state, transnational threats of extremist terrorism. Making detection 
of chemical and biological threats is just as critical but less straight forward.  
If the United States wants to lead the international community on this issue, it 
must effectively re-engage its international efforts to halt proliferation through treaties in 
the area of biological and chemical weapons. The United States should either re-enter the 
BWC or actively speak out to begin efforts to develop a replacement treaty that better 
supports legitimate pharmaceutical industry concerns for proprietary protections.  
Today’s biothreats are “agile and globally accessible biotechnologies.”856 
Biosecurity is unique in that it calls for a concerted mitigation effort on the part of 
numerous communities of interest—all of which are quite disparate, despite the common 
goals.857 To fight biological threats, the nature of the threats—natural, unintended or 
intended—may be indistinguishable; therefore, perhaps the most important defense or 
preventive measure is the build-up of effective, resilient, and well-funded public health 
systems, including prevention and response infrastructure and national coordination with 
the World Health Organization.858 Due to the transient nature of biological threats, risk 
management and mitigation measures must be coordinated across national boundaries. 
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Like the BWC, the CWC is also a protocol in need of update. While it can be 
argued that the CWC has already done a great deal to suppress, if not outright eliminate, 
the illegal production and use of chemical weapons, it also bans the “development, 
production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons by members signatories” and also 
requires the destruction of all chemical weapons stockpiles and production facilities.859 
However, like most the other NPT and BWC, it does not adequately address today’s non-
state and sub-state actor threats. The CWC specifically addresses traditional chemical 
warfare agents, but does nothing about agents developed during the latter years of the 
Cold War or toxic industrial chemicals capable of easy weaponization for use by terrorist 
organizations.  
Threats and agreements to regulate trading better are needed. Since the CWC 
extends its provisions to the civilian sector, the impact of inspections, reporting 
requirements, and export controls on commercial enterprise raises concerns unique to 
arms control treaties.860 Potential loss of information, aka “trade secrets” is of great 
concern to private industry;861 therefore, legal trade and commerce must be balanced 
with measures to reduce the threat of piracy, siphoning for secondary sales to terrorists, 
or reduced casualties in the event of direct attack by terrorists against the mode of 
transportation. The global community needs to continue efforts worldwide to lock down 
precursor chemicals. Detecting illicit transfers of controlled chemicals may also prove a 
challenging task. Covert production of chemical warfare agents, and the subsequent 
manufacture of chemical munitions, are higher-profile activities, and consequently, more 
vulnerable to detection.862 
The potential threat of CBW must neither be overhyped nor undervalued. 
However, they must be paid at least as much attention as nuclear threats and the potential 
capability of terrorist groups especially given their early attempts to be used against this 
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country. The U.S. government planning scenarios tend to focus on those that envision 
terrorists using 10-kiloton nuclear weapons, large releases of anthrax and smallpox, and 
extensive use of nerve and mustard agents in heavily populated cities or other worst-case 
scenarios. These scenarios include the assumption of perfectly executed attacks using 
large weapons and fully weaponized delivery systems.863 It is also necessary to plan for 
smaller scale and less perfectly executed attacks.  
8.  Globalization: Changing the Questions We Ask 
Today’s world and the security threats being faced have drastically changed in 
recent years. They have changed not only because the threats have increased but because 
of the manner in which they are delivered. Terrorism must be fought against a new 
background of technology, information exchange and interconnectedness. The very 
questions that need to be asked must change.864 
The forces of globalization and the way criminal networks operate have changed 
the very nature of the threat faced. It can be argued that 9/11 was not the deciding 
moment of change; it was merely the public recognition of the threat. Perhaps the reason 
for the change was not Al Qaeda or the 9/11 attacks specifically, but was due to 
technology—because weapons formally restricted to the arsenals of industrialized nation-
states are now within reach of small states, and possibly, non-state actors.865 Now a 
terrorist can threaten the world’s greatest superpower. This reality changes the paradigm 
of the very nature of the threat and impacts how the tools needed to address it must be 
applied. How can the tools be applied on national and international powers to prevent a 
terrorist from becoming a WMD power?  
Organized criminals and groups will increasingly pose a threat to U.S. national 
security interests by enhancing the capabilities of terrorists and hostile governments. 
Organized criminal activities frequently involved either networks of interconnected 
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criminal groups sharing expertise, skills, and resources in joint criminal ventures that 
transcend national boundaries, or powerful, well-organized crime groups seeking to 
legitimize their image by investing in the global marketplace. The use of cyberspace and 
global financial systems, and political corruption have made it easier for them to hide 
their involvement, to thwart law enforcement efforts, and to create images of 
legitimacy.866 This new nature of this threat is flexible, dynamic, transnational, and 
networked, which is fueled by a global economy, as well as the economic realities of 
globalization. 
The questions and answers must change because the nature of the threat has 
change. 
D. CHANGING THE LEXICON OF WMD  
Finally, while not included as a formal recommendation, this author finds it 
necessary to note informally that consideration must be given to the lexicon used to 
discuss nonproliferation and WMD. In any subject, language is important and provides a 
way to relate to an issue, but when two areas of expertise use different language to 
describe, similar—or even exact—concepts, it can lead to confusion. Also, some of the 
language is outdated or ties to concepts of war and may not be appropriate to the newer 
counterterrorism issue.  
For instance, the terms NBC, CBRN(E), or WMD867 are often used 
interchangeably, although arguably they are not all the same. Not all terms include the 
radiological threat when addressing the issues, and will aggregate the radiological and 
nuclear threats; however, they are not the same thing; a gap that is important when 
examining policies targeted to source security and detection methods. Likewise, 
chemical, biological, and nuclear threats are discussed interchangeably but methods and 
issues are very different and require specific nuances, prevention, and detection 
strategies. Depending upon the researcher, nonproliferation may only specifically include 
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nuclear proliferation, or it may notionally include CBW as well. The Gilmore 
Commission deliberately used the term “CBRN” in relation to terrorist capabilities, 
because it did not believe that “WMD terrorism” was an appropriate descriptor.868 The 
report continued to note that not only does an agreement not exist across the U.S. 
government of what constitutes a WMD, an agreement on what constitute terrorism does 
not even exist either.869 Often the debate centers on not the means but the impact of the 
attack, and the argument is that WMD used by a terrorist would not necessarily involve 
mass casualties or be capable of inflicting “mass destruction” on the level to justify 
WMD. One expert recommends, “disassociating the term “WMD” from the word 
“terrorism,”“ because it would “immeasurably improve the effectiveness of a “counter-
WMD terrorism” strategy.870  
In an article, Albert Mauroni clarifies his use of the terms, “NBC weapons as 
those weapons developed by nation-states for use on the battlefield to cause significant 
casualties,” while “CBRN materials involve the use of improvised devices by terrorists, 
but not necessarily in quantities to cause mass casualties.”871 However, this definition is 
not agreed upon nor consistent within the literature. While this author takes the time to 
define his application of these definitions, most writers, experts, and government reports 
may not. Definitions for WMD’s are applied not consistently applied throughout the 
literature. Likewise, terms associated with nonproliferation fail to translate and align with 
terms now more associated with counterterrorism missions. Consistency is important to 
bring a common understanding among experts and policy makers. 
This language is very important to link to the world of academics in which so 
much of the debate on nonproliferation occurs. Academia plays a critical role in moving 
these concepts forward and redefining how to link the issues of non-state actors and 
counterproliferation issues into the filed of nonproliferation. However, in reviewing the 
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literature, it is clear that these concepts so far do not play a dominant role in the literature. 
For instance, during a two-week intensive class for Nuclear Threats and Policy, only 
three hours of the 80-hour curriculum were specifically dedicated to issues of 
counterterrorism, or non-state actors. Nevertheless, to make real headway, experts and 
policy makers in both fields need to be cognizant and inclusive of both policy areas.  
E. GRAND STRATEGY  
Years after the revelations of Al Qaeda’s efforts to obtain a bomb, foreign leaders 
remain unwilling to remove unneeded fissile material and bureaucratic hurdles to 
implementing or sustaining threat reduction programs, and are complacent about the 
threat. Diplomatic initiatives to reduce the likelihood of loose nukes could be more 
accepted if conducted parallel to a strategy that reduces the use of U.S. nuclear 
materials,872 which does not replace the diplomacy upon which non-proliferation regime 
is built. Sustained diplomacy with countries that have the bomb or bomb-grade fissile 
materials is an essential ingredient for implementing the review’s new guidance.  
The 9/11 attacks call for a rethinking of efforts of foreign policy and terrorism 
specialists in government and academia. Whether the response to terrorism is a set of 
individual counterterrorist operations, designed for specific circumstances or a general 
strategy applied to a variety of cases, it must be shaped in terms of a larger conception of 
American security and interest. Strategic thinking in the post-Cold War world must 
account for the unconventional power of non-state actors—risk takers who are willing to 
violate norms and who may be immune to military threat.873  
It is critical to accelerate the development and integration of deterrence capacities 
across the U.S. government. As the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism specifies, 
“the paradigm for combating terrorism now involves the application of all elements of 
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our national power and influence.”874 The application of those elements of power seems 
further advanced in the realm of defeating terrorism than in deterring  
F. CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 
It is clear that since 9/11, considerable progress has been made through these and 
other efforts to improve the security of nuclear and radiological materials, to strengthen 
control over these materials, and to expand the norms and measures developed to combat 
terrorism into the counter-terrorist realm.  
However, more needs to be done; on counterterrorism, as well as non-
proliferation grounds, to continue to strengthen the NPT by such actions as prompting the 
universality of additional protocol, by tightening export controls, and by addressing non 
compliance more vigorously. It is also essential to support the CTR, PSI, GTRI, and other 
initiative as this should have not only nonproliferation but also counterterrorism benefits. 
In addition, states should support IAEA efforts to address nuclear terrorism, as well as 
promote the effective implementation/enforcement of Resolution 1540.  
Global approaches will likely continue to be the foundation for any actions, but 
additional steps will be needed to address new threats adequately.875 These efforts are 
important but as suggested, are only part of the picture (and probably not the most 
important) All these efforts can reinforce and will be reinforced by other counterterrorism 
and counterproliferation efforts, including possible efforts to deter, dissuade, and defend 
against nuclear terrorism. It is necessary to strengthen the regime and deal with outlaying 
problems, including non-compliance. All these efforts being set on national agenda have 
international implications and must be linked to the international framework. The 
proliferation regime change has to continue to grow and adapt to the evolving threat. The 
challenges require a multifaceted response by national governments and international 
organizations, which cannot be done without actively engaging and leveraging the non-
proliferation regime against WMD terrorist threats.  
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The normative and legal weight of the regime is important for counterterrorism, 
as well as nonproliferation, but it will not likely directly affect the behavior of terrorists. 
Preventing terrorists from achieving their objectives if they attempt to pursue WMD may 
deter or dissuade them as credible punishment. Absent that, intelligence is needed to stop 
and interdict threat, and to prosecute those found.  
Unfortunately, no matter how much the intelligence community is improved, 
WMD will most likely continue to pose an enormous threat. Intelligence will always be 
imperfect and, as history has persuaded, surprise can never be completely prevented. 
Moreover, it is unrealistic to expect spies, satellites, and analysts to constitute this 
nation’s only defense. As the Robb-Silberman report made clear, all national 
capabilities—regulatory, military, and diplomatic—must be used to combat 
proliferation.876  
The issues of proliferation and counterterrorism should not be considered 
separate; they should be seen as pieces of a larger puzzle. The hunt for terrorists and 
WMD proliferation networks should leverage the long-standing traditional diplomatic 
tools of nonproliferation. However, a multi-faceted, layered defense is needed to address 
new and emerging WMD threats. While no doubt progress has been made, WMD 
terrorism still seems as an afterthought on the global non-proliferation agenda. Case in 
point, was the agenda of the NPT Revision Conference in 2010. It seemed one success 
was President Obama’s nuclear security summit in 2010. However, following the 
international support and notional commitment to another meeting the following year, 
another conference has not yet been set. Moreover, despite increased warning that 
bioterrorism may be the most likely threat, it has failed to gain the attention that nuclear 
terrorism has. The chemical terrorism threat, although by far the easiest to execute due to 
fewer restrictions to agents, is only discussed notionally at the international policy level 
even though the available chemicals can be easily obtained on the open market.  
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G. AREAS FOR ADDITIONAL RESEARCH  
This thesis focused exclusively on the need to link two distinct fields in 
nonproliferation to bolster counter-terrorism efforts but additional questions require more 
research. One of the most critical areas is specific in regards to the implementation of the 
international framework—What would a broad defense framework actually look like and 
how would it be implemented?  
Additionally, more research needs to be done in the area of chemical and 
biological terrorism. In the WMD realm, a disproportionate amount of the research 
focuses on nuclear terrorism but what specific measure will help deter chemical and 
biological attacks? Will focusing on preventing or predominately stopping a nuclear 
create unintended consequences by pushing terrorists to a chemical, biological or other 
non-conventional “WMD”?  
Finally, in no way does this thesis adequately analyze the legal arguments 
involved with terrorist cases involving WMD or deal with the legal protections of 
terrorist subjects. Within the laws of war exist the means for accommodating the changed 
circumstances that global terrorism presents. Indeed, the manner in which events 
unfolded after 9/11 suggests that states moved ultimately to a position of applying 
fundamental principles of international humanitarian law to the unusual circumstances 
that unfolded.877 The events of 9/11 and their aftermath revealed complicated scenarios 
that do not fit easily into the traditional paradigms of the laws of war, including the 1949 
Geneva Conventions. Highly knowledgeable persons in the field have reached 
diametrically opposite conclusions about certain fundamental issues, such as whether the 
conflict with Al Qaeda constitutes an “armed conflict” within the meaning of the laws of 
war, or whether a person who fails to qualify as a prisoner of war under one convention 
must invariably then qualify as a protected civilian under another. The challenges of 
proliferation are complicated by the economic realities of globalization and its 
convergence with international trade.  
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Branches of the U.S. government continue to struggle to define the contours of 
constitutional and practical considerations for bringing national security cases. One report 
found clear evidence that criminal prosecution remains a vital piece of U.S. 
counterterrorism strategy. Community prosecutors suddenly found themselves operating 
under a new paradigm. The prosecution of a case was no longer the ultimate objective of 
an investigation; it was now simply one means of advancing the goal of prevention.878 
Therefore, the legal instruments involved to deal with terrorist subjects need to be more 
fully addressed.  
H. SUMMARY 
The challenges and opportunities for the future of the non-proliferation regime 
and its nexus with counterterrorism can be summarized by saying that while difficult, 
they do lend themselves to enduring nonproliferation partnerships to be formalized in 
international legal regimes and organizations. Only a few key proliferation threats and 
nonproliferation strategies on which there is broad-based agreement. For example, while 
Iran and North Korea are widely viewed as the most urgent state-level proliferation 
threats, major differences among states have occurred regarding the urgency of the threat 
and the best methods for addressing it.  
Divisions over old issues like the pace of nuclear disarmament and force structure 
will always exist; there is optimism that the international community may do a better job 
at making headway in a collective fashion in addressing new threats, such as non-state 
and the proliferation of WMD weapons capability. Preventing a terrorist or non-state 
nuclear attack within the United States involves more than the detection of the nuclear 
weapon. A larger system of deterrence, counterproliferation, and response activities are 
established to address the nuclear threat.  
The future of the NPT must include commitments within the evolving perceptions 
of proliferation threats after 9/11. Since it can function as one of the many lines of 
defense, the NPT must not be abandoned. Efforts that control proliferation should play a 
                                                 




role in preventing nuclear terrorism. To the extent that the NPT works to prevent an 
increase in the number of states with nuclear weapons, it decreases opportunities for the 
emergence of new weapon states with the possibility of inadequate security measures. 
The international regime is a basis to control materials and sensitive fuel cycle; namely, 
enrichment and reprocessing. 
While it may be too strong to say that the traditional, multilateral non-
proliferation regime is obsolete, it is at a turning point if it is to modernize itself to deal 
with the threats of the modern era. It appears possible that progress can be obtained in 
several important areas, both within and outside of the formal regime. Setting up an 
overall policy provides a means of coordinating intelligence actions, repression tools, and 
interdiction means both nationally and internationally, and therefore, appears as the only 
viable solution in the struggle against proliferation networks. 
The mission of the National Counter Terrorism Center is to “lead our nation’s 
effort to combat terrorism at home and abroad by analyzing the threat, sharing that 
information with our partners, and integrating all instruments of national power to ensure 
unity of effort.”879 Non-proliferation efforts are one of the core instruments of national 
power and need to be fully integrated into the counterterrorism mission. This viewpoint is 
a departure from the way these policies were implemented a decade ago but the dynamics 
of the WMD threats, and terrorism in general, require new more integrated and 
collaborative approaches.  
The new normal is an aggressive and sustained approach across multiple sectors; 
not to the exclusion of other threats, but rather to keep WMD low-probability. Best-case 
scenario is something worried about at the diplomatic level. To understand warning signs 
before the attack, “we write with the benefit and handicap of hindsight.”880 However, 
before an actual attack, will it be possible to adequately recognize the WMD threat? 
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Despite well-intended efforts, the diffusion of nuclear, biological, and chemical 
weapons remains a very real threat to global security. Without an integrated approach to 
securing inventories of WMD materials and expertise in the world, the United States will 
have failed to accomplish its top national security goal to keep the “world’s most 
dangerous weapons out of the hands of the world’s most dangerous people.”881 
In this second nuclear age, nuclear actors straddle a single spectrum of 
risks, consisting of states possessing the most advanced nuclear arsenals 
on one end, to terrorist groups wielding a single crude improvised nuclear 
device on the other end. The complex transactions between states, states 
and groups, and groups with other groups must be identified and 
interpreted in order to identify any clandestine nuclear weapons-related 
activity that is taking place.882 
        —Rolff Mowatt-Larrsen 
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APPENDIX A. SUMMARY OF NONPROLIFERATION REGIME 
Treaties 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) 
• Includes provisions to: 
◦ Prevent the spread of nuclear weapons: Articles I and II prohibit nuclear 
weapon states from transferring or assisting any recipient in the 
development of nuclear weapons, and prohibit non-nuclear weapon states 
from acquiring or developing nuclear weapons; 
◦ Establish safeguards: Article III requires application of international 
safeguards to ensure that peaceful nuclear activities in non-nuclear 
weapon states are not diverted to making nuclear weapons; 
◦ Promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy: Article IV recognizes rights 
to access civilian nuclear technologies under safeguards; and 
◦ Promote disarmament: Article VI calls for efforts to achieve 
comprehensive arms control and nuclear disarmament 
• Opened for signature on July 1, 1968 in London, Moscow, and Washington 
• Entered into force in 1970 with an initial duration of 25 years 
• In 1995, the NPT was extended indefinitely, with a review conference to be held 
every five years 
• Signed by 187 countries; only Cuba, India, Israel, and Pakistan are non-parties 
 
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) 
• Prohibits the development, production, acquisition, and stockpiling of 
bacteriological agents and toxins of types and in quantities that have no 
justification for prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful purposes 
• Countries must destroy or divert to peaceful purposes all agents, toxins, weapons, 
equipment, and means of delivery within nine months after entry into force of the 
convention 
• Signed on April 10, 1972 
• Entered into force on March 26, 1975 
• Of unlimited duration 
• As of June 1999, 162 states have signed the BWC, and 140 have ratified the 
accord 
 
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) 
• Prohibits the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, transfer, and use 
of chemical weapons 
• Each state is required to destroy, within ten years of entry into force, all chemical 
weapons and chemical weapons production facilities it possesses or that are 
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located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, as well as any chemical 
weapons it abandoned on the territory of another state 
• Opened for signature on January 13, 1993 
• Entered into force on April 29, 1997 
• Of unlimited duration 
• As of June 1999, 169 countries have signed the CWC, and 126 have ratified the 




Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) 
• Seeks to control transfers that could contribute to the spread of ballistic and cruise 
missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction 
• Consists of an export control policy and the institutional measures to implement it 
• Divides technologies into two categories: 
◦ Category I: complete rocket and unmanned air vehicle systems capable of 
carrying a payload of 500 kg or more at least 300 km 
◦ Category II: lower-risk, often dual-use, hardware and technologies, such 
as gyroscopes 
• Informal, non-treaty association, established April 16, 1987 by the G-7 countries 
 
As of July 1999, there are 32 member states in the MTCR, and additional states have 
pledged to abide by its guidelines 
 
Citation:  
Reprinted from “Nonproliferation Regimes At Risk” 
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation 
Monterey Institute of International Studies 
Occasional Paper #3 
http://cns.miis.edu/opapers/op3/appendix.htm 
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APPENDIX B. TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF 
NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
Date of adoption: 12 June 1968 
Place of adoption: United Nations, New York 
Date of entry into force: 5 March 1970 
 
(Text of the treaty) 
The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Parties to the Treaty, 
Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and 
the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take 
measures to safeguard the security of peoples, 
Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of 
nuclear war, 
In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the 
conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons, 
Undertaking to co-operate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy 
Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities, 
Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the 
application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards 
system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special 
fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic 
points, 
Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, 
including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States 
from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful 
purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon 
States, 
Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to 
participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute 
alone or in co-operation with other States to, the further development of the applications 
of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, 
Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the 
nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear 
disarmament, 
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Urging the co-operation of all States in the attainment of this objective, 
Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear 
weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to 
achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to 
continue negotiations to this end, 
Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust 
between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, 
the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals 
of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and 
complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, 
Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain 
in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with 
the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of 
international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for 
armaments of the world’s human and economic resources, 
Have agreed as follows: 
Article I 
Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient 
whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such 
weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, 
encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire 
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or 
explosive devices. 
Article II 
Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer 
from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or 
of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to 
manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; 
and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other 
nuclear explosive devices. 
Article III 
1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as 
set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic 
Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency and the Agency’s safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of 
the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing 
 237 
diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this Article shall be 
followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being 
produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such 
facility. The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source or special 
fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, 
under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere. 
2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special 
fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the 
processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon 
State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be 
subject to the safeguards required by this Article. 
3. The safeguards required by this Article shall be implemented in a manner designed to 
comply with Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or 
technological development of the Parties or international co-operation in the field of 
peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and 
equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes 
in accordance with the provisions of this Article and the principle of safeguarding set 
forth in the Preamble of the Treaty. 
4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the 
International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this Article either 
individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence 
within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing 
their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such 
agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall 
enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations. 
Article IV 
1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the 
Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for 
peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this 
Treaty. 
2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, 
the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological 
information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to 
do so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or together with other States or 
international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear 
energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States 




Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in 
accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through 
appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of 
nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the 
Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive 
devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and 
development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such 
benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an 
appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon 
States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty 
enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also 
obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements. 
Article VI 
Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on 
effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to 
nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict 
and effective international control. 
Article VII 
Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional 
treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective 
territories. 
Article VIII 
1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any 
proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall 
circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or 
more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a 
conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an 
amendment. 
2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the 
Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty 
and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the 
Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall 
enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the 
amendment upon the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a majority of all the 
Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the 
Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members 
of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it 
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shall enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification 
of the amendment. 
3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty 
shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with 
a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are 
being realised. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty 
may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the 
convening of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of 
the Treaty. 
Article IX 
1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the 
Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may 
accede to it at any time. 
2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of 
ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics and the United States of America, which are hereby designated the Depositary 
Governments. 
3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the Governments of 
which are designated Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty other States signatory to this 
Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, 
a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or 
other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967. 
4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to 
the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of 
their instruments of ratification or accession. 
5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States 
of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of 
accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any 
requests for convening a conference or other notices. 
6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 
of the Charter of the United Nations. 
Article X 
1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from 
the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this 
Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such 
withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council 
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three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary 
events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. 
2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be
convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be 
extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a 
majority of the Parties to the Treaty.1 
Article XI 
This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are 
equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly 
certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the 
Governments of the signatory and acceding States. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty. 
DONE in triplicate, at the cities of London, Moscow and Washington, the first day of 
July, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-eight.
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APPENDIX C. PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE: 
STATEMENT OF INTERDICTION PRINCIPLES  
Agreed at Paris, 4 September 2003 
 
The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is a response to the growing challenge posed by the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery systems, and related 
materials worldwide. The PSI builds on efforts by the international community to prevent 
proliferation of such items, including existing treaties and regimes. It is consistent with and a step 
in the implementation of the UN Security Council Presidential Statement of January 1992, which 
states that the proliferation of all WMD constitutes a threat to international peace and security, 
and underlines the need for member states of the UN to prevent proliferation. The PSI is also 
consistent with recent statements of the G8 and the European Union, establishing that more 
coherent and concerted efforts are needed to prevent the proliferation of WMD, their delivery 
systems, and related materials. PSI participants are deeply concerned about this threat and of the 
danger that these items could fall into the hands of terrorists, and are committed to working 
together to stop the flow of these items to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation 
concern. 
 
The PSI seeks to involve in some capacity all states that have a stake in nonproliferation and the 
ability and willingness to take steps to stop the flow of such items at sea, in the air, or on land. 
The PSI also seeks cooperation from any state whose vessels, flags, ports, territorial waters, 
airspace, or land might be used for proliferation purposes by states and non-state actors of 
proliferation concern. The increasingly aggressive efforts by proliferators to stand outside or to 
circumvent existing non- proliferation norms, and to profit from such trade, requires new and 
stronger actions by the international community. We look forward to working with all concerned 
states on measures they are able and willing to take in support of the PSI, as outlined in the 
following set of “Interdiction Principles.” 
 
Interdiction Principles for the Proliferation Security Initiative 
 
PSI participants are committed to the following interdiction principles to establish a more 
coordinated and effective basis through which to impede and stop shipments of WMD, delivery 
systems, and related materials flowing to and from states and nonstate actors of proliferation 
concern, consistent with national legal authorities and relevant international law and frameworks, 
including the UN Security Council. They call on all states concerned with this threat to 
international peace and security to join in similarly committing to: 
 
1. Undertake effective measures, either alone or in concert with other states, for interdicting 
the transfer or transport of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials to and from 
states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. “States or non-state actors of 
proliferation concern” generally refers to those countries or entities that the PSI participants 
involved establish should be subject to interdiction activities because they are engaged in 
proliferation through: (1) efforts to develop or acquire chemical, biological, or nuclear 
weapons and associated delivery systems; or (2) transfers (either selling, receiving, or 




2. Adopt streamlined procedures for rapid exchange of relevant information concerning 
suspected proliferation activity, protecting the confidential character of classified 
information provided by other states as part of this initiative, dedicate appropriate resources 
and efforts to interdiction operations and capabilities, and maximize coordination among 
participants in interdiction efforts. 
 
3. Review and work to strengthen their relevant national legal authorities where necessary 
to accomplish these objectives, and work to strengthen when necessary relevant 
international law and frameworks in appropriate ways to support these commitments. 
 
4. Take specific actions in support of interdiction efforts regarding cargoes of WMD, their 
delivery systems, or related materials, to the extent their national legal authorities permit 
and consistent with their obligations under international law and frameworks, to include: 
 a. Not to transport or assist in the transport of any such cargoes to or from states or 
non-state actors of proliferation concern, and not to allow any persons subject to their 
jurisdiction to do so.  
 b. At their own initiative, or at the request and good cause shown by another state, to 
take action to board and search any vessel flying their flag in their internal waters or 
territorial seas, or areas beyond the territorial seas of any other state, that is reasonably 
suspected of transporting such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation 
concern, and to seize such cargoes that are identified. 
 c. To seriously consider providing consent under the appropriate circumstances to 
the boarding and searching of its own flag vessels by other states, and to the seizure of such 
WMD-related cargoes in such vessels that may be identified by such states.  
 d. To take appropriate actions to (1) stop and/or search in their internal waters, 
territorial seas, or contiguous zones (when declared) vessels that are reasonably suspected 
of carrying such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern and to 
seize such cargoes that are identified; and (2) to enforce conditions on vessels entering or 
leaving their ports, internal waters or territorial seas that are reasonably suspected of 
carrying such cargoes, such as requiring that such vessels be subject to boarding, search, 
and seizure of such cargoes prior to entry. 
 e. At their own initiative or upon the request and good cause shown by another state, 
to (a) require aircraft that are reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes to or from 
states or non- state actors of proliferation concern and that are transiting their airspace to 
land for inspection and seize any such cargoes that are identified; and/or (b) deny aircraft 
reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes transit rights through their airspace in 
advance of such flights.  
 f. If their ports, airfields, or other facilities are used as transshipment points for 
shipment of such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern, to 
inspect vessels, aircraft, or other modes of transport reasonably suspected of carrying such 
cargoes, and to seize such cargoes that are identified. 
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APPENDIX D. UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL 
RESOLUTION 1540 (2004)  
Adopted by the Security Council at its 4956th meeting, on 28 April 2004 
S/RES/1540 (2004) 
 
The Security Council,  
 
 Affirming that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as 
their means of delivery,* constitutes a threat to international peace and security, 
 
 Reaffirming, in this context, the Statement of its President adopted at the Council’s 
meeting at the level of Heads of State and Government on 31 January 1992 (S/23500), 
including the need for all Member States to fulfil their obligations in relation to arms 
control and disarmament and to prevent proliferation in all its aspects of all weapons of 
mass destruction, 
 
 Recalling also that the Statement underlined the need for all Member States to 
resolve peacefully in accordance with the Charter any problems in that context 
threatening or disrupting the maintenance of regional and global stability, 
 
 Affirming its resolve to take appropriate and effective actions against any threat to 
international peace and security caused by the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and 
biological weapons and their means of delivery, in conformity with its primary 
responsibilities, as provided for in the United Nations Charter, 
 
 Affirming its support for the multilateral treaties whose aim is to eliminate or 
prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and the importance 
for all States parties to these treaties to implement them fully in order to promote 
international stability, 
 
 Welcoming efforts in this context by multilateral arrangements which contribute to 
non-proliferation, 
 
 Affirming that prevention of proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological 
weapons should not hamper international cooperation in materials, equipment and 
technology for peaceful purposes while goals of peaceful utilization should not be used as 
a cover for proliferation, 
 
 Gravely concerned by the threat of terrorism and the risk that non-State actors* 
such as those identified in the United Nations list established and maintained by the 
Committee established under Security Council resolution 1267 and those to whom 
resolution 1373 applies, may acquire, develop, traffic in or use nuclear, chemical and 
biological weapons and their means of delivery, 
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 Gravely concerned by the threat of illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical, or 
biological weapons and their means of delivery, and related materials,* which adds a new 
dimension to the issue of proliferation of such weapons and also poses a threat to 
international peace and security, 
 
 Recognizing the need to enhance coordination of efforts on national, subregional, 
regional and international levels in order to strengthen a global response to this serious 
challenge and threat to international security, 
 
 Recognizing that most States have undertaken binding legal obligations under 
treaties to which they are parties, or have made other commitments aimed at preventing 
the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, and have taken effective 
measures to account for, secure and physically protect sensitive materials, such as those 
required by the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and those 
recommended by the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive 
Sources, 
 
 Recognizing further the urgent need for all States to take additional effective 
measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their 
means of delivery, 
 
 Encouraging all Member States to implement fully the disarmament treaties and 
agreements to which they are party, 
 
 Reaffirming the need to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts, 
 
 Determined to facilitate henceforth an effective response to global threats in the 
area of non-proliferation,  
 
 Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 
 
1. Decides that all States shall refrain from providing any form of support to non-State 
actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use 
nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery; 
 
2. Decides also that all States, in accordance with their national procedures, shall adopt 
and enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit any non-State actor to manufacture, 
acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological 
weapons and their means of delivery, in particular for terrorist purposes, as well as 
attempts to engage in any of the foregoing activities, participate in them as an 
accomplice, assist or finance them; 
 
3. Decides also that all States shall take and enforce effective measures to establish 
domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons 
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and their means of delivery, including by establishing appropriate controls over related 
materials and to this end shall:  
  (a) Develop and maintain appropriate effective measures to 
account for and secure such items in production, use, storage or transport;  
  (b) Develop and maintain appropriate effective physical 
protection measures;  
  (c) Develop and maintain appropriate effective border controls 
and law enforcement efforts to detect, deter, prevent and combat, including 
through international cooperation when necessary, the illicit trafficking and 
brokering in such items in accordance with their national legal authorities and 
legislation and consistent with international law;  
  (d) Establish, develop, review and maintain appropriate effective 
national export and trans-shipment controls over such items, including 
appropriate laws and regulations to control export, transit, trans-shipment and 
re-export and controls on providing funds and services related to such export 
and trans-shipment such as financing, and transporting that would contribute 
to proliferation, as well as establishing end-user controls; and establishing and 
enforcing appropriate criminal or civil penalties for violations of such export 
control laws and regulations; 
 
4. Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure, 
for a period of no longer than two years, a Committee of the Security Council, consisting 
of all members of the Council, which will, calling as appropriate on other expertise, 
report to the Security Council for its examination, on the implementation of this 
resolution, and to this end calls upon States to present a first report no later than six 
months from the adoption of this resolution to the Committee on steps they have taken or 
intend to take to implement this resolution; 
 
5. Decides that none of the obligations set forth in this resolution shall be interpreted so 
as to conflict with or alter the rights and obligations of State Parties to the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin 
Weapons Convention or alter the responsibilities of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency or the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons; 
 
6. Recognizes the utility in implementing this resolution of effective national control lists 
and calls upon all Member States, when necessary, to pursue at the earliest opportunity 
the development of such lists; 
 
7. Recognizes that some States may require assistance in implementing the provisions of 
this resolution within their territories and invites States in a position to do so to offer 
assistance as appropriate in response to specific requests to the States lacking the legal 
and regulatory infrastructure, implementation experience and/or resources for fulfilling 




8. Calls upon all States:  
  (a) To promote the universal adoption and full implementation, and, where 
necessary, strengthening of multilateral treaties to which they are parties, whose aim is to 
prevent the proliferation of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons;  
 (b) To adopt national rules and regulations, where it has not yet been done, to 
ensure compliance with their commitments under the key multilateral 
nonproliferation treaties;   
 (c) To renew and fulfill their commitment to multilateral cooperation, in 
particular within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the 
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Biological and 
Toxin Weapons Convention, as important means of pursuing and achieving their 
common objectives in the area of non-proliferation and of promoting international 
cooperation for peaceful purposes;  
 (d) To develop appropriate ways to work with and inform industry and the 
public regarding their obligations under such laws; 
 
9. Calls upon all States to promote dialogue and cooperation on nonproliferation so as to 
address the threat posed by proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, and 
their means of delivery; 
 
10. Further to counter that threat, calls upon all States, in accordance with their national 
legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, to take cooperative 
action to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, their 
means of delivery, and related materials; 
 
11. Expresses its intention to monitor closely the implementation of this resolution and, at 
the appropriate level, to take further decisions which may be required to this end; 
 










States are responsible for securing their own nuclear stockpiles; 
requirements and approaches vary widely. 
IAEA 
Recommendations, 
Guides, and Assistance 
IAEA recommendations and guides are the closest thing that 
exists to international standards for nuclear security, but remain 
very generally worded. IAEA-led peer reviews and assistance 
are effective but have occurred at only a small fraction of sites 




The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material 
went into force in 1980 and covered only physical protection 
during international transport, and criminalization of nuclear 
theft. The amendment covers domestic physical protection and 
sabotage, but with very general requirements. Amendment has 
not yet entered into force as of Fall 2013. 
Nuclear Terrorism 
Convention 
Criminalizes nuclear terrorism-related crimes, and requires 
states to make “every effort” to provide “appropriate” nuclear 
security. 
UNSCR 1373, 1540, 
and 1887 
1373 legally obligates all states to take action against terrorist 
groups. 1540 legally requires all states to criminalize any effort 
to help terrorist groups get nuclear, chemical, or biological 
weapons and requires all states with such weapons or related 
materials to provide “appropriate effective” security for them, 
along with “appropriate effective” export and border controls. 
1887 calls on—but does not require—states to take a broad 
range of nonproliferation actions, including securing all nuclear 





Various programs sponsored by the United States and several 
other countries have helped improve nuclear security, 
consolidate and reduce nuclear stockpiles, strengthen 
interdiction of nuclear smuggling, and more. 
G8 Global Partnership 
Ten-year, $20 billion threat-reduction effort launched by the 
G8 in 2002, now has many contributors beyond the G8, though 
$20 billion target has never been reached; principal early focus 
on chemical weapons demilitarization and sub dismantlement; 
2008 summit agreed to broaden effort to global focus; may be 
extended at 2010 summit. 
                                                 
883 Adopted from Report: Bunn, “Securing the Bomb 2010,” 54. 
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Category Summary 
Global Initiative To 
Combat Nuclear 
Terrorism 
Ad-hoc cooperative initiative launched by the United States 
and Russia in 2006, now has 76 partners. Organizes workshops, 
exercises, provides forum for discussions, requests for 
assistance. 
World Institute for 
Nuclear Security 
Established 2008, voluntary forum for nuclear security 
operators to exchange best practices. 
Proliferation Security 
Initiative 
Ad-hoc cooperation initiative launched in 2003, focuses on 
interdicting illicit shipments of nuclear, chemical, biological, or 
missile technologies. 
Police and intelligence 
cooperation 
Ad-hoc cooperation on particular cases related to nuclear theft, 
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